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ABSTRACT
City Effectiveness in Initiating and
Controlling Urban Development
The Welfare Island Development
Arnold Joseph Yoskowitz
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.
Cities today are searching for better and more effective
tools to use in shaping and controlling development. Histori-
cally, cities have played a passive role, usually allowing
development to take place at the developer's initiative, rather
than actively initiating, planning and pursuing development to
meet its own perceived needs and goals. Only under urban re-
newal have serious attempts even been made by cities to plan
and control large-scale development and for the most part these
attempts have not been totally successful. This thesis chall-
enges the traditional belief that cities cannot be successful
in the initiation, planning and control of major large-scale
development.
Based on this Welfare Island case study, it has been demon-
strated that cities are indeed capable of taking on this. new
role, and with a good understanding of the development process
and wise-decision-making, can achieve their development goals
and objectives with a minimum risk and burden to themselves, a
viable alternative to haphazard and uncoordinated development.
I'n order to determine if the City was indeed able to
effectively plan and control the development of Welfare Island,
several crucial decisions will be carefully examined. Only by
looking at its ability to plan and control development through
the decision-making process can a thorough understanding of the
difficulties and constraints facing the City be truly appre-
ciated. The first crucial decision to be examined was what to
do with Welfare Island: a prerequsite decision entailing a de-
termination by the City of its goals and objectives for the
Island and the City as a whole. The next decision to be ex-
amined, once a determination of the program and plan were made,
was to determine who should implement the plan; the selection of
a developer to insure its accomplishment. The last two decisions,
how to transfer the land to the developer, and under what terms
the transfer should take place, including the roles and respon-
abilities of the City and developer during and after the develop-
iment period, end the crucial decision-making that will guide the
development's implementation.
Thesis Supervisors: Philip David, Visiting Professor
Arthur Solomon, Associate Professor
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
- 1 -
Cities today are searching for ways in which they can be
more effective in planning and controlling development. The
desire for new approaches stems from frustrating and bitter
experience in the past, and from the often sincere desire on
the part of cities to achieve social as well as physical
planning objectives. For too long city officials and planners
have seemingly stood by while their cities have been divided
and parceled out among developers. This passive approach has
resulted in helter-skelter construction with minimal concern
for the physical and social fabric of the city. 1.
Instead of planning urban development, cities for the
most part have concentrated their efforts in their traditional
area of responsib'ility: planning their public facility infra-
structure (streets and roads, water and sewer, schools and
libraries, hospitals, fire and police, etc.). Although they
have been able to achieve some semblance of planned growth in
this area Cfor often the provision of roads, water, sewer and
other facilities are prerequisites for development), their
activities hardly justify the appelation, "planning". The
placement of such infrastructure oftentimesis determined by,
developer plans rather than by predetermined city timetables
and strategies, and regardless of the importance of infra-
structure control, in order to fully achieve the type of social
and physical changes in the environment that may better reflect
the desires and needs of the city, more effective control over
2.
plans for large-scale urban development seems necessary.
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CITY'S PASSIVE ROLE
City officials, planners and urbanists have worked under
the pall of general public belief that although their mandate
was to control development, they lacked the sophistication
and expertise to plan for and actually implement it. The public
became used to seeing futuristic proposals that stressed social
goals and innovative hardware shelved after appropriate media
fanfare. It was accepted as common knowledge- that the planners
could only plan utopian dreams and could easily be manipulated
by the developers who controlled what actually went up. Whether
because they lacked confidence in their ability to plan and
control development, because their past experience had been so
negative, or because they felt hamstrung by legal and institu-
t: onal constraints, cities generally have been subservient to
developer initiatives, often rejecting, modifying, or approving
plans, but little else. The actual plans, timing and site
locaticns were more often determined by the developer's market-
Zng and financing considerations than by the city's perceived
needs or constraints, and at times, the city may have even felt
pressured to change local ordinances if necessary to accomodate
development proposals rather than lose out on potential tax
revenue, additional employment or needed housing, commerce and
industry. As a result of concessions such as these, the feeling
was prevalent that if left to the city and its planners, there
would be no development, or poor development at best. 3.
- 3 -
Even where city planning initiatives in development were
expected such as in the subsidized housing program, actual
practice contradicted expectations. The structure of the pro-
gram encouraged developers to acquire and control sites at
their discretion and then apply for subsidized mortage financing
under either the federal, state or sometimes city programs,(as
in New York City's case). Under the federal and state programs,
as long as no city approvals were necessary (in other words the
project conformed to municipal zoning and building codes),
cities had no voice in the planning, location, or timing of the
development. Only.under the city subsidy program was there any
degree of control, and even then, for the most part developers
merely brought sites to the city for routine approval. Although
the city might try to steer development along preconceived
guidelines, this policy was not always successful (e.g. the
principle of the city's not funding projects in areas where pri-
vate conventionally-financed fully taxpaying development was
feasible. This policy failed as rising construction costs and
private lender and developer resistance made it untenable.).4 '
Cities have tried, however, despite mixed results, to
change the typical developer/city relationship by using a variety
of programs, methods and techniques designed to give the city
greater control. Although some of these "tools" have been
utilized with some degree of effectiveness, they have not provided
- 4 -
cities with the kind of active control over planning develop-
ment necessary to achieve far-reaching social and physical
change. A brief look at some of the more commonly known tools
and programs will demonstrate this and will underscore cities'
needs for more effective methods.
REGULATORY TECHNIQUES
Building Code
Under the powerful building code control, cities were
entrusted with setting minimum standarcsfor regulating the
fitness of building plans and construction. 5' This control,
however, related only to physical adequacy in terms of promoting
health and fire prevention objectives, to the standardization
Crecently, using performance criteria) of building materials,
anad to the regulation and creation of minimum standards for con-
struction. The building code was never intended to control
actual development, although the harshness or leniency of a code
in regard to materials, construction techniques and standards
did considerably raise or lower construction costs in given areas
relative to surrounding localities, thus indirectly controlling
development by making construction so prohibitively costly as to
keep development out of certain communities, or so lenient in
others that developers were encouraged to build there. Building
codes, however, played no role in determining the developer's
actual plans and had no major effect on large-scale city social
and, physical planning objectives. Thus, whatever control cities
- 5 -
may have achieved over large-scale development through the
use of building codes was again of a passive rather than an
active nature.
'Zoning
The zoning ordinance or code, first widely introduced
in the 1920's, is the most common land-use control in the
United States and is cited as one of the most effective tools
utilized by cities. Besides regulating height, setbacks,
frontage, and side and rear-yard requirements (in other words
attempting to insure the uniformity of a neighborhood), zoning
also generally places limits upon permitted uses and densities
(such as the number of certain sized apartments per acre, or
standard lot sizes). Aware of zoning constraints of a given
area, the developer can then determine plans for his property
accordingly. If his plans conform to the locality's zoning,
however, or even if they fall far below the zoning maximum
permitted and possibly envisaged by the municipality, there is
no need for approval, since in most large cities, as long as
proposed plans are within the maximum allowances they are
examined and approved almost routinely by the city's plan
examination unit of the local Department of Buildings, with the
Planning Department not even involved in the process. Only if
the developer desires to vary in some way from the set maximum
must he apply to the City Planning Commission or Zoning Board
for a change in the zoning code. 6. This procedure on the
- 6 -
surface seems to guarantee the city some measure of control
over a proposed development. But even this semblance of city
control is not always effective since the Board of Standards
and Appeals (the developer's next recourse) may override the
Planning Commission by waiving some zoning requirement on the
basis of various criteria (initially including only physical
site constraints, such as unsuitable lot shapes, and only
later expanded to include such considerations as economic hard-
ship.) Thus the city's zoning control over proposed develop-
ment is limited in most instances, with the city able to inter-
vene only when a zoning regulation maximum not minimum is being
challenged, and even then, not always successfully.
The city's passive role of "kid-glove intervention" in
merely adopting planning and zoning standards and not assuming
more forceful control of development stems partially from the
artful legal balance between zoning and eminent domain. 7.
While zoning has been upheld as a proper use by a locality of
its police power (a residual power of the government to pass
laws in the interest of the general public's health, safety and
welfare), its use must scrupulously avoid any hint of confisca-
tory or capricious application which courts may interpret as a
taking, (or use of eminent domain, a city power which requires
compensation be paid to the property owner affected). Thus, a
careful line must be drawn to avoid trespass upon the Fifth
- 7 -
Amendment guarantee that no private property can be taken for
public use without just compensation and without due process.
This careful legal balance together with a prevailing national
prairie psychology (described as a "real antagonism toward anyone
who presumes to limit a man's right to do as he pleases on his
own property") has effectively limited city planning and has
made cities dependent upon developer initiatives. 8.
Planned Unit Development and Incentive Zoning
Cities have sometimes had success, not so much in planning
development but in controlling development to achieve planning
objectives. Planned unit development zoning for large-scale
development and innovative incentive zoning begun in New York
City are two well publicized programs that have enabled cities
to achieve a degree of developer compliance (in allowing the
city to examine and review their proposed development plans) by
using the carrot of increasing density.
The planned unit development, for example, offers more
liberal density provisions to a developer in return for his
agreeing to develop a specified minimum area (thus encouraging
private assemblage). The catch to receiving the additional
density bonus is the submission of plans and entering into nego-
tiations with the city, an optional process that many prospective
developers would rather not undergo, even at the risk of reduced
profits. While cities cannot force development to occur using
this zoning mechanism, the prospective developer wishing to
- 8 -
avail himself of the increased density must come to the city,
allowing the city to react more effectively with this tool than
it might otherwise. Depending on the city's negotiating ability,
it may be able to significantly influence the development plan,
although its traditional posture has more often been one of
retreat and compromise to insure a plan that would be acceptable
to the developer. 10.
Where these techniques have worked, clear development
pressures were evident. The city has no control, however, over
where those pressures may arise, nor over the timing, the actual
sites, the sequence of development, or how much of the district
ultimately will be redeveloped to match the planner's expectations.
Again, the city assumes the passiverole while the developer takes
the initiative. Even with incentive zoning, developers still
have the option (that may be realistically exercised) of ignoring
city design review, etc., despite the loss of economic advantages, or
the possibility of inflicting "damage" to the environment. 11.
Perhaps the greatest weakness then of incentive zoning is its
dependence on shifting market forces that can render incentive
zoning impotent, leaving anarea only partially redeveloped and
making planning for the remainder even more difficult.
Regardless of zoning's questionable effectiveness in
regulating or controlling physical elements of a development, it
does ofter indirectly determine the social composition of areas.
In fact, zoning has come under fire most recently from
liberal planners and other critics as the prime basis for
exclusionary practices, such as barring inner city blacks and
the poor from more affluent suburbs. 12. This control is
especially potent where densities are so low as to price land
and homes out of reach of certain income groups, or where
government subsidies are insufficient or unavailable to counteract
such devices as in some higher density areas. 13. Thus, in this
case, physical planning is indirectly a form of social planning,
since it relates to the free market the social composition of a
development. Even in those cases where private developers have
incorporated social concerns into their development plans (as in
Radburn in the Borough of Fair Lawn, New Jersey 14.
or where state supported development is built to permit lower
middle class families to afford apartment housing in the city,
the original social goals and concerns often become subverted. 1 5 .
Physical planning, if linked to government housing programs, can
be a form of social planning as well, sometimes leading to
homogeneous environments in terms of income or social class,
but generally not to heterogeneity or mixing of different groups.
CIf mixing within buildings occurs it is often low income with
moderate, rarely with middle income groups, except in state pro-
grams, and almost never with upper middle income groups. 16 .)
There is little control over private development, even if
social planning goals also coincide with the financial objectives
of the developer. When economic facts are altered, or more
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profitable opportunities present themselves, social goals
often lose out. The notable exceptions to the rule are the
examples of private philanthropic efforts in housing, such as
the Lavanburg Foundation or the well known Phipps Houses that
helped to coin the term "philanthropy and 5%", to demonstrate
17.
that housing for the poor was economically feasible. Where
economic return is not the chief determinant, often social
objectives are possible. 18.
City involvement in trying to achieve social objectives
directly has been more successful at least in one respect--
meeting the target group it was intended to reach through the
public housing program. For under this program, regardless of
its failures, the city's social goal of providing housing for
the poor has been achieved. Public housing is an example of
city efforts to achieve clear-cut objectives in both physical
and social planning, although the success of the program in many
ways has been questioned. Urban renewel is another well known
program that has attempted to achieve physical and social
planning objectives with similarly questionable results. These
programs will be discussed briefly.
GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS
Public Housing
Although under the public housing program, cities planned,
initiated and carried out public housing development on land
- 11 -
they owned or acquired, with or without the use of eminent
domain, the city's activity in public housing began largely
because the private developer abandoned this segment of the
market and because of the Congressional conclusion that the
private housing market generally could not provide decent
housing at affordable levels for the urban poor. 19. Thus,
rather than serving as a model of city initiative and effect-
iveness in planning development, this city involvement in
public housing was more representative of "negative" or last
resort planning for society's disenfranchised, the poor,
with the local city public housing authorities filling the
void left in the market by a lack of developer initiative in
this area. 20.
While public housing may be a valid test of the city's
development capability, it is certainly no measure of-its
ability to plan and develop livable environments, and if it is
considered such a test, the city has certainly failed. The
city's success in the actual building of public housing can be
questioned as well (critics contend that New York City for
example has not produced all the public housing it could, and
has lost federal housing funds in the process), with its
entrance into.the public housing field more a response to
considerable federal and state financial enticements than a
product of its own initiative in the area. Even with these
huge financial enticements to attract city participation,
- 12 -
however, many still have not and others were slow to get
involved.
The public housing program, however, with all its
imperfections, did offer cities a chance to plan and control
development. Many cities did fulfill their mandate to build
housing for low income residents, 21. although never in the
numbers needed or anticipated or in the original form intended.
Many cities found that they could never rise above the program's
inherent limitations and consequently could not control the
creation of livable environments. 22. The program, more than
anything else, has provided fodder for the widespread disbelief
in the city's ability to plan large-scale development, and has
had the effect of frightening some cities from wielding their
development capabilities in ways more consistent with their
social and physical planning objectives.
Urban Renewal
Perhaps urban renewal is the only program in which cities
did play an active role in formulating and facilitating multi-
use development plans, although as in the public housing program
it was always under federal and/or state tutelage, with huge
financial enticements to encourage city participation. Despite
these lures, the urban renewal program often had disastrous
impact upon cities, many times resulting in severe social and
economic dislocations as well as in destruction of neighborhoods,
wh43.e producing only questionable economic benefits. 23.
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The record of city redevelopment authorities in terms
of having their own plans implemented as the program initially
intended, has generally been only partially successful. Harold
Kaplan clearly documents in his work on urban renewal that the
redevelopers controlled actual development and that redevelop-
ment plans by and large were not carried out as the city had
originally formulated. 24. Not only was the physical program of
the redevelopment authority altered, but developers rather than
the city were able to control by indirection the social mix, as
only the choicest sites were developed for high income housing
with the worst sites relegated for public housing. 25.
Aside from the minimal control cities had over urban
renewal plans, experience has also proven the program to be an
expensive and lengthy one as well. Rarely were the initial plans
able to meet or given the chance to meet the acid rea-l world test
of economic viability, developer interest and political accept-
ability. Even if the plans survived initial feasibility studies
and were implemented, the time span from conceptualization to
completion of development took years--the average urban renewal
project taking over twelve years to complete.
Even in the "successful" urban renewal areas, the cities
generally folded in, if not at Washington's request then to
developer pressures, sometimes making great concessions in plan
concept in order to entice and keep developers. Many were
unsuccessful at attracting developers at all and even if they did,
- 14 -
experienced long planning and development delays. For whatever
reason, cities rarely seized initiatives and dealt effectively
with the development community in seeing through their plans.
The experience of the urban renewal program of the 1950's
and 60's with its concommitant dislocation and social upheaval
has had a chilling effect upon the public's confidence in
cities'abilities to carry off urban development. Whether or not
one agrees with the benefits derived from urban renewal, sub-
stantial human costs incurred cannot be qualtified, and it is
difficult to determine any policy useful cost-benefit analysis.
Nevertheless, the weight of evidence seems to indicate that the
benefits to some extent have been illusory.
However disquieting it may be for urban policy makers, they
must come to the conclusion that cities have been ineffective in
initiating and planning development. In some instances, their
ineffectiveness has been due to the passive role they have assumed
in the development process, while in others where they have
ventured into promoting, facilitating and actually undertaking
development (as in the public housing and urban renewal programs),
the results have also been far from satisfactory, despite signi-
ficant federal and/or state financial incentives.
By allowing development to occur at outside initiaties for
the most part, cities have lost numerous chances to actively
initiate, plan and pursue development in accordance with their own
perceived goals and needs. Regardless of what those goals and
- 15 -
needs are, whether they be to improve the lot of the urban
poor, reverse urban decline and the flight of the middle class,
better coordinate new development with the city's comprehensive
plan, or even improve the city's attractiveness, they all
ultimately lead to the creation of a better livable environment
for the city's present and future inhabitants. If cities are
to begin achieving some of their goals, they cannot afford to
remain passive and impotent in the face of developer initiatives
If cities want to be more effective in planning and controlling
development, they must, in addition to sharpening their existing
tools, develop new and better techniques and approaches. They
must take a more -active role in intiating and facilitating de-
velopment consonant with the city's interests (more so now given
changing federal priorities), and strive to overcome legal,
political and development constraints that have historically
hobbled them.
Perhaps the negative experiences cities have already had
in development are reason enough for cities to take a sober hard
look before jumping headlong into any policies that would require
their more active participation. City involvement has become
synonomous with long drawn out planning and development periods
and all too often with unsuccessful plans. As the city considers
new approaches, it must carefully assess the feasible limits of
its role. Not having expertise or knowledge of the development
process, and unable to assume the financial and entrepeneurial
risks and burdens involved, cities are reluctant to undertake
- 16 -
development themselves and may only consider doing so as a
last resort. To do so, however, would mean supplanting the
successful entrepeneurial developers that have proven their
abilities and willingness to assume the risks and burdens
of their role. It is the city's role and responsibility on
the other hand, to maximize benefits to the city in terms of
achieving its own goals and objectives, rather than allowing
developers to proceed at their own initiative and possibly
contrary to the city's best interests.
With the urban renewal and housing programs now halted,
cities are faced with perhaps the greatest challenge they
have ever encountered in this sphere. No longer able to rely
on federal and state financial enticements, cities will not
only have to deploy already scarce resources into the area of
housing and related services, but at the same time they will
also have to develop greater expertise and more effective con-
trol over urban development than they were able to do in the
past even with outside financial assistance (as evidenced in
the preceding brief review)--for cities must somehow continue
to rebuild and while rebuilding is taking place, cities must
plan and control the rebuilding effort if they are to achieve
social and physical planning objectives,
The thrust of this thesis is not to suggest a wide range
of alternatives to the traditional methods and tools that have
been utilized by cities towards this end, but rather to suggest
that cities can change the perception of their role in develop-
ment and can develop the ability not only to conceptualize and
- 17 -
prepare development plans, but also to facilitate and see
that development is carried out according to those plans,
with minimal risk and financial burden to themselves. In
order to examine this thesis, the case study method has been
utilized; an example of one city's deliberate attempt to
initiate and plan development is the focus of this investiga-
tion. Given the already-stated importance of cities' efforts
to control urban development, and given their unsuccessful
track record in this area, any notable effort to reverse this
traditional ineffectiveness is worthy of attention and thorough
examination.
The Welfare Island Development
The development of Welfare Island, an isolated and weed-
infested strip of land in the middle of New York's East River
is a major new town-in-town undertaking. The fact that the
development plan arrived at for this Island new town is extremely
ambitious in terms of its physical and social objectives and
that this new community is being built in the center of one of
the world's great metropolitan areas, makes Welfare Island one
of the most unique and difficult new town undertakings anywhere.
Most importantly, however, Welfare Island seems to be an
example of a development conceptualized, planned and facilitated
by New York City. Although the Island has been under City
ownership for well over a century, its history has been one of
neglect and underutilization; this despite the fact that New York
- 18 -
is one of the densest and most populous of cities and most
certainly could have utilized any available land for develop-
ment. The Island's physical closeness yet isolated access
preserved this anachronism. Only when mass transit plans to
the Island were developed in the 1960's did serious considera-
tion of large-scale development for the Island reach fruition.
Once the city had made the decision to develop the Island,
however, it was intent on doing so in a manner that would allow
it to initiate and carry out its own plans and objectives with
minimum risk and burden to itself. The fact that the develop-
nent is even off the ground and is proceeding according to the
city's envisioned plans, already sets it apart from many of the
city's previous unsuccessful attempts at planning and controlling
development. For this reason, Welfare Island may be an example
of a city overcoming its past ineffectiveness while trying to
exploit development opportunities in order to achieve the city's
perceived goals and objectives, and if so may serve as an
important model. For if such a complex project can be success-
fully orchestrated by New York City, other cities may similarly
succeed.
The chapters that follow will describe and analyze the
conceptualization and planning stages of development on Welfare
Island, with the main question being whether the City of New York
was indeed effective in planning and controlling the early
phases of the development, and whether its own perceived goals
- 19 -
and objectives were achieved in the process. (Because
the development is still incomplete, this study will not
attempt to look beyond the land transfer and development
negotiations that preceded the actual beginning of con-
struction.1 Several crucial decisions will also be care-
fully examined in this context in order to determine how
well the City understood and utilized the development
process to its own advantage.
The seven major decisions are: 11 the decision to
develop Welfare Island; 2) the identification of the City's
goals and objectives-prerequisities for (1); 3) the determina-
tion of how best to implement "the decision to develop"--the
creation of a "blue-ribbon" committee; 4) the determination
of the program and plan; 5) selection of a developer; 6) best
means for land disposition; and 71 determination of the roles
and responsibilities of the City and developer during and
after the development period--the terms of the land transfer.
Each one of these crucial decisions was a step in the develop-
ment process leading towards the achievement of the City's goals
and objectives.
Welfare Island takes on general importance as many cities
have similarly underutilized land within their boundaries.
Cities desirous of achieving social and physical planning
objectives have a responsibility to salvage whatever developable
land is left before the land is developed by private interests
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as has been done in the past in an uncoordinated fashion,
often meeting their short term financial interests but not
necessarily the city's. Welfare Island demonstrates a city
planning responsiveness to what may be the last frontiers
of urban growth, the underutilized land often found within
metropolitan areas, bypassed for sundry reasons, but now once
again rediscovered (through changes in transit patterns or
other improvements suddenly making forgotten land desirable).
These important new land resources mark perhaps the last
major opportunity for cities to demonstrate their abilities
to achieve social and physical planning objectives on a fairly
large scale. Cities can initiate these developments along the
lines they desire, or as in the past, private developers can
seize these opportunities for private gain generally without
regard to public goals and objectives.
Even if such a project is not applicable to some cities,
or if for instance they are unable to aggregate sufficient
quantity or quality of land for urban development, the approach
utilized and the practical lessons learned can nevertheless be
useful when applied to planning and development problems else-
where. The Welfare Island development provides a case study
demonstrating how the development planning process operates,
thus facilitating a better understanding of this process by
cities and their planners. As an understanding of urban
renewal was important to cities in the 1950's and 1960's, the
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understanding of how to utilize and leverage strategically
located and usable land to achieve city goals and objectives
may become the challenge of the 1970's.
One major purpose of this research is to focus in on
how the new breed of development planner must operate if he
is to take on new development initiatives and achieve his
goals and objectives. How can he utilize his planning tools
more effectively; increase his understanding of the roles and
needs of other parties involved (public or private developer
and lender), an essential component in implementing successful
development and in increasing his bargaining effectiveness;
and finally, how can he understand and utilize leverage points
to the fullest as bargaining chips and as a means of achieving
indentifiable objectives?
For planners by and large have not been trained to under-
stand development. A new type of planner able to operate
effectively in the world of development is necessary.
...the planner must be a professional of a
totally new breed. He must be a development
planner. He must see the big picture and
anticipate the year 2050 ... He must see the
region and the city as a whole, but he must be
able to produce, not land' use, but development
plans. He must understand fully the precondi-
tions necessary for successful development, its
economic and technical requirements and its
political context. Above all, he must have a
highly developed sense of priorities as they
affect the welfare of people...26.
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For if planners can understand the development process in
its fluid financial and market sense, this understanding will
increase their effective control over their traditional tools
as well, and they will be able to have far more leverage in
achieving urban policy goals.
The Welfare Island planning development process demon-
strates a much more aggressive and assertive posture on the
part of the public sector. Should the Welfare Island plan be
carried out fully, it would mark a major demonstration of the
advantages of public sector intervention in large-scale devel-
opment through the leverage and bargaining position achieved
by public ownership of strategically located land. It also
would demonstrate the advantages of utilizing public development
corporations as development instrumentalities, thus reducing risk
for the city substantially while at the same time providing res-
ponsiveness to urban concerns. The role of public developers is
sure to increase: they will assist cities in achieving often
common objectives leading to a better livable urban environment
for all the city's residents; while at the same time filling the
void left by the private developer unwilling to share with cities
the risk of development without certainty of project success.
If private developers are to play a major role and achieve
their own financial objectives, they will have to be more
sensitive to the concerns of cities and their planners; they
must respond to city or town needs or face their plans being
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disapproved or losing out to more amenable competition.
If the achievement of social objectives is possible, then
this city initiative may also serve as a catalyst, en-
couraging the private sector to develop land elsewhere in
a fashion both socially and physically desirable from the
city's viewpoint.
The consequent creation of a better planned and con-
trolled city growth pattern may also lead to renewed investor
confidence and increasingly more development activity along
desired lines. Overcoming doubts as to the city's long range
economic and physical vitality may have the added benefit of
encouraging new construction in areas of the city that might
not otherwise have been developed. This catalytic approach
displays a sophistication and pragmatism that urbanists must
possess in order to move cities towards meeting today's fiscal
and political imperatives.
CHAPTER II
WELFARE ISLAND COMES OF AGE
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Welfare Island has been called by some the most
underutilized island and possibly the most expensive waste-
land in the world. 1 Only two miles long and 800 feet wide
(at the widest point) , this long sliver of land sits in the
middle of the East River 800 feet from Manhattan and only
600 feet from Queens, helping to support the mammoth Queens-
boro Bridge. The Island has spectacular views of Manhattan's
posh East Side skyline, extending in length from the United
Nations to fashionable Beekman and Sutton Places and to
Gracie Mansion further north. Yet despite its locational
advantages, Welfare Island, with its long history as a re-
pository for society's outcasts, has been in a bucolic state
of disrepair, decline and isolation for many years. Weed-
infested and dotted with decaying buildings of a previous
era, the Island has almost the air of a ghost-town, with the
exception of the two functioning hospitals for the chroni-
cally ill at either end and the fire training school (that
literally sparks to life every so often as the City's newest
batch of firemen spring into action to extinguish simulated
blazes, ofter to the surprise of motorists on the nearby
East River Drivel, all of which occupy only fifty-seven of
the Island's 147 acres.
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Prior to the current development scheme, this is-
land, in the midst of one of the densest and most populous
cities in the world, was only marginally utilized. Owner-
ship changed hands a number of times over several hundred
years, with the Island initially used as a farm and later as
a country estate.Z After 1828, however, when New York City
finally purchased the Island, then known as the Blackwell
Estate, almshouses, correctional institutions, chronic care
hospitals, and rare disease treatment and research facili-
ties came to be its primary tenants. In fact, realizing
its obligation to provide such institutions, New York bought
the Island especially for that purpose, as it seemed an
ideal location in which to keep social outcasts--whether
prisoners, lunatics, paupers, lepers or tuberculars--away
from the mainstream of society.
The Welfare Island Development
Suddenly in 1969, after more than 140 years of
City ownership, the Island has become the site of full-
scale activity and development. A unique new town is being
built, a town offering New York City much-needed housing and
open space, and more importantly, transforming the Island's
147 acres from an underutilized isolated island of special-
ized institutions to a town which will eventually house
5000 families of all economic strata. These families will
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potentially be part of a unique living alternative in the
heart of New York City, that is, if all goes according to
the plans of its sponsor,. the Welfare Island Development
Corporation, a subsidiary of New York's innovative State
Urban Development Corporation. The Roosevelt Island new
community, as it has recently been renamed, (previously
known as Welfare or Blackwell's Island, as well as a host
of lesser known namesa) is an attempt to create a proto-
type for urban living in New York. The design plan, in-
fluenced strongly by site constraints and making the most
of the Island's elongated shape and spectacular views of
Manhattan and the river, concentrates development along
one main spine, Main Street, and allows for large open
spaces, exotic parks and the preservation of historic
landmarks. Two pre-existing functioning institutions
are being retained as links to the past: Bird S. Coler
and Goldwater Memorial Hospitals, at opposite ends of the
Island.
The Island development plan is unique in that
it will attempt to provide innovative solutions to every
sphere of urban life. This ambition is demonstrated in
many areas, one of the most prominent being the new town's
commitment to mass transit, translated into a strict limita-
tion on the use of automobiles on the Island and substitu-
tion of a mini-transit system which will shuttle residents
to and from the motorgate parking areas to be located at
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the foot of the bridge connecting the Island to Queens. To
meet the anticipated social and educational needs of future
residents, the development plans call for a dispersed school
system throughout the Island as well as for a network of day
care centers. Perhaps most innovative of all, however, is
the proposed economic integration of different income groups
that will live in close proximity on the Island. Roosevelt
Island is not intended as a new community for the rich alone,
but rather as an economically integrated development of
various income strata with possibilities of social and eco-
nomic mixing left open. The total success of this unconven-
tional development hinges as much on the acceptability of
many of these innovations, especially the restrictive means
of transport and economic mixing scheme, as on exogenous
factors such as timely completion of the subway and/or
other suitable transport from Manhattan.
That a new community is going up in New York City
is in itself remarkable. But even more remarkable is the
fact that this new community is being built on underutili-
zed almost vacant land in the midst of the most populous
metropolis in North America, a city where land is the
scarcest of commodities and at a premium if it can be found
at all. Furthermore, the first 2000 units of housing are
going up just opposite the stellar heights of the United
Nations and only 700 feet away from the most fashionable
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and plush residential neighborhoods in the world, New York' s
Upper East Side ,with land values in excess of $200 a square
foot.4 . In a city literally bursting at its seams for leben-
sraum, it is hard to imagine how this or any other land so
close to Manhattan and such a potential candidate for meet-
ing any of the City's urgent needs (i.e., housing, commer-
cial or industrial uses) was not developed earlier. For
unlike traditional urban redevelopment of the 1950's and
1960's, this new development, so close to the throbbing
metropolis, is not removing people or businesses, not de-
stroying family life or ethnic and neighborhood ties. The
poor are not being thrown out in order to make room for the
rich, as in other renewal areas where renewal moved relent-
lessly to bring back the middle classes and reverse the tide
of "creeping urban blight". The development of this island
has never been faced with the advance hostility that has
traditionally hindered the political acceptability of re-
development and consequently, the provision of decent and
safe housing as contemplated under the Housing Act of 1949
and by the legislative intent of Title I.
To understand why this land was not fully utilized
earlier and why it was suddenly considered ripe for current
development, it is important to look at the four major fac-
tors that were responsible for this historic marginality of
use, and conversely, how these factors have changed in such
a way that the City has finally decided to make the Island
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live up to its full potential.
The Island's previous underutilization cannot be
easily explained. There was certainly no lack of develop-
ment entrepreneurs, sufficient capital, financing, or an
adequate market, as can readily be attested to by the level
of development in the surrounding areas. Likewise, although
size and shape are significant constraints for any develop-
ment, especially so for Welfare Island which is rather
small and awkwardly shaped, these physical characteristics
have not deterred the Island from being used successfully
for numerous purposes in the past.
The four factors that played a prominent role in
the Island's previous underutilization are: 1) pattern of
growth, 2) institutional character, 3) access, and to a
lesser extent, 4) political climate. These factors have all
been instrumental in successively deterring and abetting the
the Island's transformation.
GROWTH
Perhaps looking at the Island in the context of the
growth of New York City itself is central in understanding why
this island remained comparatively fallow for so many years,
bypassed in the normal chain of development.
With a population of just under eight million, New
York City is the most populous city in North America. People,
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however, generally think of Manhattan when they think of New
York, despite the fact that Manhattan with 1,600,000 people
contains only one-fifth of the City's population on its 22.7
square miles. Welfare Island, on the other hand, while con-
sidered a part of Manhattan's area, constitutes only a scant
one-quarter square mile (or 147 acres), with ninety acres
unused entirely prior to current construction. Its popula-
tion of 3,400 was composed primarily of hospital patients,
comprising a density of only twenty-three persons per acre
for the entire island; this compared to a density of 110
persons per acre for Manhattan as a whole. An extrapolation
of Manhattan's density to the Island would set the Island's
population at a little over 16,000, while a comparison of
the Island to the employment population of the Central Busi-
ness District alone would bring it closer to 60,000 people.
Prior to the City's purchase of Welfare Island in
1828, there was little or no pressure for its development.
The main segment of the City's population was located below
Canal Street, with the area to the north (including Welfare
Island) still primarily agricultural. When private entre-
preneurial activity did begin to move in all directions from
the core of Manhattan, (especially after 1860 when the ad-
vent of steam ferry and rail transport moved development
northeastward in the direction of Welfare Island), the Is-
land was already identified with institutional uses and with
the City itself as the owner of the land.5 These two factors
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precluded private entrepreneurial activity from the Island
even when development pressures reached the northern area,
perhaps helping to explain how development skipped over Wel-
fare Island eastward, at least in the early stages of New
York City's growth.
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER
Even into the 1900's, Welfare Island was strongly
associated with institutional uses of one kind or another
(hence the name, Welfare). The City had purchased it ini-
tially to fulfill certain institutional needs and as those
needs changed over the years from charitable to correctional
and finally to medical ones, so did the nature of the in-
stitutions found on the Island--the City's ad hoc response
to the needs it perceived at the moment. City uses became
firmly entrenched, seemingly even solidified as the years
went by, and the Island began to achieve the almost self-
fulfilling prophecy of being suitable only for institutional
use. The continual needs of the City and consequent chang-
ing uses of the Island created a momentum and force that
seemed to stamp the Island with an almost irreversible charac-
ter (whether or not this was the City's intent) and to pre-
clude any serious contemplation of other uses. Only when the
many hospitals on the Island began to relocate to the "main-
land" leaving the Island in a state of disrepair and aban-
donment, did the Lindsay Administration seriously begin to
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review alternative development options for the Island.
ACCESS
The problem of access to Welfare Island has played a
major role in its delayed development. The usefulness of any
location is of course determined by numerous factors, but
generally, accessibility is the one factor that all high in-
tensive use locations have in common. The greater the access,
the higher the correlation there seems to be with more inten-
sive development.6. The problem of accessibility is even more
acute for an island, having limited means of approach.
Until 1956, when the Welfare Island bridge from Queens
was completed, boat and ferry were the major means of access,
although in 1918 an elevator storehouse connecting the Is-
land to the Queensboro Bridge (also known as the 59th Street
Bridge) helped to lessen dependency on water transportation.
Rapid transit, the umbilical cord tying all of New York City
together, was never extended to Welfare Island, despite the
presence beneath it of two tunnels carrying four subway
lines. Access shafts and station provision for Welfare Is-
land were ruled out, primarily because construction costs
would have been excessive and because it was considered un-
desirable and unsafe to build stations on grades steeper
than one percent.7. (The two tunnels are at 4.2 and 1.8 per-
cent, respectively.) In addition, it was the feeling of
traffic planners that the lines had all the capacity they
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could handle during peak hours without the added capacity
a new subway stop would bring. As long as the Island con-
tinued to have poor access characteristics, however, no
major development could take place.8
With the rise in the poshness of the East Side's
First Avenue area in the 1950's9. and its resultant extra-
ordinary land values, the City and private individuals
began to give thought to the possibility of extending East
Side land values to this slice of land, Welfare Island,
administratively considered a part of Manhattan. Numerous
proposals were developed in the 1950's and 1960's, but only
with the decision to provide rapid transportation did the
Island actually become feasible for development. On Feb-
ruary 16, 1965,. the City's Transit Authority announced
plans to construct a subway station on Welfare Island as
part of a new $28 million subway tunnel from 63rd Street
in Manhattan to Long Island City, Queens (designed to take
pressure off already overloaded transit lines), a move that
would put Welfare Island within ten minutes access time to
mid-town, access superior to that of the outer-boroughs and
even to some parts of Manhattan.
The announcement of plans to construct a station was
made amid a backdrop of numerous development proposals for
the Island and intensified interest by City officials. The
subway announcement, however, was far from a firm commitment,
and despite the effusiveness of the Transit Chairman, it
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would take several years before the plan would become a re-
ality. Nevertheless, the announcement of the plan provided
the conditions necessary for the City to begin a serious re-
view of the Island's development future.
POLITICAL CLIMATE
The Island also seemed ripe for development politi-
cally. Urban redevelopment in the 1950's and 60's had
clearly become a political liability. In fact, after a
thorough review of its renewal and housing programs10.
in 1966, The City of New York decided to change its policy
rather drastically from large-scale clearance to "vest-
pocket housing", using vacant or underutilized sites in
existing neighborhoods (endearingly referred to by housing
officials as "Hazen's Gas Stations"1ll4, while at the same
time stressing the controlled development of larger vacant
or underutilized sites of land elsewhere in the City.1 2.
Welfare Island was such a site, representing a development
opportunity that would not force dislocation of anyone or
anything unlike politically controversial urban renewal
clearance. That fact alone would garner the City political
credit from threatened communities and their representatives,
especially the poor and minorities who made up thirty percent
of the Mayor's constituency and who were most often renewal's
victims. Also, given the City's many pressing needs--i.e.,
housing, open space, jobs and increased municipal revenues,
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to name but a few, it was more dangerous politically for
the Administration to continue ignoring the Island than
to develop it, even if that development would only go a
short way towards meeting some of those urgent needs.
These considerations alone made the project enor-
mously popular with the Mayor, but its high visibility off
the East Side and the United Nations made it all the more
attractive. In fact, the Island's state of decrepit dis-
repair had become a liability, requiring some action lest
it tarnish the Administration's desired image of improving
the City. If the Mayor could produce a plan that would de-
monstrate his commitment to good design and architecture,
it would not only win the approval of his prime constituency,
the affluent liberal Manhattanites, but would also enhance
the Mayor's prestige and political credit and in addition,
serve as a highly visible monument to himself, a lasting
legacy to his administration.
Perhaps the very nature of the Lindsay Administration
also played a part in the political decision to develop the
Island. Unlike his cautious predecessor, Mayor Lindsay
represented change in every way, from his attempts at im-
proving the physical facade of the City to his introduction
of new techniques and innovative approaches into City opera-
tions, all in an attempt to provide more effective govern-
13
ment control. An innovative new development plan for Wel-
fare Island would mesh well with this creative image,
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especially if the City were to initiate and maintain con-
trol over the project rather than leave it to private in-
terests alone. It would also serve to combat charges against
the Lindsay Administration that it had not only reneged on
campaign promises to increase housing production, but had
actually fallen behind the production level of the previous
administration. In every sense, then, the Mayor had nothing
to lose and almost everything to gain by pushing for develop-
ment of the Island.
Thus, the newly announced transit link, together with
the declining institutional character of the Island, its
general state of disrepair. and abandonment, the City's
various pressing needs and a favorable political climate
all combined to indicate a readiness for development. Clear-
ly, too, the political credit to be achieved by the City for
initiating and controlling any development on the underutil-
ized Island would far outweigh any possible disadvantages.
Thus, the decision to develop Welfare Island was a conscious
decisive attempt on the part of the City to come to grips
with the City's needs and to initiate development itself,
rather than merely react to outside initiatives. Having
taken this decisive step, it remained to be seen how effec-
tive the City would indeed be in controlling development on
the Island towards achieving the City's perceived goals
and objectives, objectives which were still in the process
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of being defined.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The Mayor's development objectives for the Island
often seemed to be shaped and reflected by his alter ego in
the development sphere, Jason Nathan. As the Housing and
Development Administrator and as a man closely associated
with Lindsay's style, Nathan shared Lindsay's vision for
the Island. In a televised interview shortly after taking
office, Nathan spoke about opportunity poles of virtually
unused pieces of land . . . one, but a stone's throw away
from midtown Manhattan, was probably the most expensive
land in"America". 14 -Referring to Welfare Island, he felt
it could be the "jewel in the crown", but also one of the
most complex problems.
Nathan envisioned an exciting, innovative and
creative approach to development of the Island. He wanted
to see the Island as a complement to the City and its pro-
blems and therefore felt that the ultimate solution had
to be one of lasting social significance, breaking with
traditional methods and norms. Mayor Lindsay shared his
enthusiasm, although as Nathan commented: "He was ex-
tremely interested in the development of the Island for
his own ego and the City's. Both were legitimate, both
had to be recognized."1 5.
Both the Mayor and Nathan expressed little
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patience with the proposal that suggested building a park
on most of the available land, feeling that the Island was
large enough to support several uses, not just that one.
For the same reason, they were not wedded to housing as
the final and sole solution, regardless of the feelings
of many (William Diamond, Assistant Administrator of HDA
for special programs, in particular) to the contrary.
Nathan continuously stressed that his organization was
the Housing and Development Administration and therefore
was not dedicated to housing alone.16. Although concerned
with the number of housing units produced, the Mayor and
Nathan were more concerned with providing quality housing
in a quality environment. They foresaw an end result
possibly combining housing and recreational schemes, or
even some combination unthought of as yet--as long as
that alternative fulfilled the social significance
criterion.
Although a major goal clearly was to see any
Welfare Island plan implemented outside of the City Capi-
tal Budget with private development and financing playing
a major role, Nathan would not accede to giving up New
York City's "birthright" to private development. He felt
the City should first make the basic decision on how the
Island should be used and only then bring in private or
outside interests to act as agents for implementing the
Island's development under some kind of continuing City
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control. The City, then, would remain the principle
party in determining the future of the Island. l7.
The determination of goals and objectives is not
always a simple process for many objectives may be unarti-
culated or assumed to be givens (yet still remain very
much a part of City operational policy) while others may
be more emphatic and enunciated. Regardless of how goals
and objectives are arrived at, they must be clearly defined
before effective action can be taken towards achieving
them. Basically, the City's goals and objectives for Wel-
fare Island can be separated into four main categories:
1) financial; 2) political; 3) social; and 4) physical.
A fifth overall operational objective, control, was seen
as essential to achieving the others.
F INANC IAL
1. Minimizing Capital Expenditures. The City's major fi-
nancial objective was to avoid using the City's overburdened
debt limit wherever possible by attempting to implement all
Welfare Island plans outside of the City's Capital Budget.18 4
Not only was the budget already at a breaking point due to
the high number of projects across the City vying for prior-
ity, but also the task of obtaining City appropriations for
such a major expenditure was a lengthy and complicated pro-
cess, one that required approval of line item by line item
and that often resulted in considerable project delay and
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political "haggling". In addition, since any substantial
capital outlay was also bound to be controversial, the
chances of the Mayor's project even passing the Democrati-
cally-controlled Board of Estimate were dubious, especial-
ly since the City was barely operating with the two per-
cent State constitutionally-imposed debt limit for hous-
ing (two percent of total assessed real estate valuation
in the City) and was already frantically trying to devise
ways of circumventing that limit as much as possible. 19.
The ten percent debt limit for all capital expenditures
was also strained and the City would therefore attempt
to limit its burden of building improvements and infra-
structure.
2. Minimizing Financial Risk. The City wanted to assume
as little of the financial risk and burden of development
as possible. In the past, developers had often relied
upon City assistance to bail them out of development pro-
blems, i.e., arranging financing when the developer could
not (conventional), increasing tax abatement when the
developer was confronted with cash flow problems, or in-
creasing density from permitted levels in an attempt to
make the development more financially feasible. For the
Welfare Island project, the City realized it needed a
financially strong developer, not only to avoid eventuali-
ties such as these, but also to avoid assuming any financial
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obligation in the event of a developer default (such as
being left with an unfinished development and consequently
no revenues after the City had already completed the con-
struction of public facilities). In addition to a strong
developer, however, a detailed and binding written agree-
ment would be needed, the specifics of which would have
to be ironed out in negotiations between the City and the
developer in order to insure and protect the City's finan-
cial interests.
3. Expense Budget. City administrations are generally
concerned about the likely fiscal effects of any proposed
land use.20. The budgetary impact of any new development
must be carefully balanced against project revenues not
only to maintain taxpayer and political support, but also
to win required legislative approval for proposed capital
and expense budgets. In this case, however, the City
appeared more concerned with minimizing its capital con-
tribution than its yearly expense budget (primarily be-
cause the Capital budget is scrutinized-more carefully)
and seemed prepared to provide a whole array of social
services that would probably not be covered by anticipated
revenue. Although the City's major concern was to re-
ceive sufficient revenue from whatever development was to
be constructed on the Island to pay off public facility
debt service, it also wanted enough revenue to cover the
level of services needed for maintenance and operation of
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those public facilities, although the latter was not an
overriding factor. A "no-load" or surplus revenue develop-
ment may have been a desirable although unrealistic ob-
jective that could conceivably be traded off for other fis-
cal or non-fiscal benefits elsewhere in the development
negotiations.21
POLITICAL
1. Enhancement of the Mayor' s Pre stige. Perhaps a major
consideration for any politician is his political surq-
vival, a factor that certainly permeated Mayor Lindsay's
thinking in regard to Welfare Island. Any decisions made
clearly had to take into account their effects on the
Mayor's image and his subsequent chances for reelection
or pursuit of higher office. The Mayor's political goal
of heightening his prestige (that had suffered greatly as
a result of a multitude of municipal strikes--transporta-
tion, sanitation and education--that had all crippled the
City to varying degrees and earned him the enmity of many
segments of the City's population), therefore, weighed
heavily upon his objectives for Welfare Island.
2. Increasing the Amount of New Housing Construction.22.
It had generally been agreed by City officials that one
of the weakest points in the Lindsay Administration had
been its failure to construct new housing as promised
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during the 1965 campaign, and that if the present situation
was not altered, the four years under Lindsay would pro-
duce fewer new housing units than the previous four under
23
Wagner, a situation that could be a political liability. .
3. Achieving Consensus. It became politically important
to develop consensus and support for whatever plan was
chosen for the Island. Although the concept of citizen
participation had previously been promoted by Lindsay,24.
the City would not face the problem of community demands
with this development as no community currently existed
on the Island. Nevertheless, the Mayor realized that any
plan proposed would be scrutinized by the representatives
of the City's minorities and poor with suspicion to insure
that their needs and desires were also taken into account.
A controversial plan would reduce any favorable impact
that the City's development initiative would otherwise have.
SOCIAL
Remembering the "hot summers" in Detroit, Newark
and New York City in 1967, the Mayor was concerned with
the social needs of the City's poor and minorities and had
already committed his Administration toward improving their
lot.
1. Social Significance. The City was therefore concerned
that the Welfare Island development be one of lasting social
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significance and at the same time be a development model
of excitement, innovation and creativity.
2. Economic Integration. The Island could also fit in
well with the City's stated goal of stimulating opportuni-
ties for the growth of ethnically and economically inte-
grated neighborhoods. Not only was this goal a political
must for any City-sponsored development,25 . but also a
sincere desire on the part of the Lindsay Administration
along the lines of prevailing liberal sentiment; the hope
being that by integrating and harmonizing different groups,
the City would not be ripped apart by the growing dispari-
ties between the rich and poor and Black and White, a
problem becoming more and more evident in the City.2 6.
3. Meeting the Needs of the City and its Residents.
Clearly the Island was too small to provide a solution to
the many pressing needs of the City, but it could con-
ceivably begin to meet at least some of them. Plans could
include housing and park space (as well as other necessary
amenities), two needs running across all segments of the
population, although industry, certainly equally important,
could probably not be easily accommodated.
PHYSICAL
High Quality Urban Design. The one goal that perhaps fits
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best with the Lindsay spirit and style was the goal of pro-
viding high quality urban design in new development.27.
Throughout his two terms, the Mayor continuously stressed
his commitment to good design, spurred on by the accolades
of influential critics such as Ada Louise Huxtable and
the intellectual and cultural elites of New York. The
City would therefore want to control the architect selected
for any Welfare Island development plan in order to insure
that this objective was met. 2 8 - The City had no specific
physical goals for development of the Island as it was
confident that any plan that would match its other goals
and objectivesincluding that of high quality urban design,
would be not only acceptable but completely consonant
with the City's desires.
CONTROL
Because of its importance, control warrants
inclusion as one of the City's objectives, despite its
being more of a means to an end than an end in itself.
The City realized that in order to achieve its other ob-
jectives it would have to retain control over the develop-
ment, control being the modus operandi that could make
the difference in the achievement of those objectives.
The City announced openly that it desired con-
trol over development of the limited supply of undeveloped
land left in the City. 29- This objective implied that the
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City would not passively respond to outside developer
initiatives, but would instead initiate, plan and insure
that any development would in fact be in keeping with the
City's perceived goals and objectives, rather than leave
those goals to either the whims of private developers or
outside interests alone. Control then, may possibly have
summed up the City's philosophy of dealing with the develop-
ment of Welfare Island in one word--for this approach fit
in well with the Mayor's hope of maximizing the political.
impact of the development plan selected and with Nathan's
belief that in no way should the City give away its de-
velopment "birthright".
CHAPTER III
THE DELIBERATIONS
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The Appointment of The Welfare Island Planning & Development
Committee
Once the Mayor and his staff had made the decision to
develop Welfare Island and had determined their goals and
objectives, they faced the problem of deciding upon an implem-
entation strategy, one that would insure acceptability and
support for their decisions. Numerous ideas had been presented
for developing the Island over the years and the task of sorting
through them was seen as politically difficult;- for any political
credit received there would also be enemies made, few people
totally satisfied, and ammunition provided for political opponents,
regardless of the outcome. This very difficulty of sorting and
choosing among alternatives resulted in Mayor Lindsay's appoint-
ment of a committee of distinguished citizens, a blue-ribbon
committee, whose primary function Cas seen by the Cityl was to
legitimize the administration's preconceived plan and to de-
velop some well thought out and more readily acceptable recommend-
ations. The Mayor was, in essence, shifting the burden of
officially making this highly political choice to the committee,
thus taking the issue out of partisan politics and instead,
elevating the decision to one of consensus for the benefit of
the City as a whole.
Assuming the development was a success, the Mayor would
still receive primary credit for getting the project underway,
as even the most distinguished of committees is eventually
forgotten; if it was a failure, then the committee would be a
convenient mechanism for shifting part of the blame.2
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In addition, the committee would serve as a further testing
laboratory to identify any major difficulties in the Mayor's
plans for the Island before an irreversible decision was made.
Using public leaking to receive feedback from the media and
other sources, the committee provided the "proving ground" so
essential in decision-making, especially with decisions that
may have long-term effects and political ramifications.
The Mayor's decision to appoint the committee, then, can
be seen in decision-making or planning terms as a successful
technique for implementing the Major's own plans in a politi-
cally hostile environment and at the same time achieving what
he and his Administration perceived to be the City's goals and
objectives-. Other possible approaches did not have the ad*-
vantages of the "blue-ribbon committee" from the Mayor's
vantage point. The appointment of consultants could lead to
charges that they were hired by the City to do the City's
bidding. Academic solutions were often unrealistic and un-
predictable, and any plan drawn up by the Administration alone
would have the political liability of partisanship attached
to it (not to mention the fact that all these approaches,
regardless of merit, would prove -more costly to the CityL,
Thus the City was in a position to have its carefully
conceived plans tested by professional consultants and respone
sible citizens and presented to the public to be further re-
fined and developed. This technique represents a method of
policy planning and decision-making that is highly flexible
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and goal oriented, and that potentially could maximize impact
and minimize political repercussions (at least initially),
all the while giving the Mayor and his Administration credit
for initiative, imagination, foresight, action and the creation
of momentum for this project, a project that is all the while
carefully orchestrated and controlled from City Hall.
Committee Membership
Convinced that the "independent" citizens committee was
the best strategy, the Mayor appointed the Welfare Island
Planning and Development Committee in January of 1968, composed
ofl
representative citizens of the City of New York,
and appropriate City of ficials, and directed them
to review past studies and recommendations made by
others for uses of Welfare Island, to consider the
whole problem anew, and to present their conclusions
to you Cthe Mayor)-, if possible, not later than the
year end.3 .
In essence,, the purpose of the committee was to review
all the previous proposals for the Island and to propose solu-
tions in the form of recommendations that the City Administration
could live with and hopefully embrace, In the process of clearing
away the underbrush of these previous proposals, the committee
was also expected to cover all pertinent technical aspects and
considerations in order to sufficiently justify their recommenda-
tions. Jason Nathan in fact warned the committee not to present
its conclusions in the abstract, but instead to present highly
defined recommendations which could sell themselves. In other
words, he did not want broad philosophical principles, but
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rather highly defined recommendations that could be the basis
for development; a plan that "would excite the minds and warm
the hearts of City residents," a plan that could clearly be
accepted and implemented. 4'
The Mayor initially appointed eighteen private citizens
and three City officials ex-officio to the committee, with
Benno C. Schmidt, prominent member of the financial community
and one of the few men in New York close to both Mayor Lindsay
and Governor Rockefeller, as Chairman. The committee members,.
despite the Mayor's and Schmidt's assertion of representative-
ness, can hardly be called a true cross-section of the City's
population. Appointment to the Welfare Island Planning and
Development Committee for the eighteen private citizens was
considered a prestigious honor conferred on friends of the City
and especially on political friends of the Mayor. Many of the
committee members represented either the liberal Manhattan
socialities of the Mayor''s "Silk-stocking" Congressional District,
his Republican business supporters, or members of the art es-
tablishment who were concerned with issues of design, parks, and
open space, and who shared the Mayor's vision for a transformed
visual New York.
The prime qualification of the committee members selected
was obviously not their expertise in planning, real estate or
development Cin fact there was only one real estate man on the
committeel, but rather their independent positions of prestige
and power, and their acceptance of the fact that they were
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the "Mayor's Committee" with the task of basically assisting
the Mayor in his decision-making. 6. The committee's composi-
tion actually formed more of a social gathering than a working
force, and while not minimizing the contribution of its mem-
bers, it was a foregone conclusion that they would provide a
plan consonant with what the City wanted, both by virture of
the City's presence on the committee and by the composition
and leanings of the citizen members themselves,
Besides fulfilling an honored civic function and serving
as a manifestation of social standing, membership on the
committee had the added appeal of being a "clean job", espe-
cially since any plan for the Island would not involve dislo"
cation of the poor and of minori'ties, It further had appeal
in that this piece of land, off many of the members' front
doorsteps (Manhattants East Sidei, was considered to be the
City's potential "crown jewel" with an extremely high visibility
and a minimum of development problems. Not only would there be
no dislocations, but there would also be no substructure problems,
and once the promised subway was provided, no access problem.
This committee would have' the honor of recommending to the Mayor
how this last untouched space so close to Manhattan should be
developed. 7.
The Mayor saw the members as a committee basically sharing
his political philosophy, social consciousness, and high stande
ards, a committee that could be swayed by his aides on the
committee, especially Jason Nathan who most clearly reflected
the Mayor's view of what the Welfare Island development would
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eventually look like. The committee's main function would
be to help achieve consensus, or more charitably as Jason
Nathan later stated, the committee would "independently come
up with the same conclusions as the City". 8.
To further insure that the City's objectives were indeed
met, the Mayor appointed three City officials ex-officio to
the committee. Led by Jason Nathan, Planning Chairman Donald
Elliott and Parks Administrator August Heckscher would not only
provide City input, but would also bring professional expertise
to the committee. A fourth City official was appointed much
later, only after the committee had already decided to retain
the hospitals, and only after the official's slighting was
brought to the Mayor's- attention. Thus the Health Services
Administrator, Dr. Bernard Bucove, joined the committee without
contest, considering the vital stake the hospitals had in any
set of committee recommendations.
Financial Re'sources
Despite the fact that the City had defined the Welfare
Island committee's mandate, had carefully controlled the appoint-
ment of members to the committee, and had then insured its
control over the committee"s decisions by appointing its trusted
officials to it, the City nevertheless felt it was crucial
that the committee's public image be one of an independent self'-
sustaining operation that would arrive at a set of determina-
tions quite apart from the City"s~ influence. Although the main
reason for asking the committee to raise its own financing was
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to avoid taxing limited City budgets and the consequent
political involvements implicit in the use of City funds,
an additional compelling reason for this request was the
desire to portray the image of an impartial committee as
a means of achieving widespread political consensus for
the eventual plan.
The two major expenditures required by the committee
were for technical staff assistance and legal counsel. To
provide staff assistance and professional advice, the
committee engaged the Development and Resources Corporation
of New York, chaired by David Lillienthal. 9. Lillienthal,
former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and first
head of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, provided
a high powered staff to evaluate and sort out proposals and
to develop the technical studies needed by the committee,
The firm of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn was unanimously,
appointed as legal counsel to the committee. These services
were financed by contributions to the Welfare Island Planning
and Development Corporation made by committee members and
10.
others.
Previous -Proposals
Over the years, hundreds of official and unofficial
proposals had been made for developing the Island. Aside
from those which suggested housing, open space, recreational
uses, and various combinations of the three, proposals in-
cluded more unusual uses such as that of an atomic energy
plant beneath the Island, a United Nations housing and educa-
tional center, a correctional prison facility, and a resort
complex and gambling casino, to list only a few. For the
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most part, these latter proposals were never seriously
considered, or if they were, were easily dismissed as
unfeasible for lack of appropriate merit, access, timing,
financing, or sustained support.
Prior to the creation of the Schmidt Committee (as it
came to be called), only one proposal, the Richmond-Gruen
Plan had received serious attention from the City.
This plan to provide a highly intensive development of
20,000 units was responsible for generating a Housing and
Redevelopment Board Study, a City Planning Commission study
and counter proposal, and an opposing American Institute
of Architects (New York Chapter) open space and recreational
plan. The controversy and concern that resulted may have
played a role in the creation of the Schmidt Committee it-
self, 12. and certainly did in formulating the City's deter-
mination not to turn the Island over to private development.
The City 's desire to maintain control and initiative over
any future development of the Island (although various other
reasons were cited for the Richmond-Gruen proposal's
ultimate rejection)- was certainly an outgrowth and possibly
even the climax of the interest Welfare Island had elicited
over the years. The various proposals collectively were
instrumental in catalyzing a concern for action among City
officials as well as a sense of accountability to the citizens
of New York regarding any development for the Island. The
appointment of a blue-ribbon committee to examine these
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numerous proposals and develop recommendations of its own
was clearly an evolutionary process and the City's way of
beginning to act on these concerns.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATIONS
The members of the Schmidt Committee approached their
task using a set of constraints that included: City needs
and desires; political acceptability; physical characteris-
tics; pre-existing uses; and to some extent financial
feasibility. 13. These constraints, however, merely served
as parameters within which the committee was able to
develop acceptable recommendations, and in reality did very
little to change any pre-conceived notions the committee
members might have had,
Physical Characteristics
1. Size and shape. An obvious constraint on development
was the size and shape of the Island. Only two miles long
and 1/5 of a mile wide, the Island's shape precluded many
types of development and provided serious design problems
even to those uses considered feasible. In order to maximize
the available land area, careful land use planning would have
to be applied.
2. Location. The East River itself imposed another constraint
upon the Island's development. Any constriction of the river,
as would occur if the East Channel were dammed or filled, would
increase the already critically high velocities of the reversing
currents. Furthermore, any proposals for bridging to the
Island would have to take into account the strict clearance
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requirements of the shipping channels.
3. Environmental considerations. The committee was concerned
with the possible impact that any high intensive development
would have, not so much on the Island itself, but more so
14.
on surrounding areas and services. Some committee members
shared the general concern of residents and real estate interests
on the East Side who for obvious reasons did not want to have
their East River views obstructed by high rise and/or unattractive
development. Air and water pollution problems would also have
to be considered in terms of adequate solid and liquid waste
collection and treatment facilities, and the impact of heating
facilities. These considerations together with the possibility
of overloading transit capacity, etc., would act to modify the
size and density of any development scheme.
Access
The sinesqua non for this development was a technically
sound and financially feasible transportation system, capable
of accomodating peak loads for the proposed land use. The
existing transportation facilities for the limited use of
the Island were inadequate and had contributed to the Island"s
decline. The access problem would have to be resolved sucess-
fully before any development could be considered feasible.
Pre-existing Uses
Also important was the realization that although there
was no residential community to be displaced on the Island,
there were existing facilities as well as a variety of
- 57 -
abandoned buildings, some of possible historic merit. Any
proposal to eliminate the existing active hospitals and fire
department training school would have to take into account
the problems of physical relocation as well as financial
feasibility. !1 decision to retain these uses might present
problems in terms of limiting uses to those that would be
compatible. In any case, the institutions represented built-
in adversaries, or at the least, a concerned indigenous
community. A decision concerning what to do with those pre-
existing uses would have to precede and necessarily influence
the character and shape of any recommendations for the Island.1 5 .
Needs- of the City
Probably one of the major considerations facing the
committee was the needs of the City and its residents. No doubt
the City had many often conflicting needs, including housing,
parks, jobs, etc., but obviously 147 acres could hardly be
expected to make a substantial contribution towards any one of
them. Realizing this, the committee would have to provide re-
commendations that would benefit the greatest number of citizens
and at least in part, alleviate some of those problems it
perceived to be most pressing. One task of the committee would
be to determine the extent to which these needs could best be
met on the Island and which would be most suitable.
Financing
Any development recommendations for the Island would
require substantial financing, Realizing the City's desire
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not to utilize limited capital resources for development
purposes, one of the committee's prime concerns was to
insure that outside financing would be available given the
other projects within the City likely competing for the
same scarcie resources. Financial feasibility of the project
itself, however, was not seen as a major consideration, and
indeed played only a secondary role in the selection of a
16.
plan (coming after political, social and design considerationsI.
Political Acceptability
Any proposal would first have to meet the Mayor's
criterion of political acceptability; that is it would have
to take into consideration and incorporate those political
concerns that had become axioms of City policy (i.e. the
philosophy of economic integration for any housing plan).
Furthermore, it would have to be acceptable to the various
minority groups, civic groups and the media, as well as all
other groups directly or indirectly concerned. With the task
of having to satisfy such a wide and often conflicting cross-
section of interests, and in order to provide a politically
realistic and viable set of recommendations, the committee
would have to temper its desire for a creative and artistic
plan with careful consideration to the many other demands
upon it.
The Committee's Deliberation
As already mentioned, the decision which essentially had
to precede all others was the question of what to do with the
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existing facilities on Welfare Island, including two functioning
hospitals, a fire training school and an assortment of derelict
and abandoned buildings. The decision was crucial and needed
resolution for several reasons. First, it was necessary to
determine the actual amount of land that would be developable
and consequently over how much land the committee would be able
to exercise its control. Second, a determination was needed in
order to insure that any contemplated uses would be compatible
with those already in existence. And finally, the committee
was also under pressure from the Mayor and others to decide this
matter quickly in order to relieve the uncertainty and concern
that was hindering operations and destroying morale of the hospi-
tals' staff and patients.
Hospitals
The hospital issue was a thorny one for the committee, for
while it would obviously prefer to develop its recommendations
without any preconditions, there were too many factors supporting
the retention of the hospitals despite the effect such a decision
might have upon the future usage of the Island. The eventual de-
cision to retain the hospitals came after a visit to Welfare
Island by committee members and after three months of study and
observation of the various facilities and operations located on
the Island.
The unanimous view of the ten members who had visited the
Island was that it would be impractical to recommend the elimina-
tion of either Bird S. Coler or Goldwater Hospitals, primarily
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because of the financial state of both the City and the
City Hospital system. More specifically, the decision
made by July 10 to retain the two hospitals at their current
locations was made apparently for the following reasons: 17.
1. The estimated cost of replacing these two hospitals
at another location would be in the order of $172 million,
excluding the cost of purchasing new land. The committee
concluded that in view of the financial burdens which the
City in general and its Department of Hospitals in particular
faced, the cost of such a relocation would be exorbitant and -
unrealistic,
2. The committee also felt that the hospitals were making
critically important contributions to meeting the City's
urgent and growing need for facilities for the chronically
illl and disabled, 18. and rather than deprive the City of
the beds these hospitals provided during the time it would
take to relocate, its recommendation was to retain them at
their current locations.
While it was not the committee's intent to make the re-
tention of these hospitals the central basis upon which its
recommendations for utilization of the balance of the Island
would be predicated, its decision necessarily excluded uses
imcompatible with the continuedoperation of these hospitals.
At the same time, it also tended to make the committee examine
uses that would complement or enhancethe hospitals, such uses
as housing and recreation attuned to hospital patients and
staff, thus further limiting the range of development
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alternatives. While the major reason for the early decision
on the hospitals was to relieve the uncertainty in the minds
of those who since the committee's inception had been appre-
19.
hensive about the future of the hospitals, the decision,
no matter how realistic, acted as a major inhibiting factor,
severely limiting the range of development choices open to the
committee to what was compatible with the hospitals rather than
what perhaps would be the best overall development program for
Welfare Island,
The City, represented by Jason Nathan, felt the decision
to be a wise one, noting that previous study groups had
floundered on the same question. 20. To Nathan and the Mayor,
it was politically acceptable and noncontroversiAl to retain
the hospitals where they were, rather than risk charges of in-
sensitivity and financial imprudence.
Demolition of Abandoned Buildings
Along with its decision regarding the hospitals, the
committee also had to decide what would be done with the
abandoned buildings strewn over the Island. The committee
members who visited the Island unanimously recommended selective
demolition of most of the abandoned buildings, save those of
21.
unique historic and architectural interest. Such a move would
not only provide more available land for the committee to work
with, but would also serve as evidence of the City's development
momentum and even provide opportunities for the disadvantaged
poor as part of the City's summer work program. All of these
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benefits could be obtained for a relatively small expenditure
on the part of the City. The City indeed followed through on
the recommendation immediately, finishing the demolition pro-
gram by November 12, 1968. 22.
Fire Training School
Because of the fire training school's (currently located
in the center of the Islandy habit of setting fires on the
Island as a part of its training program, it was generally
agreed that the facility would have to be relocated, probably
to a remote part of the Island. Only when the committee had
reached an. advanced state of deliberation was the decision made
to relocate the school to the south end of the Island, away
from the hospitals with which it had certainly never been com-
patible, and away from the other recommended uses that were
more compatible with the hospitals. The relatively low cost of
relocating the facility was not considered a serious factor.
In fact, at the urging of Dr. Ralph Bunche, the committee
eventually agreed that the fire training station not be located
on the Island at all, but rather be removed entirely. The
convenient excuse for its removal was the impracticability of
its intended site given the construction of the Delecorte
Fountain. 23.
With the question of existing uses resolved, the committee
was ncw in a position to deal with recommendations for de-
veloping the remaining portion of the Island, although any re-
commendations made could be expected to reflect heavily the
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decision to retain the hospitals.
Throughout the deliberations, three major proposals
surfaced again and again and were seriously considered by
committee members: housing; recreation and park use; and
an atomic energy plant.
Atomic Energy Plant
The unexpected obstinacy of the atomic energy plant
proposal was troublesome. Although an atomic plant had never
been built in the midst of a major metropolis, many of the
members seemed to strongly support the proposal that one be
built on Welfare Island. It was never quite clear who had
originated the idea, but it was widely presumed that Consoli-
dated Edison had, and that it had then encouraged individual
committee members to advocate for it. 24. Many of the members,
swayed by their seeming concern for pollution control,
conservation and the environment actually believed it would
be a positive step, while others went along out of shared
business interests, or considerations for friends such as
Lawrence Rockefeller, well known conservationist yet strong
advocate of the plan. 25.
It took the continuous arguments of Dr. Lillienthal,
Jason Nathan and others to finally convince the committee that
there had not been enough time to study the experience of
atomic plants in metropolitan areas, and therefore the safety
of the City could not be assured. Furthermore, the capacity of
the plant itself was in question as well as its metropolitan
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location given inexpensive power transmission from outside the
center City. Despite these arguments, it took an open
confrontation between opponents and proponents before the issue
could be resolved (Jason Nathan and Lillienthal at a meeting
with Lawrence Rockefeller and Schmidt 26') and it was not re-
solved completely until the Mayor forced the committee's hand
on October 8, 1968 in order to counter a news report citing the
intended use of the Island as a nuclear power plant. Thus,
while not ruling out an atomic plant on Welfare Island sometime
in the future CConsolidated Edison wanted the current site of
Goldwater Hospital for that purposel, the committee rejected it
at least as a part of its current recommendations.
Pa rks- ardor"- fous ing
The parkt bias on the committee was clearly a strong one
and certainly understandable given the backgrounds and leanings
of the -members, Many 'members also served as museum trustees and
civic leaders and had supported conservation and open space
initiatives elsewhere in the City. 27. The park and open space
cause was considered an especially desirable land use for Welfare
Island given the noticable lack of parks in their own "backyard",
Manhattan~s East Side (except for Carl Schurz Park). The desire
for open space on Welfare Island then was part of the overall
attempt to transform densely populated Manhattan into its
rightful place as a City beautiful and one of cultural eminence,
and fit well with the beliefs of many on the committee that parks
provided the only solution which would allow the Island to be
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utilized by the greatest number of New York citizens of all
classes.
The committee was faced with several strong considera-
tions, however, that seemed to preclude an all parks solution,
whether a Tivoli Gardens, a Disneyland or a Flushing Meadow
Park. Perhaps the most compelling reason was its political
unacceptability. The expenditure that would be required to
develop parks on the isolated Island would certainly be seen
as frivolous by many and hardly justifiable, especially
given the nei'ghborhood park needs of ghetto areas and more
importantly, the crying urban needs, i.e. decent housing,
schools and community facilities throughout the City. The
point was realized by at least one committee member:
And I'm sure you agree with me that we must
expect a hue and cry from minority, poverty-prone
groups who, after all comprise some 30 percent of
the Mayor's constituency. 28.
It took primarily the decision to retain the hospitals
as well as the entreaties of Nathan and others to convince the
committee of the folly of an all park solution. There was even
some doubt raised that an all park solution would be able to
attract a large enough number of New Yorkers to justify such a
plan, given the Island's isolated and inaccessible location.
Even with the subway completed, such a solution would have to
be very exciting and unique (even then financially uncertain
given the experience of New York's World Fair in 1965) to entice
New Yorkers in great numbers away from Manhattan's own parks,
which would still be far more accessible and much closer to other
places and activities of interest.
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For these various reasns,those committee members
initially wedded to parks alone as a solution were convinced
that other uses for the Island should be considered as well,
uses that would provide a captive audience for the parks and
open space that the committee would try to preserve on the
Island to the greatest extent possible. This stance was
acceptable to the other members since it represented the least
expensive land use and at the same time, did not preclude
alternative future uses, if park use proved unsuccessful. 29.
On the other hand, housing as a proposed use was considered
to be a much more pressing need, at least by the City. The
Wagner years of 1961 - 1965 had produced an average of 49,000
housing units a year, significantly more than Lindsay's first
term which produced an average of only 22,000 units a year..
Dr. Frank Kristof (using an annual rate for 1969 of 24,200
based upon only the first seven months of the year), calculated
an average of 24,000 units completed annually and warned:
...represents a disastrous setback for continual
housing progress in the City. Along with an annual
loss, through abandonment and demolitions of approx-
imately 44,000 units of existing housing the City had
an annual deficit of 20,000 housing units over the
past three and a half years, in the face of an annual
increase of about 16,000 households over this period.
These events have contributed to a precipitous drop in
vacancies, to intense pressure on rents, and to an ex-
tension of rent control (the only way twenty-five years
of political control of the housing supply permits the
City to reactl. 30.
The urgency of this situation in 1968 was clearly upon the
consciousness of the City Administration and was certainly
brought to the attention of the Welfare Island Planning and
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Develpment Committee. Not only was the overall housing prod-
uction picture poor, but housing in the government sector was
also down considerably from Wagner levels and increasing vocal
discontent was being heard from representatives of the poor
and minorities., From a level of 7,000 public housing units
constructed in 1965 when Mayor Robert Wagner left office,
production declined to only 3,000 in 1969, representing a drop
of more than 59%. Publicly aided housing fell from a level of
16,000 units in 1965 to 4,000 units in 1969, a spectacular drop
of 75% in only four years. Even housing produced by private
sectors fell 61%, slightly less than the overall drop of 65%
in the four year period.
(See Table I on page 68.
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TABLE I
NEW YORK-CITY NEW DWELLING UNITS COMPLETED
PUBLIC
2,086
6,786
2,950
7,222
7,179
5,253
2,860
1,439
2,997
PUBLICLY AIDED
4,297
7,310
11,825
9,926
16,513
5,870
6,145
5,784
4,314
PRIVATE
28,744
33,208
45,256
34,771
25,760
21,008
14,031
10,019
10,158
MAYOR
WAGNER
WAGNER
WAGNER-
WAGNER
WAGNER
LINDSAY
LINDSAY
LINDSAY
LINDSAY
SOURCE: Mr. Alexander Garvin, Director of Community
Development, New York City Planning Commission,
March 18, 1974.
YEAR
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
TOTAL
35,127
47,304
60,031
51 919
49,452
32,131
23,036
17,242
.17,469
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Clearly housing production was a sensitive political issue
of the highest priority in the City Administration.
Despite the fact that both the need for housing the the
political necessity of providing it were keenly felt by the
City, the committee might not have come to the conclusion of
providing housing at all had the decision to retain the hospitals
not been made. The consequent attempt to meet the needs of the
hospitals and to find compatible uses and facilities for them
made the decision to include housing more or less fall into line.
Relatively early the committee had begun to focus on the issue
of hospital-related facilities, especially patient and staff
housing and recreation. It seemd to be the general consensus
that any program for staff housing should also include a number
of commercial amenities including supermarkets, drug stores,
movie theaters, etc., as would be required by any "normal"
community, and especially so in this case given the isolation of
the Island.
This consideration provided the opening for the City's
argument. Jason Nathan and others contended that the total
hospital staff alone would be insufficient to support such
amenities, and thus, the amount of housing originally contemplated
might have to be expanded to a wider community in order to
make such a plan financially feasible. 31- Some on the committee
feared that such an expansion would not only change the character
of the Island, but might even change the hospitals' orientation
towards more general care, reflecting the wider community's needs.
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It was still relatively easy, however, for Nathan to win
his argument for expanding the proposed housing, since no
one on the committee was in a position to challenge his
assessment of economic feasibility.
The decisive moment came during the November 6, 1968
Board meeting when Nathan skillfully won reluctant approval
for his compromise recommendation to have Philip Johnson
along with R. Wood Tate of the staff prepare a "meaningful
recommendation for a combined housing and recreational use
of the Island..". 32. Johnson, the only architect-planner
on the committee, was acceptable to most committee members
as well as to the City. As a trustee of a museum and as a
respected designer, he had earned the trust of the museum-
parks group who felt he could be counted on to prevent the worst
fears of some members from materializing..a dreadful intensive
high-density sterile housing development. Nathan, who also
felt he could rely on Johnson to share his objectives for the
Island, engineered Johnson into the position of saving the
Cityas plan.
There was a logical progression then from the committeets
initial decision to retain the hospitals to the final one of
expanding housing to a sufficient size to support infrastructure
and commercial amenities. These decisions together with the
political unacceptability of an either-or solution led to the
reluctant compromise.
To accomplish his objective, Nathan carefully extricated
himself from the decision-making, giving a free hand to Johnson,
- 71 -
with whom he had previously discussed strategy. By indi-
rection, Nathan was directing the committee. In this way,
however, the City was able to provide the housing that it
know to be a political necessity, while at the same time
allowing the committee to feel it was making its own decision.
Nathan could now relax, confident that the decision. to provide
housing and parks was assured, with Philip Johnson providing
the community vibrancy and excitement Nathan felt to be such
an important part of the plan.
The --Conmikttee- Recommp-ndations
The committee arrived at a final recommendation for the
future use of Welfare Island after a year of deliberations
consisting of ten formal meetings, written comments of
members, and technical staff assistance from the Development
and Resources Corporation. After clearing away the underbrush
of previous proposals, the committee approached its task from
the perspective of problems and opportunities presented by
Welfare Island for New York City. The final report was not
seen as a finished blueprint or a detailed design, and the
recommendations were intentionally left broad with considerable
room for the City and any development organization selected
to enlarge upon them.
In typical Lindsay Administration manner, the final
Schmidt Committee report was kept secret. (Whatever circulated
copies there were were either leaked or unofficially marked
33.
"top-secret"). As with the annual Housing Statistics Yearbook
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and the long awaited' Master' Plan for' the City of New York,
the Lindsay Administration used this technique to measure
influential interest group opinion, to weigh the political
impact of the report, and to provide the Mayor with the
information needed to make a "go-no-go" determination up to
the last-minute before public release.
In brief, the recommendations were as follows: 34.
1.k Hosp'ital s
The committee recommended that Goldwater Memorial and Bird
S. Coler Hospital and Rome be retained on the Island. as City-
operated, long-term care facilities. The major reasons cited
for their retention were the financial impracticability of
relocation and their significant contribution to the City's
needs.
2. Demolition
Seven buildings of the Island's abandoned remains had already
been demolished by the City as a result of the committee's
recommendations. It was recommended that this demolition
program be expanded to the other unwanted buildings, with the
exception of those that should be preserved for architectural,
historic or religious interest as a part of the project devel-
opment.
3. Transportation
The committee recommended that the new 63rd Street subway line
should include a station on Welfare Island to be completed
simultaneously with that line. The estimated cost of $1.5
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million, the committee believed, would be a relatively small
investment in return for the increased value of Welfare Island
to the City that would result from this station's inclusion.
It was felt that the Welfare Island Bridge connecting Queens
to the Island was in need of modification on the Welfare Island
approach which currently formed a wall inhibiting effective
integration of new developments to the north and south of the
bridge. It was suggested that the bridge approaches be incorp-
orated into a new parking structure sufficient to meet the
parking requirements of the Island, and thus reduce the on-
Island vehicular traffic to a minimum. A new bridge or tunnel
from Welfare Island to Manhattan was deemed impractical and
economically unfeasible.
The committee further recommended the construction or extension
on the Island of suitable roadways, as well as an internal bus
or mint-bus transit system for all parts of the Island. Water
access by ferry or other means, although not intended as a
major transportation source to Manhattan, was recommended, as
well as a docking facility for pleasure boats.
4. Parks and Recreation
The committee felt that open space and park use for 80 acres
of the Island would require no added justification given the
crowded nature of the City. Ideally located and highly visible,
the landscaped parks and gardens would provide a source of
beauty.
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It was suggested that areas adjacent to the hospital be
developed as parks including facilities for games and walking
paths, etc. for patients and hospital staff. The parks might
have athletic fields, playgrounds, swimming pools, ice skating
areas, and other uses which would increase utilization but not
detract from open space usage. Landmarks would be rebuilt
consistent with park usage and with subway completion. The
committee also recommended extending facilities to include
museums, concert shells and other intensive recreational
facilities, although it inveighed against any Coney Island-type
recreational character.
5. -Housing
The committee recommended the development of 500 - 1000 units
of housing for the physically disabled who were ambulatory and
did not require intensive care. 1000 - 1500 units were reserved
for medical staff desiring to live on the Island. The committee
also recommended the development of non-hospital related housing,
sufficient in size only to justify community facilities, con-
venience shopping and services needed to provide adequate support
to the residential community. The total community would comprise
some 4000 - 5000 units, contain between 10,000 - 15,000 people,
and require the use of no more than about twenty acres of land.
The community'*s size, the committee felt, should not be determined
by the committee but by the eventual development entity for the
Island.
The committee believed that the design of this community was
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of paramount importance to the success of the entire proposed
development. It did not believe that Welfare Island should
be the location of a large-scale housing development, and
instead preferred to see created on the Island a small housing
community of unusual appeal that could inspire finer housing
design elsewhere. Although the committee made no specific
design recommendations, it felt strongly that a high-rise visual
barrier would be inappropriate.
While realizing that luxury housing would be most desirable
in terms of economic return (projected taxes) to the City, the
committee felt that financial criteria alone were not over-
riding, Using the City"s Welfare Island for luxury housing
would be "socially and politically unsound". Therefore, the
committee recommended that it would be both economically feasible
.and socially useful to provide some housing for low income
families, some for middle income and some for high income.
6, Fire' TriningFaciity
Because the committee felt the activities of the Fire Department
to be inconsistent with proposed usage of the Island, the
committee recommended it be removed from the Island as the
development proceeded, despite the necessity of obtaining an
alternative site and providing sufficient lead time to construct
the facilities required. The responsibility for implementation
of this recommendation was left to the Development Corporation
acting in conjunction with the Fire Department and other concerned
City agencies.
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7. Pollution Control
The committee recommended that the Department of Water
Resources carry out a plan for sewage disposal best suited
to the recommended land uses, expressing the view that Welfare
Island should serve as an example in reducing air pollution
in the City.
8. Implementation
The committee, realizing that the effectiveness of any of
its recommendations depended upon the quality of the implem-
entation and follow-through, recommended that a single
managing organization be responsible for the actual development
of the Island, The appropriate City agencies such as the
Department of Hospitals would continue to manage their own
operations.
The committee recommended that responsibility be placed in
the hands of a multipurpose development corporation with the
power to receive Federal, State and local funding assistance,
and with the power to issue bonds and enter into private
contractual arrangements. A new special-purpose development
corporation for Welfare Island could be created similar to
the Battery Park City Authority or the United Nations Develop-
ment Corporation,as long as whatever instrument was selected
had sufficient powers and financing capability to carry out the
development task effectively, and at the same time would assure
the preservation of the City's vital interests. Representatives
of city departments concerned in the affairs of the Island such
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as health, housing, parks and planning officials should be
included on the Corporation's board, together with selected
private citizens whose experience and interest could con-
tribute to the quality with. which the Welfare Island plan
was to be carried out.
9. Name
The last recommendation of the committee was to change the
name of the Island. This recommendation came out of the
feeling that the Welfare Island name was obsolete and would
be increasingly so as the Island was developed. Suggested
names for the Island included East River Island, East Island
35.
and Minnahanock Island.
Conclusions
Basically, the City succeeded in getting what it wanted from
the committee in terms of a set of recommendations that
seemed closely aligned with the City's own goals and objectives
for the Island. Thus, the effectiveness of the blue-ribbon
committee as a method of legitimizing the City's own plans
seemed successful: the strategem has worked. There may be
some reason to doubt, however, that if the City had not
participated on the committee and had not had the substantial
imput it did, that the results might very well have been
different. There were many occasions throughout the delibera-
tions when it seemed the committee, despite the City's careful
planning, would exercise that independence which the Mayor had
so wanted to portray in favor of an atomic energy plant or an
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all parks solution, two uses that continuously received
strong support. Had it not been for several factors,
especially the sensitive and calculating role of Jason
Nathan representing the City's interests and the decision
to retain the hospitals with the inevitable logical pro-
gression that this decision entailed, the final results
might very well have been different.
CHAPTER IV
THE CITY SELECTS A DEVELOPER
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Although the Schmidt Committee recommendations were
not exactly what the City had expected, they were general
and flexible enough to allow the City to achieve its goals.
and objectives within them. With the committee's report
already publicy released, and with the interest, feedback
and momentum that the Mayor had been seeking generally
favorable, the City realized it would have to demonstrate
its ability to move quickly if it were to capitalize upon
the atmosphere that had been created. After all, the
realization of any plan depended not so much on the plan
alone, but more on the quality of the implementation and
follow through. Therefore, before any further planning was
undertaken, the City felt it important to determine how and
by whom the development would be carried forward.
Involvement of the developer at this point would serve
two important purposes: first, it would allow the City to
unload all or at least part of the burden of front-end
planning and financial and technical feasibility costs onto
the developer; and second, it would be much more prudent to
have the developer come up with a detailed plan to the City's
liking based on the already accepted committee guidelines than
to have the City provide a detailed plan that would later be
unacceptable to any developer. The only risk in selecting a
developer so early would be the City's possible loss of
control over the development, but since the City was moving
cautiously and deliberately, it felt this risk could be
minimized.
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Essentially there were four possibilities open to the
City in the determination of a development instrumentality:
1. A private developer could be brought in;
2. One or more City line agencies (such as the Housing and
Development Administration and/or the City Planning De-
partment) could serve as overall developer;
3. A separate City Development Corporation could be
established expressly for the purpose;
4. The New York State Urban Development Corporation could
be given the job.
Before the City could select the most appropriate alternaV
tive, it was important that it assess and understand what it
needed from a developer in a project of this magnitude and scope.
From the City's vantage point, it was important that any
development agent selected have the funding capacity, staff
expertise and proven ability to carry the plan forward swiftly
to completion. Significant amounts of financing would be
required not only in the form of seed money and equity for the
front-end planning and technical feasibility studies, but also
to provide mortgage financing for the development's huge
capital cost (incorporating the infrastructure as well as
design experimentation and additional amenitiesi. The City
additionally was concerned with minimizing its own financial
risk and burden as well as its capital outlay (given tight
expense and capital budgets) to the greatest extent possible,
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thus reinforcing the availability and adequacy of financing as a
major criterion. The developer would need to demonstrate his pro-
ven ability or track record to get the job done speedily. This
would mean also having an expert staff with the committment and
time to devote fully to the project and the staying power and
stamina to make sure the job got done. Getting the job done
quickly would certainly earn the Mayor credit for successfully
getting the development underway and gaining momentum in the
attempt to reverse the City's apparent decline; but it would also
serve to minimize interest and construction cost escalations
that could severely jeopardize marketability and project success.
Not only did the City want the lion's share of political credit
for initiating and carrying the project through, but it also
hoped to share in the profits and value created by the development.
Finally, as a means of insuring that its objectives would be
achieved, the City also wanted a developer who would be responsive
to the City and under its control. It realized, however, that
attaining this latter objective would be most difficult given the
often negative experience with developers in the past reneging on
agreements with the City.
Having determined what it wanted from a potential developer,
the City was now ready to examine its various options.
Private Developer
In assessing what would be required of any developer
attempting to tackle the Welfare Island plan, it quickly
became apparent that the difficulties and obstacles to be
faced would be too great for any private developer. The Schmidt
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Committee, in fact, had already eliminated this possibility.
Only one board member, Walter Wriston, President of the
First National City Bank, had even seriously considered it,
I would be interested in knowing what logical
reasons could be advanced against having the
City put the Island up for bids to major de-
velopers in this country and thereby obtain
some real money in exchange for the land.
Obviously, any request for such tenders would
have to be subject to the approval of the
appropriate municipal authorities. In this
way, the City would not have to expend any
funds to rebuild the Island, or even to demolish
some of the buildings presently on it, would
retain control of the types and nature of installa-
tions to be built and would in fact realize a sub-
stantial cash gain.
Moving real estate from the public to the private
sector always raises emotional problems, but such
transfers could be beneficial to all concerned if
enough control is retained on the ultimate installa-
tion. 2.
Wriston's argument, although convincing, stressed finan-
cial gain as the City's prime consideration. Although
certainly wanting to minimize its financial outlay, the City
felt that control over the development in order to see it
through and to achieve City objectives was even more important.
In fact, the primary reason for appointing a committee of
prestigious private citizens in the first place was to deter-
mine a use for the Island that would be in the rest and
widest public interest and that would receive wide public
consensus. To then charge a private developer with carrying
out the recommendations would be seemingly (despite traditional
safeguards such as lease restrictions, etc.) contradictory to
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this purposeas the private developer's major concern is
usually private profit rather than the public interest.
Also a major consideration was the prospect of having public
rather than private interests capture the value created by
development of City-owned land. *
Furthermore, once development designation was given to
a private developer, and once the City had agreed to develop-
ment specifics, the City would then be excluded from any
further input and would thus lose the initiative and control
it strove so hard to maintain (as any prudent private developer
would never agree to leave himself open to major modification
of the plan by the City in the future). Yet, on the other
hand, as the City had experienced so often in the past, a
private developer would be likely to come back to the City
asking for plan changes, pleading hardship and inability to
carry out the plans unless substantial modifications were made
or significant City financial assistance (such as infrastructure
expense, tax abatement and even subsidized mortgages, or in-
creased density ) were given. The City, suspicious of developers
using this sometime ploy, was reluctant to trust "its prize
jewel" to any private developer (that all too often has little
equity and insufficient financial resources to weather long
planning periods and inevitable delays without financial assistance
which cities are reluctant to give--a situation that often
creates political and financial problems). It seemed very clear
that it would be poor public policy for the City to convey this
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land in any way to a private developer for private profit.
Wriston's second major error was his assumption that any
private developer would want to undertake the project. A
project of this scope requires enormous amounts of front-end
planning money that very few, if any, private developers could
alone provide. Also the private developer's inability to borrow
long-term tax-exempt money puts him at a competitive disadvan-
tage, especially given the high expected capital expenditures
involved and the long construction and pay-out periods before
any cash flow or return could be expected. Even if resources
were somehow available, the questionable social and economic
mixing scheme and other innovative plans for the development
might seriously jeopardize its marketability once completed,
thus providing additional risk and making the project unjusti-
fiable from the vantage point of most private developers.
The private developer's unwillingness then to risk under-
taking the Welfare Island development without substantial City
expense, coupled with the City's basic mistrust of private
development in carrying out the public interest were primarily
responsible for the rejection of this alternative.
The City as Developer
Despite the fact that a City line agency could undertake
the development without the political difficulty a private
developer would encounter (i.e. upholding the public interest
and City political credit), the financial problems, staffing
requirements, legal and constitutional issues, not to mention
any potential problems of self-dealing, were so complex as to
rule out this possibility.
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The major problem was that any City development of this
kind would have to be financed through the City's hard pressed
normal 2% housing and 10% general debt limit. Given the vast
number of competing projects in neighborhoods throughout the
City (some politically important as well), the imposition of a
project of this magnitude and scope would heavily tax the City 's
resources or possibly force a change in priorities to the
4.
detriment of projectselsewhere. It was also felt that the
City lacked development expertise (the City had no experience
in developing anything other than public facilities and govern-
ment housingl to carry out the plan and that whatever expertise
and manpower it did have would be dissipated by this project,
again to the detriment of housing and development policy else-
where in the City. Legally, it was even questionable if the
City line agencies had the enabling powers to undertake develop-
ment of this nature, and a further constitutional problem arose
in using tax-exempt City financing for upper income housing and
commercial space. Additionally, the City did not want to be
put in the position of landlord given its bitter experience with,
public housing tenants and especially with tax-foreclosed often
abandoned properties, The numerous problems and complications
with this approach caused the City to reject this alternative
(despite the attractiveness of capturing the value of development
for the City) without even seriously considering it, although
a City sponsored Development Corporation received more attention.
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The elimination of the first two possible approaches led
the City to the two Schmidt Committee recommendations: the
creation of a City Development Corporation; or utilization of
a subsidiary of the New York State Urban Development Corporation.
Both of these alternatives had the advantage of being semi-
public bodies, capable of floating tax-exempt bonds to finance
any development outside the City or State debt limits, and able
to undertake muli-purpose development using powers of contracting
out for development and receiving Federal, State and local
funding assistance.
City Development- Corporation
The creation of a City Development Corporation could be
confined to an ad hoc single project approach similar to the
Battery Park City and United Nations Development Corporations,
or could be broader in scope, able to undertake city-wide
development especially in parts of the City where private
developers for whatever reason may refuse to go, or where
City policy dictates that public interest concerns and therefore
City control should predominate. In the case of Welfare Island,
the main advantage of using a City Development Corporation from
the City's viewpoint was that the City would completely control
it and would therefore retain all political credit for initiating
and seeing through the development, from its City-inspired
inception to its ultimate completion. Its other major advantage
however was financial. By being outside the City's debt limit,
the corporation could float tax-exempt bonds to pay for public
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facility infrastructure and capital improvements without
impinging upon the City's tight and scarce capital budget,
or its full faith and credit, while at the same time allowing
the City to capture the value created by the development.
It would also provide the City with a source of development
expertise unbeholden to anyone, and in a sense could be used
as a measuring rod against which other developers would be
judged (playing a role similar to that of the Tennessee Valley
Authority in the electric utility industry)
The major arguments against the City Development Corporav-
tion, however, fall into three areas: administration and
management problems, political impracticability and financial
risk. The administration and management problems are basically,
the same as for the City line agency alternative, primarily the
lack of staff and expertise. In fact, Roger Starr, who was
later to become the Housing and Development Administrator,
commented:
While it might in theory be true that the City
could develop Welfare Island through its own
efforts...the assembly of an administrative
mechanism under the City itself capable of
carrying out this project would surely strip
the City's housing agencies of talented per-
sonnel otherwise occupied. 6.
His belief was shared by other City officials as well, including
the then current Development Administrator, Jason Nathan.
Another chief disadvantage of the approach was the
necessity of receiving local and state political approval
before any such instrumentality could be created. Even if
local legislative approval were forthcoming, it was considered
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highly unlikely by City officials that the State would permit
the creation of a local development corporation with the
power to float tax-exempt moral obligation bonds for the City,
especially given the traditional City-State rivalry and the
already existing State Urban Development Corporation having the
powers and capability to carry out a mandate similar to that
of a City Development Corporation.
The last major disadvantage was the financial risk in-
volved. The risk and financial burden of development would
rest on the City, not only for the enormous planning and other
front-end costs of a development of this size, but also for
the capital infrastructure and improvements. Substantial initial
funding, either directly from the City or from the sale of bonds,
would almost certianly be required, significantly obligating the
City financially, and the City would be responsible for the
financial viability of the development regardless of its success
or failure.
Mayor Lindsay, clearly wanting the City to develop the
Island, strongly supported the City Development Corporation
approach despite its disadvantages. Jason Nathan, on the other
hand, strongly opposed it. Lindsay argured: "God damnit Jay,
it should be your monument," to which Nathan retorted,"It'll be
a great monument if it won't be built. If it is built it won't
be anybody's monument, it'll be Lindsay's and you know that as
much as I do." 8. Nathan inveighed against the City developing
this complex project:
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I was against the City doing Welfare Island knowing
how the City operates. I was convinced that if
Welfare Island ought to be done, it should be done
by an autonomous body having the independence and
power, once under contract, to put its financial
resources behind it and have override powers of
zoning and building codes. It should be a one-shot
decision by the Board of Estimate and not an ongoing
political football that would return to the Board of
Estimate every time before it could make a move, 9.
Nathan clearly considered UDC to be the better alternative,
The New York State Urban Development- Corporation
While no immediate decision was made to eliminate the
City Development Corporation alternative, the Urban Development
Corporation was already on the scene offering more immediate
advantages to the City, especially given the political diffit
culties of creating the City Development Corporation. In fact,
the existence of the State UDC may in itself have precluded
acceptance by the state legislature of a city copy, and being a
quasi-public state development agency, UDC could allay the City's
political fear of conveying the Island to private development
interests. Regardless of all the other advantages, however, the
crucial one appeared to be that UDC already existed and that an
ad-hoc special development corporation or a City Development
Corporation was not politically feasible.
In order to understand fully how the Urban Development
Corporation was eventually chosen as the overall developer, it
would be helpful to briefly examine UDC and the powers enabling
it to facilitate development.
The riots of the summer of 1967 led to a prevailing
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national mood of "saving our Cities," that resulted in sub-
stantial public and private corporate committment to the
"City". One manifestation of that committment was the creation
of the Urban Development Corporation in New York State on
April 10, 1968 for the purpose of rebuilding New York's cities.10 .
As a corporate governmental agency, UDC constituted a political
subdivision of the State, and as a public benefit corporation
it was entrusted with a broad range of powers and exemptions in-
cluding the power to condemn, clear land, relocate displacees,
and issue tax-exempt moral obligation bonds, and exemnptions from
municipal permit granting powers and certificates of occupancy',
especially local zoning and building codes, as well as limited
exemption from local property taxes on properties held by UDC.
The major legislative purposes of the corporation were to attract
new jobs, have UDC as a participant with the private sector in
city, state and federal programs, and to replan, recontruct and
rehabilitate substandard areas. Its mandate broadly covered the
provision of capital for the acquisition and construction of
industrial, manufacturing, commercial, educational, recreational
and cultural facilities in addition to housing. From a develop-
ment perspective, however, the corporation most importantly
was a development agent that had the capability of planning,
financing, constructing and managing almost every conceivable
project, including residential, commercial, industrial and in-
stitutional facilities necessary to carry out its mandate.
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The powers that UDC could bring to bear greatly appealed
to the City. Especially attractive was its capacity to sub-
stantially reduce the financial risks and burdens of develop-
ment for the City, risks that would almost certainly be con-
sidered too great for any private developer or conventional
lender and perhaps even for the City itself, especially given
the project's magnitude ,innovation, and host of other concerns.
By using its powers to issue tax-exempt bonds at a rate
reflecting the full faith and credit of the state at essentially
the same low rate the City itself could borrow at, UDC could
obtain the necessary financing for the project including the
large sums of seed money and equity needed. Its size, available
resources and the fact that it operated on a self-insurance
principle would also place UDC in a position to sustain many of
the risks and development problems that would be encountered
including the long period before cash flow Would be generated
and project investment returned. 12. Thus UDC could finance the
entire development without diverting or using the City's own
hardpressed expense and capital budgets, and could consequently
relieve the City not only of the major responsibility for super-
vision of the development, but also more importantly of the
financialrisk of failure.
UDC could also offer the City additional financial incen-
tives, depending upon the City's negotiating ability. For one,
UDC could build public facilities infrastructure itself, thus
averting a major cause of developer delay and risk while at the
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same time, helping to transform a project that would seem
marginally profitable and risky for a conventional developer
into one that is both practicable and attractive. 13. UDC
could also capture the value created by development for the
public interest and put back into the project a portion of
the profits it realizes on the packaging and sale to the
private developer, using those profits to lower rents for
lower income families.1 4 * Not only was there a good possib-
ility of the City's sharing in the captured value and in any
profits, but also more importantly a share of the profits
would go to the public purse and thus diffuse the issue of a
private developer gaining from the public interest. Although
the City might prefer to receive all the profit, to the
average citizen it makes little difference whether the profit
goes to one governmental pocket or another, as long as it
remains in the public sector.
Unli)ethe situation in which a private developer reaps
all benefits of a successful development while the City
shoulders the significant burden and risk of a failing one
(such as infrastructure installation, property tax losses,
and in the case of urban renewal, land writedown by all three
levels of government), by using UDC as a developer in this
instance, the City could conveivably share in the success and
profit of development while minim-izing significantly its own
risks and burdens in the case of failure. UDC thus offered
the City an opportunity to lessen City risk and increase
possibilities of City revenue.
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By using UDC as the developer, the City in a sense
would also gain access to a second level of government, its
arch rival the State, with numerous potential supplementary
funding sources for the development. If the Welfare Island
project failed, UDC as a state public developer could be
counted on to make up any deficit. And certainly having
national and state administrations run by the same party could
only help the overwhelmingly democratic city fare better
politically, using UDC to catch the administration in a more
favorable posture. Given the predilection of the federal-
government to give the state more of a role, UDC could be
expected to fare especially well there in terms of receiving
grants and requisite subsidy commitments.
As a public developer, UDC certainly put public interest
above private profit and could be counted on more readily to
share the City's goals and objectives for Welfare Island.
Its legislative intent and administrative rhetoric in fact
lent credence to this belief, This factor would facilitate
and speed up the development process especially in terms of
required public approvals which could be granted with less
scrutiny and more dispatch than in any transaction with a
private developer (in this case primarily the conveyance of
c ity-owned land). Traditionally, private developer dealings
are at arm's length and require elaborate administrative
safeguards to protect the public interest, prevent even the
semblance of arbitrary or capricious actions, and avoid all
15.
hint of graft or corruption.
- 94 -
Thus, the choice of UDC would eliminate the problem of a
political giveaway or "sweetheart deal" with a private develop-
er, as well as the possibility or semblance of City self-
dealing.
UDC, like the City, was publicly committed to good design
and was actively pursuing this goal in its developments.
Another of its major goals was to develop in the inner City and
Welfare Island was clearly an example of this type of develop-
ment on a large highly visible scale.
Its committment to economic integration and social and
design innovation was evidenced by its willingness to take the
risk and spend the money needed to accomplish those objectives,
risks the City, although sharing the same goals, was unable
to assume. These shared goals and objectives, however, gave
the City confidence that its plan would indeed be carried out.
The City also appreciated UDC's ability to quickly
facilitate development using its array of powers. Not only
was speed important in terms of its impact on construction cost,
but also in terms of beating the steadily rising interest rates.
It took on even more importance, however, given the City's
major efforts to reverse the flight of the middle class by
building developments such as Welfare Island, social experiments
that hopefully would prevent further fragmentation of the City.
Speed was crucial in maintaining the momentum of the project
and the support it had generally received in the community.
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Delay might mean reappraisal by various groups, discontent
and dissension. UDC might serve to minimize this, partly
because of its unique new powers and because of its ability
to serve as a buffer between the City and the City's various
interest groups. Lindsay further wanted to see development
of the Island during his term as Mayor, not only so that it
could be his administration's legacy, but also to avert the
possibility of some other Mayor appointing a politically
connected private developer, changing the plan, or not
building at all. Speed was thus essential to having the
Mayor's plan realized, and UDC was the most reliable mechanism
to provide that speed.
Finally, by utilizing UDC, the City could insure partial
control over the development through its participation in a
subsidiary board, if agreement with UDC on this point could be
reached. Such an arrangement would grant the City a modicum
of control without its concurrent assumption of the risk and
burden of development. The primary disadvantage, however, was
that no matter how good the participation of the City, it
would still be a UDC subsidiary and the effectiveness of sub-
sidiary boards has traditionally been minimal. In any case,
the City was reconciled to the fact that it would have to share
political credit for the Island's development with its arch
rival, the State, despite all of the effort and initiative it
had already demonstrated.
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UDC was in effect the only feasible choice for developer
given the political uncertainty of creating an ad hoc or
overall City Development Corporation, the City's desire not
to place primary responsibility in the hands of a private
developer for the implementation of the Island plan (and
16.
vice versa 1, and the impracticability of the City's de-
veloping the Island itself. By selecting UDC and hopefully
obtaining favorable terms in subsequent negotiations, the
City could assure its goal of carrying out the Welfare Island
plan with minimum risk and burden to itself. That UDC was -
a fledgling agency with an unproven track record, although of
concern to the City, was mitigated by Ed Logue's reputation,
UDC's formidable array of powers, and the secure knowledge that
the State was standing behind UDC to assure its financial
obligations. It was inconceivable to City officials how they
could have done better, given the contraintis they had to live with.
UDC's Interest
UDC was thus considered by the City to be the most
realistic and preferable of the available alternatives. Equally
important was UDC's strong interest in undertaking the Welfare
Island development along lines that would be agreeable to the
City, an interest fostered by UDC's President and Chief Executive
Officer, Edward J. Logue. 17. Prior to his position as head of
UDC, Logue's involvement in the Mayor's Task Force on Housing &
Neighborhood Improvement led him to Welfare Island as part of his
investigation of NYC's housing scene. Logue"saw the opportunity
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right away"n18 . and in his report, identified Welfare Island
as a site where special area planning and design (falling
between project level and city-wide planning) were needed and
as an area of great development potential.
Perhaps Logue's first serious contact as potential de-
veloper of Welfare Island, however, did not come until
September 18, 1968, when a morning phone conversation between
Benno Schmidt and Edward Logue, followed by a call from Schmidt
to John G. Burnett, Development & Resources Corporation's Vice
President and Director of Urban Development, and later General
Manager of UDC, resulted in Burnett's sending Logue all of the
19.
nonpublicly available working papers for the Island. By
then, UDC was being considered by Schmidt and D&R as a poten-
tial development instrumentality for the Island, and regardless
of who had initiated the contact, both parties were clearly
interested. In fact, Logue would be kept informed of the
Committee's deliberations from that point on. 20. Even before
the plan was determined, Schmidt and D&R had decided to maintain
and cultivate UDC's evident interest, possibly with the concurrence
of Jason Nathan, but probably without the Mayor's. The Mayor
and UDC were still city-state protagonists and the Mayor would
have to be won over to a pro-UDC point of view, no minor accom-
plishment.
Logue was Welfare Island as an opportunity to demonstrate
the fledgling UDC's development capability and as a proving
ground for applying and testing UDC's development powers,
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financial resources and committment towards "saving our Cities",
its ultimate raison d'etre. 21. Given its high visibility and
lack of development problems, Welfare Island was perceived by
Logue not only as the City's "jewel", but also as UDC's poten-
tial flagship project for both New York City and State. It
offered UDC a chance to experiment in terms of social and design
innovations, an experiment that would credit Logue and UDC
with creativity and willingness to pioneer new approaches, and
would perhaps establish UDC as an effective development entity.
Its willingness to cooperate and work closely with New York City
on such a major and seemingly difficult and complex project
would also serve to encourage other cities throughout the state
to seek out UDC's assistance in their own redevelopment and de-
velopment efforts.
Ed Logue was as enchanted with Welfare Island as all of
the previous suitors had been, with one essential difference.
As master of the Urban Development Corporation, he was actually
capable of pulling off"the development, not only because he was
a public developer and therefore to be trusted with the City's
"jewels", but also because he had the development and financial
depth that the State had endowed upon him together with a repu-
tation of getting things done that made his fledgling agency
more potent than it perhaps would otherwise have been, even
with its well-endowed stable of powers. Logue wanted a flagship
to carry him in New York City, the real state capital for all
practical purposes, and the place where Logue's reputation as
chief of this new development engine would be made or broken. 22.
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In line with UDC's established policy of not forcing itself
upon the cities and towns of the state, UDC would not openly
announce its interest in Welfare Island, and instead attempted
to coax New York City into making the first move. Thus, in 1968
Ed Logue wrote a letter informing all cities and town that UDC
was available to assist and explore development possibilities
with them. New York City's initial response was not encouraging.
New York City's View of UDC
As a state instrumentality, UDC was viewed by the City
with distrust, not only because of the personal animosity between
the Mayor and Ed Logue (after Logue had spurned the Mayor by
taking a job with Nelson Rockefeller 23*), but also because of
the very real deepseated feelings of homerule that were aroused
by UDC in a city where those sentiments ran very high. In fact,
when he had initially been faced with the legislative prospect
of a statewide UDC, the Mayor had assumed a very strong stand
declaring:
Home rule is critically important, and we will take
all steps that we must take in order to protect that
very important principle in New York City, and I'm
sure other cities in the State feel the same way...
If efforts are made to somehow damage/affect the
zoning powers that we have as a planning tool, we
would have to resit it. 24.
The City's strong resistance was understandable. Already
suffering from a loss of effective control over the private
sector in terms of the City's development destiny, the City
was determined not to relinquish any further control to the
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State, however worthy the objectives, without a good fight.
Perhaps another reason for the Mayor's reluctance to go
with UDC on the Welfare Island project, despite all the talk
of home rule and usurpation of power, was quite simply as
John McGarrahan, the Mayor's housing aid, related: "He thinks
the job could be done a lot better if the City had its own UDC
and I think he's probably right. Given the choice between a
New York State UDC and a New York City UDC, we'd all opt for a
New York City UDC. Given a choice between a State UDC and
25.
nothing, well obviously the State UDC is a very useful tool."
The City's reluctance to press for its own UDC was
primarily due to the realization that an~, upstate legislative
majority that sup'posedly passed UDC only because of substantial
armtwisting by Nelson Rockefeller and threats on the occasion
of Martin Luther King's funeral of witholding "favors" to legis-
lators, would certainly not support a separate City UDC, and
even if it did, the Governor would never sign it. As McGarrahan
relates: "...there's only one UDC that's going to go through
the legislature of the State of New York and be signed by the
Governor and that's the State UDC. And that's the decision -the
Governor made a couple of years ago in 1967 and that's the way
it is." 26.
Despite this realization, the Mayor made his preference
obvious. As the press briefing on February 13, 1969 announcing
the Welfare Island report, the Mayor indicated that he would
immediately form a City Development Corporation to develop
parks, recreation facilities and housing for Welfare Island
as recommended by the Schmidt Committee. 27. He neglected to
- 101
mention, however, that the City Development Corporation was
only one of two alternative development mechanisms recommended,
and never noted the possibility that UDC might be utilized.
Regardless of the Mayor's open hostility towards UDC, Ed Logue
and UDC refused to give up without a fight and decided to push
for UDC's designation as developer.
The UDC Response to the Mayor's Welfare Island Announcement
Without delay, only a day after the Schmidt Committee
report was released, UDC drafted a letter to the City's Develop-
ment Administrator, Jason Nathan, expressing its agreement with
the conclusions of the report and its willingness to implement
them, stating:
We agree that such a unique resource should be developed
in such a way as to benefit the greatest possible number
of New Yorkers, We concur in the recommendation of the
report that along with additional hospital facilities, a
small self-sustaining housing community should be develop-
ed on the Island and that its design should reflect the
highest standards for architectural excellence in housing
and community design. We agree further that maximum usable
open space should be retained for park use and for future
development of a wholly new intensive recreational system
when transportation to the Island develops to support it.
We agree finally that attention should be given to the
retention of existing structures of historic value. 28,
Stressing the advantages of UDC over the multi-purpose City
Development Corporation proposed by the Mayor, Logue commented:
The advantage of the latter course, UDC, we believe to
be substantial. No new legal authority is required to
establish the UDC subsidiary. The UDC subsidiary is al-
ready endowed with all the powers recommended by the
report. In addition the UDC is already well staffed and
ready to proceed to the next stage of planning for the
project. 29.
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He continued by emphasizing financial resources and speed,
two significant attributes of UDC Logue knew to be very
attractive to the City.
UDC was not only prepared to talk to the CIty , but to
act as well in order to bring this proposed project from its
very preliminary planning stage to reality. UDC proposed to
30.do the following almost immediately:
1. To form a subsidiary corporation pursuant to the powers
of the UDC Act for specific purposes of undertaking de-
tailed planning studies and ultimate development of the
Welfare Island Project.
2. To form a board of directors of the subsidiary corpora-
tion that would consist of appropriate members of the
Welfare Island Planning and Development Corporation and
representatives of concerned City agencies.
3, To arrange the actual staffing and day-to-day work
activities of the subsidiary corporation so that they
could be performed under contract to agreed upon consult-
ants or by direct staff hired by the subsidiary.
Logue did not want to miss the opportunity of developing
4,000 new housing units plus related commercial facilities as
well as civic facilities such as schools, playgrounds, day care
centers, etc,, and possibly a unique type of city-wide recreation
facility. Towards this end, UDC, like the trojan horse, came
bearing gifts. It offered substantial amounts of money
($500,000 initially subject to equal amounts of money being
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made available by private sources for the purpose of hiring
consultants and such staff persons as would be necessary for
the next planning phase), promises of full cooperation,
acceptance of the City's report and recommendations,and
excitment and committment to the job, while at the same time
stressing that it would be removing the risk and burden of
development from the City, moving quickly to save precious
time and avoid political problems of setting up a new instru-
mentality, and even granting the City what appeared to be a
modicum of control on the Board of Directors of the subsidiary.
The offer was a difficult one to resist.
The City seemed to be working at cross purposes with
regard to UDC. While the Schmidt Committee and Nathan were
seriously considering UDC as a potential developer for Welfare
Island, another branch of the City was turning down Ed Logue's
offer of placing UDC's development capability at the disposal
of the State's cities and towns. Donald Elliott, the City
Planning Commission Chairman, was assigned this latter task,
and in line with the Mayor's general hostility towards UDC,
Elliott rejected the offer, "rejecting each site line by line
31.
for some stupid reason." Upon hearing of Elliott's response
Nathan characterized it as "naive to the nth degree."' 32.
The Mayor Reverses Course
What particularly irked Nathan was the fact that Elliott-
had responded to Logue's letter without first clearing the
response with the other City agencies involved in development. 3
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Extremely distressed about this, Nathan called for a meeting
with the Mayor to air the matter, and at that meeting, painted
a scenarioof the implications of that "naive" City Planning
response if left uncorrected,
Mr. Logue, an old pro, beautiful operator is going
to stage the expected accomplishments of the first
year in a joint press conference with the Governor.
Announcing the first year's program he'll point to
two projects in Oswego, two in Albany, two in Syracuse,
etc., possibly $500 million of UDC activity. The
press naturally assuming the CIty needs housing and
development too, they'll ask where is UDC in New York
City? Logue will simply and eloquently respond:
Gentlemen, here is this great new capacity to re-
generate and help our cities and we receive a letter
from the City telling us to go screw ourselves. -
This vivid political scenario and the strong possibility of
Logue's actually making it a reality, together with the City's
realistic appraisal of its own inability to develop the Island,
reluctantly led Lindsay to begin a dialogue with Ed Logue.
The City found itself in a dilemma. The consequences of
not using UDC's potential could be politically disastrous. On
the other hand, the City desired not only to control development
in its bailiwick,but also to guard the semblance of home rule
and political credit associated with it. Any use of UDC,
especially given the City's previous disposition against it,
would have to clearly show strong benefit to the City or else
certainly hurt the Mayor's credibility. Giving UDC Welfare
Island alone would be considered a political sellout equivalent
to giving the choicest plum to its arch rival, even if it was.
the best developer to implement the City's plan. The City would
- 105 -
have to get much more to not only justify giving UDC Welfare
Island, but to justify using UDC at all. Nathan was conscious
of this and developed strategy to fit the situation at hand.
Nathan presented to the Mayor what he thought would be
a great deal from the City's viewpoint. It was based on
knowing Logue's desire to develop Welfare Island and the City's
need for housing development elsewhere, plans and sites that
Logue 'might not be as interested in. The City would thus try
to utilize UDC more on the City"s terms. If the City was going
to select UDC as developer of Welfare Island, it was determined
to obtain the most it could from UDC.
I said to Lindsay and (Deputy Mayor Sweet that Ed
Logue will never conclude UDC a success unless he
proves the effectiveness of UDC in New York City,
He wants a flag carrier in New York City. He'd give
his eyeteeth for a highly visible project like
Welfare Island. Welfare Island will be our carrot.
Logue wanted it. I wanted a package undertaking
using Welfare Island as hostage.
I told the Mayor, the development and the housing
needs of NYC are so enormous that it would be nothing
less than criminal not to use every resource available.
There is more to be done that we can do. We must
lasso any new capability, put them to work and we
must put Welfare Island into the package. In the past
Lindsay di t want to do it, but now that was the
decision.
Nathan and Logue netotiated, and basically UDC was amenable, in
fact eager to undertake the projects.
Donald Elliott remembers the negotiations with UDC and in a
sense how effective the City ploy was.
- 106 -
Ed wanted Welfare Island very badly. Essentially
what happened was that we, the City, asked him to
build 10,000 units in New York of projects which
had been planned by the City, and where all community
input and so forth had already occurred. He agreed
to do so if he got Welfare Island. He took the posi-
tion that we were offering him all the dogs in the
City and that they were very difficult sites and did
not have a lot of sex appeal. But Welfare Island had
everything. It was a great jewel and he was very eager
to do it. 36.
The City's scenario was more successful than perhaps even
the City dared dream. Realizing that UDC was the best developer
in any event, the City extracted what it thought to be a good
quid pro quo for its "crown jewel", the development projects
that the City had been unsuccessfully trying to develop for
years and had been unable to for sundry reasons.
UDC may have fared even better than the above implies for
it also wanted to penetrate the City and prove its capability,
even with some more difficult projects. Nathan would charit-
ably and sincerely state:
By no means did Ed Logue take all the dogs. Two of the
most attractive parcels in Harlem, the Northeast and
Northwest corners of Central Park, the two best loca-
tions in Harlem considering their capacity to be transi-
tional neighborhoods, since they faced the park. 37.
Years later, in retrospect, the Mayor's housing assistant at
the time less charitably stated that Logue wanted the Island so
badly that he took some projects that he shouldn't have taken,
including Welfare Island itself. The meeting concluded with
Lindsay's designation of Jason Nathan to personally represent
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the City and begin negotiations with Edward Logue. The
memorandum of understanding was the result of those negotiations,
the prelude to the leasebetween the City and UDC. The memorandum
can in a sense be seen as the official confirmation of the City's
designation of UDC as the developer of its Welfare Island plan.
CHAPTER V
THE DECISION TO LEASE
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Once the City had decided to develop Welfare Island and
had chosen UDC as developer, it has two alternative means
of transferring the land to UDC--by sale or lease. This
chapter will attempt to analyze why the lease position was
the one eventually chosen and agreed to by both parties, and
what advantages and disadvantages this decision offered to
each.,
In making its choice, the City had to be certain that it
selected the method most advantageous to itself in terms of
minimum risk and burden, as well as the one that would least
compromise the achievement of its goals and objectives for
the Island's development. At the same time, concerned that
the approach De workable, the City had to be certain that it
would be acceptable and advantageous to the other party in the
transaction as well.
Given the widespread interest in public development bodies
such as UDC, this chapter also aids in demonstrating what spe-
cific powers UDC could bring to bear to aid the City in
controlling, facilitating and speeding up the development of
Welfare Island. These powers certainly played an important
role in the decision to lease or sell and the advantages of a
public (or quasi-public} developer over a private developer
are thus discussed. Furthermore, the very fact that both parties
were public bodies working in concert with mutual give and take
may have in itself facilitated the development process in a
way that would not have been possible had a public and private
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body been the parties involved. Although financial concerns
were certainly important, so were the achievement of shared
goals in the public interest.
But perhaps the primary reason for this type of analysis
is to present to urban planners and policymakers a better
understanding of the actual development process. By focusing
in on the specific concerns of both parties, policymakers
can gain understanding of the crucial ingredients necessary
in facilitating development, in order to produce workable
development vehicles.
THE CITY'S VIEWPOINT
The City's overriding concern in deciding on a means of
disposition to the Urban Development Corporation was the selec-
tion of a method that would still allow its goals -and objectives
for Welfare Island to be achieved.
There were basically five major areas for the City to
consider in its decision to lease or sell: 1) financial;
2) protection of the public interest; 3) control over develop-
ment; 4) political; 5) legal.
Financial Considerations
Guing-svgayment
The most obvious financial advantage of a sale to a land-
owner is the immediate lump-sum payment he receives. Under
ordinary circumstances, capital gains tax is subtracted from
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the agreed upon sales price, substantially diminishing the
actual amount received by the owner and thus also decreasing
the relative advantage of a sale. Critics of the City's
policy charge that by not selling land outright for fair mar-
ket value, the City is being deprived of an important source
of revenue, especially since the City, unlike any other property
owner, is not required to pay capital gains tax on sale proceeds,
and thus receives the full amount of the set sales price.
Given this factor, and considering the City's strained finances
and its desperate need for funds to relieve hard pressed budgets
without increasing property taxes, critics claim that a sale
would substantially improve the City's financial position by
freeing more funds to pay for existing expenses or debt, thereby,
possibly improving the City's credit rating. Even if the City
did not expend the funds immediately, it could reinvest the sale
proceeds and tax savings and perhaps receive a higher return,
tax free, than it would otherwise.
Difficulty of' Fixing a Sales Price
But as the two parties tried to determine a development plan
and terms acceptable to both, it became obvious that unresolved
problems and factors as yet unknown would hinder the determina-
tion of a fixed sales price. Fixing a sales price is a difficult
matter regardless of the development situation, since even the
-most sophisticated real estate appraisal techniques are dependent
on a variety of assumptions, and assumptions by virture of what
they are, are always open to challenge. Thus, two parties using
- 111 -
the same techniques but different assumptions could arrive
at greatly differing results.
This uncertainty over fixing a sales price if further
compounded in the Welfare Island case since for a variety of
reasons i't seemed desirable to keep certain aspects of the
development program flexible. For example, not being sure of
the marketability of office space on the Island at this point
in the development planning, it was difficult to specify the
exact square footage of office space that should be built.
Without a fairly precise square footage figure, it was
-impossible to estimate the cost of construction or the rental
income which would be received for that space and therefore,
for the entire project. This kind of uncertainty and desire
for flexibility meant that by fixing a sales price now, the City
would be acting almost in the dark, without any knowledge of
future valuation of its land. It would thus be leaving itself
open to criticism in the future of letting the land go for too
low a price, or possibly too high, resulting in the destruction
of the economic feasibility of the project. In addition to
uncertainties such as these, there were also more general unknowns
such as changing interest rates, construction costs and other
variables that clouded the picture in these early stages.
Leasing as a Profit-Sharing Solution
From the City's viewpoint, a classic business solution to
this type of problem was the profit-sharing lease, most frequently
used in shopping center and retail leases and in situations where
the landowner remains as a partner. Basically, this type of
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lease is equivalent to the joint venture type of development
in which the landowner contributes his land, the developer
contributes the other capital needs as well as considerable
development expertise, and both participants share in the pro-
fits. This kind of lease solves the land price valuation
problem which a sale presents, and accepts a floating rent
with a guaranteed -minimum as the fairest resolution to the
initial development ambiguities. Assuming that the lessee,
UDC, has- a profit incentive in the development, the City felt
that it certainly stood more to gain by having a guaranteed
,minimum and a profit participation through a lease than it
would if it were to fix a rent or a sales price that would
remain stable regardless of the changing valuation of the land
and improvements. The guaranteed minimum in this case is
ground rent which is the remunerative return a lessor receives
for allowing a lessee to use his premises during the term of
the lease..1- This rent generally has extremely good security,
the lessee's improvements, with these improvements serving an
additional purpose for the lessor of considerably enhancing
the value of his land. Ordinarily, the return to the lessor
ignores for practical purposes the reversionary residual value
of the property which he also receives at the lease's termina-
tion. Given normal expectations of land appreciation, however,
and the considerable expense of improvements to be provided by
the lessee on Welfare Island, the City felt that it stood to
make a considerable profit when the lease expired. The City
- 113 -
saw this residual value then as financial security and a
hedge in inflationary times, reasoning that holding an asset
during an inflationary period would be a good investment,
eventually yielding a higher value. It was also a way of
utilizing city land that currently was non-revenue producing
in a more constructive way and certainly with a more remunera-
tive future. By leasing then, the City in essence was able
to make a new investment, while at the same time, obtaining the
ground return on its land plus the residual value of any
improvements, all without having to put up any major equity
investment (except public facilities which the City -must pro-
vide in any case; whether sale or lease). At the terminati'n
of the lease, it would receive a property worth potentially
far more than the one initially delivered to the developer,
with the City having only to forego the use of -the Welfare
Island land for the term of the lease. (See illustration I
below.)
- 114 -
ILLUSTRATION I
From the lessor's point of view, he is no worse off
in a lease than he would be under a sale. This determina-
tion can be made after looking at the actual present values
of the streams of income attributed to both a sale and a
lease situation. For example, a landowner leases his pre-
aises for 99 years and receives a conservative return of
6% on a $50 million land valuation, or $3 million annually
as grount rent. A conservative assumption is that the
residual value would provide for a $100 million improvement
valuation that would go to the lessor. If the landowner had
decided to sell, he would receive the $50 million in a lump-
sum payment.
Lease
The lessor will receive $3 million (6%x$50 million)
for 99 years, and $100 million dollars at the end
of 99 years.
I. Present worth of $1 at 6% in 99 years=.003124
Residual value at end of 99 years =$100 million
.003124x$100 million =$312, 400.
II. Present worth of $1 at 6% received annually for
99 years =16.615
$3 million received annually for 99 years
16.615x$3 million =$49,845,000.
III. Present value of lease equals I + II
$312,400
$49,845,000
$50,157,400=present value of lease
Sale
The present value of a sale is determined by the immediate
lump-sum payment made. In this case $50 million. As it is
plainly evident, the difference between the lease and sale
option is a mere .3%, or $157,000. The lease value is greater
but insignificantly. However, if the proceeds from the sale are
reinvested elsewhere at a higher return, then the sale option
may or may not become more remunerative (capital gains and rate
of return).
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Economic Risk in Leasing
The City's position can be seen as virtually riskless
under this solution even if the development fails economi-
cally. The only risk it takes is of losing its future stream
of income in the form of ground rent payments and the opportunity
cost of not having sold or invested elsewhere. But the land
value will likely increase and whatever leasehold improvements
were made will probably still be to the City's advantage.
If non-payment occurs or any other of the lease provisions
are defaulted, the City is secure in the knowledge that it has
first claim upon the lessee's improvements. In any lease
situation, the possibility that the lessee may default upon
payment of ground rent is a strong one. This may occur if
marketability of his improvement is unsuccessful, if the develop-
ment never gets off the ground in the first place, or if develop-
ment costs are higher than originally anticipated. Regardless
of the reason, the result will be that the lessee will not pay
his rent, and depending upon the lease terms, may or may not
have time to make up his omission. Income thus may be temporarily
interrupted or may permanently cease, making this annual income
stream not totally reliable.
Under a sale situation there is no worry about future
streams of income, as there is one lump-sum payment made at the
transfer of title and all ties to the property are severed for
the original owner. However, in a sale, the City would end its
economic interests in the development when it received the agreed
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upon sales price, and would thus lose out on the possibility
of any future profits and residual value.
Valuation Problem
Selling property in any case can be extremely difficult,
especially during periods of tight money. Generally, leasing
provides an acceptable alternative, especially if a sale would
not have brought a very good price (such as in a distress sale),
or if the owner has no financial need for an immediate lump-sum
payment. In this case, since there is also difficulty in valua-
tion of the project, perhaps the City felt that this leasing
arrangement offered the easiest way out of the dilemma by allow-
ing the City to retain the residual value. Even if the project
is undervalued, the City would still own it at the lease's
termination and all this while would be participating in the
development's profits (although carrying this undervalued
interest throughout the lease term). Leasing, in fact, generally
provides for the stabilization of a land value at a level which
oftentimes may be higher than the sales price would have been. 2.
For instance, where a high sales price may be unobtainable or
unagreeable to a prospective purchaser, the lessor's high
valuation may be acceptable to a lessee, if the negotiated ground
rent he would be obligated to pay and the other terms of a
lease would still make his development feasible. In fact, it
may be more acceptable to him than an outright purchase, since
a lease would be less of a strain on his resources, and since
the ground rent payment rate usually amounts to less than the
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rate of payment under a mortgage. 3 In a sense the agreed
upon ground rent then establishes the value 6f the property.
ILLUSTRATION II
The ground rent, capitalized at the then going
capitalization rate is one method providing a valuation
for the land. Three alternatives appear below:
I. If for instance the lessor uses a 6% capitali-
zation rate on a ground rent of $3 million, the
value of the property will be;
$3 million by 6%=$50 million
II. Using a higher capitalization rate of 8% (more
probably used by a prospective developer) the
result is as follows:
$3 million by 8%=$37,5 million
III. Using a lower capitalization rate (possibly used
by the City as lessor) another value is arrived at:
$3 million by4%=$75 million
While the lessee could afford the $3 million ground rent, he
may not be able to afford to purchase the land at any one of
the three land valuations, even at the highest "cap" rate,
and still have an economically feasible development. This is
especially true of developers despite the fact that they
traditionally have high capitalization rates and therefore
low valuations of land. The purchase of land is even more
unlikely given the landowners' low capitalized rates and higher
valuations. This divergence alone in addition to those prob-
lems already mentioned earlier hinders determination of a
sales price, a problem that leasing circumvents by allowing
both parties to benefit; the land owner gets his valuation,
while the lessor pays what he can afford (if unable to purchase
at his own valuation).
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City Facilitating Development By Leasing
The City realized that in order to facilitate the
development of Welfare Island (once it had decided not
to develop the Island itself), it could not insist that
the developer put a great sum of cash up front for land.
Yet if the City were to sell and not be charged with a
giveaway land price, a large up front cash sum would have
to be required, thus hindering rather than facilitating
development. Leasing, therefore, would seem to be a less
burdensome means of conveyance (for the developer) at
least initially than would selling. Even in a lease, how-
ever', the City realized the danger of charging too high a
sum in ground rents and taxes, a factor which might destroy
the economic feasibility of the entire development by forcing
rents up, thus possibly endangering the marketability of the
conventional housing as well as the office and retail
commercial space.
Aside from these concerns there were other financial con-
siderations, some unique to the City as a lessor, which entered
into the decision of whether or not to lease.
City Exempt From Taxes on Rent
Although the City does not pay capital gains tax on sale
proceeds of land (as mentioned earlier), it is also unique in
that it is exempt from income taxes on any rent, in this case
ground rent, which it would receive under a lease. Thus, for
private financial interests ground rent payments are far less
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attractive as they are fully taxed and unsheltered. While
taxable entities might find leasing at a low ground rent
economically unrewarding, then, the City and other non-
taxable institutions are able to lease land for comparatively
low returns due to this tax-exempt feature, thus facilitating
development where it might not otherwise occur. The City,
under a lease, would thus receive a tax-free return as ground
rent together with any residual value of the improvement built
by the lessee.
Public Facilities
Also important is the fact that the City is normally re-
quired to provide public facilities and infrastructure for
any area of new development, whether under a lease or sale, and
must do so for Welfare Island. 4' Under the sale option the
City would have to use a good portion if not more than the
amount of proceeds it would receive from the sale of Welfare
Island to build public facilities there, with this investment
of funds offering little return or benefit. On the other hand,
with the City's knowledge of UDC's powers as a developer, the
City felt that UDC could build the infrastructure and public
facilities faster than the City could if UDC were willing to
utilize its own financing. The City would then need to find
some way of reimbursing UDC for this expenditure, whether by
paying UDC directly, by deducting payments from ground rent or
taxes, or by some other means. The main benefit to the City
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in that case would be that the City's debt limit would not
have to be used, a very crucial factor since the City did not
want to give up its scarce bonding capacity. This possibility
alone, if agreeable to UDC, would make leasing very attractive
from the City's point of view, allowing the City to avoid a
major capital outlay that it would have to assume under a sale.
Another advantage for the City in this transaction is that the
City, in essence, does not have to assume the financial risk
of providing public facilities without knowing whether or not
the development would be successful and therefore whether or
not future tax proceeds would eventually pay for this major
investment by the City. Also with leasing, the financial drain
on the developer is less, so presumably he can make improvements
at a faster pace thereby increasing land values and property
tax revenues sooner, another advantage for the City.
In a sense, whether leasing or selling, the transaction
can be seen as a "wash". Under a sale the City must build the
public facilities using the sale proceeds. Under a lease, with
UDC building and financing the public facilities, project reven-
ues are pledged toward public facility debt service even though
the City's debt limit is not obligated. This latter arrangement
places the City in the same net cash position it would be in if
it had sold the project, thus completing the wash.
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If under a lease the City were to pledge its future rent
and tax receipts to pay for public facilities built by the
City or UDC, it is also losing the possibility of mortgaging
the land and thus of obtaining the additional financial benefit
from leasing. (See illustration III) This process, or pledge,
is otherwise known as subordination. Because the City does not
have the obligation to provide these facilities, it is losing
some economic benefits that would ordinarily accrue to a land-
owner under a lease or sale. Under a sale, the City would have
to plough back the sale proceeds into public facilities, while
under a lease, this responsibility to provide public facilities
would probably eat away the greater part of ground rent and
taxes. In either case, the City must in effect subordinate its
economic interests, although by leasing, it can shift some burdens
to the lessee and also obligate him to develop the entire plan
in order to generate the needed revenues to pay off public facili-
ties and insure an economically viable development. The City
will have lost nothing, since it had nothing to lose (it would
have the obligation of public facilities in either event), but
will have in this way gained substantial leverage over the lessee.
Protecting the Rublic Interest
Aside froi these fnancial conceins, the issue of protecting
the public (in~this case, City) interest was a crucial one in'
the determination of whether to lease or sell,
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ILLUSTRATION III
By mortaging his land (if there is no subordination
to the lessee interest) the lessor is able to pick up
a major source of capital and possibly increase his
return through positive leverage. The lender will
agree to mortage the land given the fair certainty of
sufficient income to secure the debt and the certainty
of not needing an equity cushion should default occur,
having as security the far more valuable total improve-
ments of the lessee. For example:
If, Land Valuation = $50 million
Ground Rent (6% of land value)=$3 million
Mortgage terms of 6% over a forty year term=a
constant of 6.61%
70% of land value mortgagable (although it may
by possible to receive 100% or more of land
value, given the loan's security, as long as
income is sufficient to pay off debt service).
Mortgagable loan=70% of $50 million=$35 million
Debt service=6.61% x $35 million =$2,313,500
Net income to lessor =$686,500
The lessor is able to pick up $35 million (possibly more)
and still receive $686,500 as yearly income (4.58% of
remaining $15,000,000 of land value). Using a lower
interest rate, positive leverage could be achieved. A
5% interest rate on land would provide a return of
approximately 6.3%. The lessor is able to achieve a
return higher than that received from ground rent.
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Finality of Sale
Many regard a lease as less final and more flexible than
a sale. In a sale, a much stricter legal interpretation of
the City's interest and correct valuation of the City's property
must be made and made at the outset, for the decision is a
terminal one and a sale is virtually impossible to undo. In
a sense, a sale would leave the City open to much more criticism
than would a lease. Even if it were possible to set an agreeable
sales price (and the complications involved have already been
notedl, no matter at what level the price was set there would
still be charges of a giveaway, and the giving away of a public
asset by sale, even to another public body is condidered a politi-
cal liability. Thus, underlying the whole decision-making pro-
cess was the thought that the less the City gave up the better,
making the lease by definition a better method of conveyance than
a sale (with the onus of proof falling upon the supporters of
selling as a better method) . The reasoning was along the lines
of an old planning concept; that the ultimate benefits of public
facilities and improvements on public land should accrue to the
public 5. (the City here) and not to an outside developer (des-
pite the fact that the developer in this case is a quasi-public
one, and the concept must therefore be more narrowly defined as
benefits accruing to the City and not the entire State).
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Efficient Use of Land
By leasing in this situation, the City is able to
demonstrate that it is using city land productively instead
of holding it idle, and that it is attempting to maximize
a rather large and thus far underutilized land bank without
investing very much of its own funds Cand therefore not being
subject to risk of lossl, yet sharing in any profits that may
result. Any criticisms of the plan for Welfare Island can
be defended as being only temporary, for no matter how success-
ful or unsuccessful the development proves to be, the City is
still the owner of the property as far as the public is con-
cerned, and at the lease's expiration, it can -then modify the
development or totally redevelop the area if it so desires.
This is important when noting the fact that there are now
declining areas in the City on land the City may once have
owned but sold for sundry reasons. The City is put into the
position of having to buy back land through eminent domain
or urban renewal in order to once more upgrade and/or redevelop
the area. By leasing in this case, the future eventuality
that this same plight may befall Welfare Island is averted. This
landbanking philosophy should win some political credit once
6.it is more clearly understood.
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City Control Over Development
Perhaps the most significant advantage of leasing from
the City's viewpoint is that the City's leverage or control
over the development is greater as a vital party to the lease.
Limits Flexibility
Some critics claim that a lease provides for less control
by the City, for instead of continuous approval and review as
is usually the case for developers, a one-time appearance by
UDC is all that would be required under a lease situation. If
for some reason the City was negligent, or did not have suffi-
cient foresight, or was lacking certain facts when drawing up
the lease, it would have little recourse later in altering the
lease terms. In effect, then, the City under a lease has only
one chance to press for the plan it desires. Given a change in
administration, it is also possible for those terms to become,
in a sense, the legacy of one administration that will have to be
carried forth despite changing development circumstances or
political winds. Even if City policy towards development changes,
the provisions of this original lease could not be modified
unless the mutual consent of both parties was obtained (although
the City could use delaying tactics in carrying out its part of
the lease as leverage in obtaining the changes it desired). In
a sense the lessor is locked into the lease, more so than the
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lessee who is more easily able to terminate if necessary
development approvals are not forthcoming. The loss of
flexibility is not only for the present, but for the full
length and duration of the lease. No matter what future
opportunities for unencumbered profitable sale or disposition
of the property may arise during that period, the lessor
cannot remove or abridge the rights of the lessee. Thus, it
is the lessee who in effect controls the property and not the
lessor. Any sale of the lessor's interest must protect the
lessee's rights, and the rate of return to the purchaser would
be controlled by the original lease terms.
Traditionally, it has been difficult to impose restrictions
upon the sale of property, although the City could still retain
some -means of control over the developer in a sale agreement
through zoning, mechanisms similar to urban renewal, the UDC's
Memorandum of Understanding, restrictive deed covenants, or
other promises by UDC to the City. Encumbrances, however,
have been generally discouraged as to give complete autonomy to
the purchaser (although restrictive covenants in sales have
become a recent innovation promoting city planning objectives).
This policy supposedly stems from a desire to make the title as
clear and clean as possible. Controls as comprehensive as to
cover the social and complete physical plan of a major develop-
ment, although conceivable under some of the mechanisms mentioned
above, would be much more binding and more appropriate under a
- 127 -
leasing option, especially where control is desired for a
period extending beyond the actual development alone. In
addition, a lease arrangement would tend to give -the de-
veloper less leeway not to proceed than he would have
under a sale.
Leasing as Important Means of Control
Leasing provides the lessor with a means of controlling
what the lessee may do with the land. Controls may be
stringent and very specific, or relaxed, depending on the
desired objectives of the lessor and what he can extract
from the lessee during the negotiating process. It must be
remembered that the City's main desire in the case of Welfare
Island was to insure that the development package was built,
and not just any development but rather the one commissioned
by the City. * By leasing, the City was able to formalize
its desire to see the agreed upon Johnson plan carried out and
would do so by having UDC accept the development package
(including those social goals, inputs and controls that the City
felt to be important) as part of the lease agreement. Controls
-could include land use, design, planning and zoning provisions
and virtually any other provision agreeable to both parties. 8.
The lessor can thus control many aspects of the development,
even though he personally is non-accountable and risks little or
nothing in the process. The lease allows the City to have a say
in the determination of the development program, both physical
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and social, and it can further require that the development
program be completed by specifying a strict timetable to
which the developer would have to adhere. * If the developer
did not comply with that plan or with other provisions of
the lease, he would be technically in default of the lease
and could conceivably jeopardize his entire investment.
Only a lease would provide the appropriate remedy if for
instance UDC did not begin construction by the required time,
or if the development proved financially disastrous; under
the lease default provision, the land and any improvements on
it could be taken from UDC by the City. In a sale, on the
other hand, it would be virtually impossible to sanction UDC
for not adhering to an agreed upon program.
The lease document, including these crucial controls, would
chart the development progress not only for the present, but for
the entire duration of the lease. The City would thus be able
to monitor, and sometimes by mutual consent even modify the
development's course over the years, thus achieving some modicum
of control. Also, dependent upon a reliable stream of ground
rent and in-lieu of tax payments, the City is provided with a
sense of participation and a real stake in the development '-s
success. This continuing involvement would furthermore give
the City a better standing in any possible law suit to enforce
the development plan since courts generally respect economic
interests, and the City, by leasing in this case, has a
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continued economic interest.
Control for the lessor is even more far-reaching in
this case, primarily because both parties to the lease
transaction are public bodies, a factor which confers upon
the lease transaction an atmosphere of trust and confidence
perhaps greater than would be realized in any other combina-
tion of parties to an agreement. It is assumed that both
are working toward a common objective: the success of the
social and physical development program towards the greatest
public good (this factor also mitigates the fear that the
public interest would not be served under a City-UDC joint
agreement).. A lease commitment from another public body that
is trying to establish itself and its reputation would carry
enormous weight. It would certainly be more meaningful than
that of the ordinary private developer who, away from the
public limelight, has primarily only financial criteria with
which to contend.
Political Factors
City Identification With Project
Although not mentioned frequently, another factor also
played a role in the City's decision to lease the Welfare
Island land; the City's (in essence, the Mayor's) strong desire
to be identified politically with the Welfare Island development.
Even more than- other major developments throughout the City, this
potential crown jewel, visible daily to millions of city residents
as well as to domestic and international visitors alike, could
potentially have an enormous impact upon the City's image. It
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was therefore important to the City that it be identified with
10.
the project's implementation and progress.
Political Credit
Under a lease situation, there is no alienation of the City
from the island. The City as the lessor, the owner of the fee
and equity partner participant in the profits, remains legally
and financially bound to the development and can thus still
legitimately claim credit. The fact that the City is the land-
owner, initiator and expeditor of the development would provide
enormous -mileageif the development succeedsand if it does not,
there would be little or no liability on the City's part, such
as might have been the case had the City decided to undertake
the development itself. Political mileage is received in various
stages: in the predevelopment stage the City receives credit
for initiating the concept introduced by the Schmidt Committee
and for its follow-through on the Johnson plan; it receives
politi-cal credit for getting a developer, the UDC, to carry out
the City's plan; and the decision to lease ensures that political
credit will continue beyond the completion of the development.
If a sale occurred, the City's visibility would likely end at the
point of sale, even though it had initiated and developed the
conceptual framework and was responsible for making the project a
reality.
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Not only does the Mayor and his administration receive
credit, but members of the Board of Estimate who must approve
the lease do also. A difficult political situation is diffused
by the fact that no community presently lives on Welfare Island,
meaning a lack of vocal neighborhood opposition and no need for
any relocation. A decision to lease, and the fact that the lease
would be to another public body would also mitigate the fear
that a ravenous developer will be the prime beneficiary and once
again has outsmarted the City. All these factors combine to
make the Board of Estimate's work easier and therefore its
credit for implementing the project greater. Its members are
adding their political stamp of approval and will share in the
glory of the project's success, if it succeeds. If it fails,
they most likely will put its failure on the Mayor's or
Governor's doorstep (the Mayor and Governor being intense poli-
tical rivals, both aspiring for higher office and each protecting
"turf interest."). The Mayor in turn can claim sole credit for
its success as it was his administration's project. And in a
sense, his administration has provided a legacy for itself, for
the lease controlling the development will last not only for his
administration but for many years more and for many more
Presidential and other political primaries.
For many private landowners, the prestige value of ownership
and project success, factors which are certainly reflected in
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the City's desire for identification with Welfare Island,
11.
are often illusory. * In the case of Welfare Island, however,
the City retains high visibility in the project as a result of
leasing and insures itself a participators's role in the project's
success or failure, throughout the lease and beyond. 12. The
City has established a policy of leasing land where it desires to
be associated with that project and where control and public
interest elements combine to make leasing an advantageous situa-
tion. In addition to getting development in the City, without
using City funds, leasing actually provides a means of facilita-
ting development for the developer, since he is not required to
put any cash up front for land cost and can instead use his
financial resources for the actual improvements. Welfare Island,
then, became a bellweather for the City in pursuit of this
inarticulated but active policy.
Legal Considerations
In addition to all of the previously discussed merits of
leasing, there is another advantage that should at least be
considered. It is proposed that leasing is an easier means of
disposition than a sale, the legal requirements for a city
selling real property being more complex, time consuming and
politically fraught with danger. In the case of Welfare Island,
however, a reading of the controlling disposition statute
dispells this myth. The legal basis for the decision to lease
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or sell is most important. A 1969 amendment to the UDC statute
simplified substantially the requirements imposed upon the
City before it could enter into a lease or sale with UDC. As
a result, only the approval of the Board of Estimate is required
after a public hearing has been held, even for a sale. 13.
This move was essentially a means of removing legal hurdles
and lengthy reappearances before numerous public bodies, re-
quirements that might cause delays and obstacles to the progress
of any project.
The ease of conveyance, then, in either sale or lease under
the UDC statute is the same, with the "myth" dispelled only
because of the UDC Act. This statute is an example of UDC's
powers coming into play to facilitate development. The Act also
provides a maximum lease term of 99 years, sufficient time for
the most conservative of lenders to finance a lessee's project.
Regardless of the fact that the UDC Statute cites a sale as
analogous to a lease in terms of ease of conveyance, the political
fact remains true that a sale still represents a more deliberate
decision on the part of- the City and a more politically dangerous
one than a lease, and if the City had to undergo its normal
disposition procedures for a sale or lease, the political fact
would become hard reality.
THE UDC PERSPECTIVE
UDC was also faced with the question of what was most
advantageous to its interests; leasing or buying Welfare Island.
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Before entering negotiations with the City, UDC had to decide
its posture on this issue and although primarily concerned with
its own interests, in the final analysis each party was also
forced to consider how the other would fare under each means
of conveyance. While there were certainly advantages and dis-
advantages to both leasing and buying, UDC had to determine
if the differences were major enough to create any clear pre-
ference on its part. Unlike the City, UDC's considerations as
a developer would necessarily be primarily financial, although
it was certainly also concerned with facilitating the project
and with control.
Financial Considerations
Depreciation
UDC realized that by leasing it would receive distinct
economic advantages not found in buying. First, any housing
built could be depreciated. 14. That which is depreciable in a
given property is usually the actual construction cost of the
property improvement or the value of the improvement in the
acquisition of property (usually determined by the assessment
ratio of land to building applied to the total purchase price
of the property). By leasing the land UDC could depreciate its
total cost, whereas if it were to purchase the land, it would
only be able to depreciate the cost of construction and not that
of land. This total allowable depreciable expense provides the
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developer with a non-cash expenditure that can shield income
from the property and/or from other sources. Where the developer
himself cannot use the excess losses, he can syndicate them to
investors, and by syndicating the equity he has more tax advan-
tages to use (or sell) and will consequently receive a higher
after-tax return on his development package than on an otherwise
comparable development on land that is purchased. This factor,
then, would give UDC the additional leverage in negotiations to
obtain favorable terms for the sharing of tax shelter proceeds
with sublessees. 15.
Ground Rent and Tax Payments Deductible
Secondly, UDC realized that any ground rent payment under
a lease is also a deductible expense, unlike land amortization
payment which is treated as income, 16. If the land were pur-
chased, then, and a mortgage procured for it and for improvements
-upon it, debt service (interest and amortization) would be
collected on both the proportion allocable to land and to improve-
ments. For instance, given a hypothetical 80% mortgage on land
and improvements, 80% of the land cost and the same percentage of
the improvement costs would then have to be repaid or amortized,
while if the land were leased and an 80% mortgage was obtained
(but this time on improvement costs alone)l, there would be no
land cost to amortize or repay. The only payments made on land
under a lease are ground rent and usually taxes and both of these
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expenses are allowable tax deductions. In other words,
amortization is not tax deductible if the land is purchased,
while rent and tax payments are deductible if the land is
leased.
Front-end Expense and Risk
Also signigicant financially is the fact that UDC would
be averting a major front-end expense by leasing instead of
buying outright. Developers traditionally work with as little
front money as possible in order to reduce risk, and the
initial capital outlay required for the purchase of land is
usually a significant portion of total development cost. Since
leasing reduces the amount of front money required, money is
then freed up and can be used for other purposes such as buying
better professional services (for instance superior architects
for better design), for improving marketability, for providing
the marginal difference that may make the project work where
otherwise "coming up with the cash" could prove its undoing, or
simply as additional profit. By not having to purchase land,
the developer can in essence use land as his own money or capital
and thereby reduce his own exposure and risk. In a sale, where
he must come up with a substantial sum of money at the onset of
development, the carrying costs of that land alone may be enough
to do his project in before it gets under way. Thus, leasing
may often financially facilitate development where it might not
otherwise occur. CSee Illustration IVL
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ILLUSTRATION IV
In addition to this major savings of a heavy lump-sum
cost for land, there is also a savings in the equity needed
upon financing. The following example examines the differ-
ence between a sale and lease option in terms of equity
requirements.
REDUCTION OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENT
LEASE SALE
0 LAND $50 million
$200 million IMPROVEMENTS $200 million
$200 million TOTAL $250 million
$160 million MORTGAGE (80%1 $200 million
$40 million EQUITY (20%) $50 million
Under a sale, $10 million more in equity is required, or 25%
more than under the leasing option, assuming that the lender
will lend the same percentage whether on a lease or fee.
CThere is some risk that under the leasing alternative, since
the lessee does not have the land as additional security-, the
lender may not. However, where there is subordination of the
lease the percentage lent may be the same, or even higherY.
This difference can make an otherwise marginal project econ-
omically feasible.
It should be pointed out that sometimes in a sale the
developer can also avoid the full cost of land acquisition
through techniques such as options, or through a conditional
purchase and sales agreement subject to a set of conditions.
However, since the seller usually wants to terminate his
connection with the parcel and not be left with the land if
and when the buyer backs out, theSe provisions are not included
in most sales. In a lease, a ."subject to" approach is often
more amenable to the landowner or lessor, in some respect due
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to the feeling of a perceived shared interest (if the project
succeeds he will sometimes share in the profits and in any case
will receive the residual value) and even where not amenable,
the risk is still far less than under a sale.
By leasing, the developer in effect is borrowing 100% of
the value of the land at the same rate or usually below the
mortgage debt service rate (that is, lower than the constant
payment). The lessor, in effect, is acting as a lender re-
ceiving annual payments for the lessee's use of the property-
in the form of ground rent, the equivalent of an interest pay-
ment. If the developer were purchasing the land, however, he
would have to pay not only interest but also amortization on
mortgaged land. The following example helps to illustrate the
savings therefore available which can be passed on to the tenant
as rent reductions thus making the project more marketable and
economically successful, or which can be retained by the developer
as additional profit. (See Illustration V)
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ILLUSTRATION V
For purposes of this illustration, we will assume an 80%
mortgage for the feehold and for the leasehold respectively,
with mortgages respectively on $250 million for improvements
and land, and $200 million for improvements alone. Assuming
a 6% ground rent on the leasehold and none on the feehold, and
a debt service constant at approximately 10% for both and
equivalent taxes and operating expenses, there is a saving of
over $1 million under the leasehold assumption in cash flow
before tax. The same analysis of leasing versus acquiring
land also shows that there is a higher rate of return on leased
development than on development on acquired land.
RETURN ON INVESTMENT- BEFORE TAX
LEASE SALE
$40 million NET RENTAL INCOME $40 million
$10 TAXES (25% of NRIY $10
$ 3 GROUND RENT (6%x$50m land) 0
$16.064 DEBT SERVICE (K=10.04%) $20.08
$ 6 - ALL OTHER OPERATING EXP. $ 6
$ 4.936 $ 3.92
The equity under the lease is $40 million, 20% of $200 million,
while the sale equity is $50 million, or 20% of $250 million.
$4.936 $3.92
$40 = 12.34% Rate of Return $50 = 7.84%
Under the lease situation, even if revenues plummetted $1,016,000
to the $3.92 million level, they would still yield a higher return
on invested equity, a return of 9.8%. To equalize the return be-
tween sale and lease at 7.84% would require the paring of an addi-
tional $784,000 in revenue from the leased premises, a cushion of
$1.8 million between the 12+% return, and the still adequate 8% re-
turn on reduced income from the leasehold property. The return on
the lease example can be substantially greater under certain circum-
stances, such as subordination. Perhaps as important is the break-
even point--the dollar figure (in terms of net rental income needed
simply to sustain the development without any profit or loss. Under
leasing the breakeven point in our example is $35,064,000 while .
under a sale it would be the higher sum of $36,080,000. The differ-
ence of $1,016,000 is the cushion that exists under the leasing
option.
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Subordination
Capital needs could be further reduced for UDC if the City
agreed to subordinate its economic interests in the lease
(ground rent and taxes) by giving a first lien to UDC's lenders.
Subordination would help UDC significantly in obtaining finan-
cial backing both from bondholders and conventional lenders
since it would provide them with the security of being first in
line to receive any of the development's revenues. Thus, if
the City were willing to assume the risk involved in subordina-
tion, it would be facilitating the progress of the development
and thereby reducing risk for UDC.
Oftentimes under subordination, lenders will value land as
part of the lessee's holdings even though the lessee does not
own the land, and in such a case the lessee may be able to
"mortgage out" without any equity investment. If the lessee were
to do that, however, the lessor would be precluded from mortgaging
his own land, as any income derived from land and improvements
would already be pledged to the lessee's lender. Depending on
the degree of subordination (i.e. whether land is pledged in
addition to expected revenues), the lessor is placed in a tenuous
situation, for in the event of nonpayment of debt service the
lender could foreclose on the entire property (including land).
The following table demonstrates the advantages of subordination
to the lessee.
LAND
IMPROVEMENT
TOTAL
TOTAL COST
MORTGAGE
EQUITY
TABLE I
ADVANTAGES OF SURORDINATION TO THE LESSEE
SUBORDINATION
(LAND PLEDGED)
$50 million
$200 million
$250 million
$200 million
SUBORDINATION
(REVENUESBUT NOT LAND)
NO SUBORDINATION
0
$200 million
$200 million
$200 million
$200 million (80%) $160 million (80%)
0
($50 million
imputed equity)
$40 million (20%)
$200 million
$200 million
$200 million
$140 million (70%)
$60 million (30%)
FEE
$50 million
$200 million
$250 million
$250 million
$200 million (80%)
$50 million (20%)
In a non-subordinated lease the lender desires a higher return, not having the
certainty of a first lien ahead of ground rent, as in subordination. This may be re-
flected not only in reduced equity to loan ratios (more equity required so there is
less debt service--debt service becomes a lesser proportion of gross revenue), but in
higher interest rates usually of to a full percentage point. The higher equity re-
quirement may in itself make the project unfeasible.
In the fee example the owner must purchase the land and in this case put up
$50 million in equity, equal to the cost of the land and this project may also be
unfeasible.
The most desirable situation from the lessee's viewpoint is subordination,
where he requires as much as $40 million, or as little as no equity, thils greatly
facilitating development. He may have to pay the lessor a higher ground rent for the
privilege-6 of using his land as equity to avoid the use of limited risk capital.
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Public Facilities
It was crucial to UDC that the public facilities be
completed on schedule according to the development timetable,
and that they be innovative and ofhigh quality. The only way
UDC felt certain this would happen was if it were to contruct
the public facilities itself, since as its own building inspec-
tor and developer it could prevent the usual delays in capital
budgeting procedures, lengthy construction timetables and
delays and restraining ordinances. If the City would allow UDC
to do this under a lease, UDC might agree to provide the finan-
cing for those facilities where necessary (except for those
facilities that the City could get financing for more readily
from other levels of government, such as schools), although it
would demand appropriate reimbursement by the City for public
facilities debt service.
For UDC, then, if the price of the land under a sale was
less than the cost of public facilities, it would be more advan-
tageous for UDC to buy the land and let the City fulfill its
responsibilities for providing those facilities. If the price
of the land was more than the cost of public facilities, it
would be more advantageous to UDC to lease and to provide the
cost of public facilities itself, since it could at lease control
the timing, innovation and quality of public facilities in this
manner.
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Leasing Equivalent to Ownership
UDC understood that leasing on a long term basis was for
all intents and purposes equivalent to owning the land for
the term of the lease. Depending on its ability to success-
fully negotiate the points it felt were essential for the
development's success, it could then have virtually full con-
trol over the property and could even go so far as to mortgage
the improvements. As long as UDC then abided by the provi-
sions of the lease agreement, the City would have in effect no
17.
direct control for the lease term's duration. The lessee
is generally able to assume this virtual ownership position by
paying only a minimal sum, a fraction of the cost of the land.
This control over the premises under a lease can be less
risky than the lessee's control would be if he had purchased the
land and had it mortgaged with the property improvement. Courts
in general side with the lessee in disputes concerning the lease,
and provide every possibility for him to correct his lease with
the lessor, in contrast to a far harsher treatment usually meted
out to a mortgagor faced With outstanding backpayments of
principle and interest. In a sale situation, the bank would
threaten or actually try to foreclose, while in a long term lease
there is usually more room for accomodation between lessor and
lessee.
Residual Value
The major disadvantages to the lessee, however, are that
he does not receive the residual value of the property and the
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prestige of ownership. At the end of the lease term, the
lessee must relinquish that improvement and the increased
value he has added to the land (often at considerable expense)
to the lessor.
UDC, however, felt no great need to retain the residual
value of the development if it could arrange through negoti-
ations as long a lease term as it felt was necessary (and by
statute that could be as much as 99 years) in order to properly
amortize any and all investmant and make sufficient profit as
well. In any case, the residual value was not significant in
terms of the present value of money and profit was not the most
essential element for UDC. For UDC was created to do what the
other private developers, for whatever reason, (basically the
fear or lack of desire to take the kind of risks needed to spur
great development) dared not do. UDCt s statute gave it
immense powers as a developer which it felt certain it could
exercise just as well under a lease situation as under a sale,
and even if the project yielded only a marginal return, UDC
could still undertake the investment, especially since it could
obtain its own financing for public facilities (if necessary)
as well as for other parts of the development.
Reduction of Risk
By leasing, UDC felt that it could reduce risk substantially,
a major objective of all developers. The reduction of cash and
capital outlays, possibilities of subordination and improved
marketability attributed to leasing have already been discussed.
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Another area of risk reduction that can be realized under a
lease is the lessee's ability to terminate the lease with a
minimum loss. If for any reason the development does not pro-
ceed, then at least the major initial lump-sum expense of
land acquisition has been averted. The actual losses to the
lessee would be determined by the lease provisions and would
obviously be dependent on how far development has progressed.
Termination in the early stages of development (especially
before all required and necessary approvals were received)
could make losses insignificant, while aborting or abandoning
the project after or near completion could mean a substantial
loss of equity and credit rating as well as possible long term
financial oblications. Nevertheless, a loss of this magnitude
would still probably be considerably less than a loss due to
abandonment if the land were owned. Assuming the owner had
paid the major expense for the land in addition to having invested
other equity in improvements, then if zoning and building code
permits, local tax agreements, or even financing (not totally
.applicable to UDC although other factors could certainly stop
the development program) were not forthcoming, the owner would
have little recourse but to abandon the project and take his
losses, including the loss of expected residual value.
If the developer had optioned the land with little or
nothing down, on the other hand, or if he had arranged a con-
tingent purchase and sales agreement, no cash would have to be
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paid until the project was determined to be feasible and had
received all the necessary approvals. The only risk then is
the market and overhead of the developer.
Development risk is also reduced for the lessee by sharing
obligations and responsibilities with the lessor. Dependent
upon the lessee for his payment, it is to the lessor's advantage
to do whatever he can (including helping the lessee obtain
appropriate approvals and sometimes financingl to insure that the
lessee is successful in his development, not only to insure
certainty of payment but also to increase residual value of the
development. The lessor/lessee partnership thus works to the
mutual advantage of both. 18. A disadvantage of this sharing of
risk between lessee and lessor is that if the lessor does not
fulfill all of his obligations, it is conceivable that the lessee
may not be able to proceed (although he does have the option to
cancel the lease). He .would thus not have full control over the
project, and the City's not completing the subway link for
instance or not getting necessary approvals may delay or abort
the project, adding these uncertainties to the other development
problems the lessee must face. 19
One-Shot Approval
By approving a given development plan in the lease, however,
UDC is gaining the major advantage of obtaining "one-shot
approval" for its project. Once approved by the Board of Estimate,
the lease as a controlling document cannot be changed by political
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winds. The lease therefore reduces the necessity for UDC to
return to the City for any further approvals (except for lease
modifications that may be necessary or desired), while under a
sale, although it may be possible to arrange for approval of a
general development plan, the City would more than likely still
want UDC to come in for step by step approval so as not to lose
the City's perceived prerogatives.
Lease Limits Flexibility
At the same time, however, once the provisions of the lease
are fixed, the lessee has very little flexibility for the term
of the lease. Usually ground rent, use of. the land, and most
other crucial elements are locked in at the lease's onset and
are not responsive to changes in market, the economy, or other
development problems that may occur. Any one of a number of
possible items may limit the flexibility of the lessee in the
crucial development process, a problem he could avoid if he
owned the land. It is therefore crucial for the lessee to fore-
see as much in advance as possible in order to avert future
problems.
Good Faith
Implicit in the above is the added danger in a lease of a
lack of good faith on the part of either or both parties. Even
in the event of a different City administration, the City could
conceivably (if there is no subordination) terminate the lease
over some minor technicality and take over control of not only
the land (that it already owns) but also the building and im-
provements that the lessee had added, -in essence foreclosing
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upon the state bondholders and UDC.
Although UDC preferred to lease because of the advantages
already ennumerated, it would no doubt have also been able to
go along with a sale and of course would have negotiated the
best possible position for itself. In a sale it could still
provide public facilities but at a much higher price to itself
since it would have to absorb the additional costs of land and
debt service for public facilities, costs that might have been
too much for even UDC to handle unless it scaled down the public
facilities, increased the revenues by providing more commercially
remunerative space, or reduced the amount of low and moderate
income housing.
UDC did not fear negotiating with the City for it knew that
the City wanted this development to proceed nearly as much as
UDC wanted to undertake it; and since both were public bodies,
the City could make the kinds of concessions to it that it could
not make for any private developer. UDC would then try to
maximize whatever it could get from the City. It realized,
however, that it could get more from the City under a lease situ-
ation than under a sale, for the simple reason that a sale would
break the City's ties and interests in the development. UDC
knew that once the development plan was determined under a sale,
it could not return to the City for changes or modifications, or
expect any help from the City over the course of the project. It
was just as important therefore for UDC to tie the City into the
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development as it was for the City to tie UDC in.
Conclusion
Besides providing major financial advantages to the City,
the decision to lease also gave the City at least a semblance
of control and partnership, and best furthered its goals and
objectives towards facilitating the Welfare Island development.
Leasing was also advantageous for UDC in terms of reducing its
front-end risk, offering other significant financial advantages,
and allowing UDC to demonstrate its ability to facilitate devel-
opment (including the provision of public facilities and its
concommittant debt burden) without threatening the City's
interests or jeopardizing its own. The decision to lease thus
seemed to best meet the objectives of both parties,
Prior to the actual lease negotiations, there was another
set of negotiations that culminated in a memorandum of under-
standing, entered into primarily to publicly state the intentions
of both parties to carry forward the development (and in effect
to validate the City's selection of UDC as developer), and to
set down some basic agreed-upon points that would guide the
future course of the Island's development. This non-binding
agreement, the prelude to the lease, was important as the
starting point in the negotiations that were to follow, with
each party jockeying to secure the most favorable position in
order to achieve its own objectives in facilitating the Island's
development.
CHAPTER VI
PRELUDE TO THE LEASE:
THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
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The Schmidt blue ribbon committee had charted the general
development goals for Welfare Island, and the City, having
groped for years for a feasible approach to developing the
Island, eagerly adopted its recommendations (in line with its
own goals and objectives). The next step was implementation.
Within two months of the publication of the committee's recomend-
ations, the City had decided upon UDC as the developer and had
begun to chart guidelines to be followed in the implementation of
the committee's general plan. These guidelines as well as the
goals and objectives of the project were embodied in the General
and Specific Memoranda of Understanding that were entered into by
the City of New York and the New York State Urban Development
Corporation on April 17 and April 18, 1969 The memoranda were
signed after a tough negotiating period, the first of many, and
although the decision to lease was not clearly spelled out, it
was generally understood by both parties at that time.
The policy of entering into memoranda of understanding was
initiated by UDC at its inception, when in order to avert poten-
tial political confrontation, UDC invited cities and towns
throughout the state to take advantage of its facilitating powers
in project development. Upon receiving favorable responses, UDC's
policy was to negotiate with those localities and to then publicly
issue joint expressions of intent known as memoranda of under-
standing. It is important to note that memoranda of understanding
in most cases were essentially letters of intent; written promises
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not legally binding, expressing the interest of the two
signatory parties in pursuing land development.
General Memorandum of Understanding
New York City was originally reluctant to respond to UDCt s
request, but when it eventually did, a number of development
projects (eight projects and two feasibility studies of pro-
jects including Welfare Island), was agreed upon after a period
of sustained negotiations. This agreement was expressed in the
General Memorandum of Understanding entered into on April 17,
1969 by Jason Nathan, the City's Administrator of Housing and
Development and Edward J. Logue, UDC's President and Chief
Executive Officer.
In the memorandum, both side listed their respective
contributions and responsibilities in making the developments
viable ones. 2. The City obligated itself to do several things,
primarily as enticements or rewards to the developer for agreeing
to do business along its lines. It agreed to transfer land to
UDC free of all tenancies and demolition, to provide UDC with
the general development program and to obtain all necessary local
and federal approvals. 3' UDC agreed to maximize the use of its
powers in order to facilitate development and to free the City
of substantial obligations, although in turn it expected the
City to help reduce its front-end risk wherever possible. UDC
agreed to arrange financing for Welfare Island and the other
seven projects, a task that was often the City's when dealing
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with private developers. It agreed to use the residential
projects, once built, as relocation resources for residents
who may be affected as future areas are designated for re-
development, to provide a minimum of 20% low income housing
units per project, and to establish community advisory boards.
It obligated itself to prepare studies, plans and specifications
for the projects on the basis of which UDC would be able to ask
the City to modify its original development plan or replace it
completely. UDC was to be responsible for project design, in-
cluding the hiring of talented architects (there would be no
city design review, but instead there would be periodic con-
sultations with the City on project status); finally, it agreed
to use its powers to facilitate the primary objective agreed
to by both the City and UDC: to utilize maximum speed and
minimum cost in accomplishing the development of the projects.
With the general memorandum setting the ground rules for a
UDC-City relationship, the next stop would be dealing with
Welfare Island specifically.
The Welfare Island Memorandum of Understanding
The specific memorandum of understanding for Welfare Island
was signed the following day, on April 18, 1969. The fact that
this agreement came only two months after the Schmidt Committee
findings were made public emphasized the City's determination
and UDC's eagerness to pursue this development. The memorandum
- 153 -
called for the creation of a wholly owned UDC subsidiary to
be known as the Welfare Island Development Corporation, and
even went so far as to detail the composition of the fourteen-
member board: eleven directors to be designated from members
of the Mayor's committee on Welfare Island; three from UDC--
its chairman, president and chief executive officer, and
general manager. While the chairman of the board was to be
selected from the eleven, the UDC president and chief execu-
tive would automatically become the present of the subsidiary
and would designate a chief executive officer to head the
development subject to the subsidiary board's approval. That
eleven out of the fourteen board members would be from the
Mayor's committee having veto power over the board's chief
executive officer assured the City that its interests would be
protected as the development progressed. While this board
could potentially wield great power, the City realized that most
boards never do and are led more by strong staff than by a
sometime nominal chairman. * But regardless of its effective-
ness, the City had, on paper at least, control of the subsidiary
corporation that would develop Welfare Island, an additional
safeguard that it hoped would insure the development's being
built along the lines it had intended.
Most important for the City, the memorandum also contained
the provision that the Schmidt committee's report on Welfare
Island was to be the basis for the development of a "detailed
and imaginative final plan for the Island", with broad objec-
tives cited of a "community of variety and excitement....
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open space and recreational areas... .linked as strongly as
possible to the remainder of New York City". 5.
As part of its obligation, UDC agreed that within six
months it would provide at its own expense, all the necessary
design, planning, engineering and economic feasibility studies
essential to determining a final plan. The plan would pro-
vide the basis upon which both the City and UDC would make a
finding of feasibility (basically a decision for each as to
whether or not they would proceed with the development) subject
to three City preconditions: 1) that the final plan require no
City capital contribution other than a land transfer; 2) that
an agreement on public facilities could be worked out; and 3)
that the availability of state or other non-city tax-exempt
funding sources for the projected parks and recreational facili-
ties be determined. By establishing these conditions, the City
provided itself with an escape hatch should it decide that it
6.
did not want to proceed with the development. The City,
however, could later waive these conditions if it so desired.
The plan was also to include a construction and improvement
timetable that the subsidiary was to abide by. The subsidiary
was responsible for arranging all interim and permanent mortgage
financing, whether through the State HFA, the FHA, or the sale
of UDC bonds and notes, and was obligated to obtain interest
reduction or other equivalent subsidy to meet the needs of low
and moderate income families; the City in the meantime was to
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obtain all necessary federal and local approvals. UDC and
the City predetermined a unit mix to contain a minimum of
20% low income, 10% elderly and the balance of an "appropriate
range of middle income and conventionally financed housing".
Hospital-related housing would also be provided in the amount
determined feasible and necessary. The final plan would
designate the portions of Welfare Island to be developed and
transferred by lease or other appropriate means of disposition
to UDC. The disposition documents were to be submitted to the
Board of Estimate for approval as soon as possible after an
agreement had been reached between the parties.
The references throughout the memorandum are ambiguous as
to the exact method of land disposition to be used. It is
stated that the City obligates itself to prepare and submit as
soon as possible a "draft lease or other disposition agreement"
setting forth the terms and conditions for the transfer of
Welfare Island for development. Yet, another statement emphasizes
7
that the method of conveyance is yet to be determined. * The
City seemed to be keeping all its options open, although it
appears that by this point it may have already made at least a
tentative decision to lease.
The concern of both the City and UDC for high standards of
design was reflected in the City's designation (with UDC's
concurrencel of well known architect/planner and member of the
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Schmidt Committee, Philip Johnson and his partner John Burgee,
as master planners. Since Johnson and ten other members of the
Mayor's committee would be sitting on the subsidiary board to
protect the City's interest, the City felt fairly confident that
good design would be assured even without final power of design
review. This was especially truegiven that the City would have
approval power over the master plan controls and the development
plan in any case and also given Logue's committment to good
architecture as evidenced in his Boston and New Haven achieve-
8.
ments. A detailed design review process by the City was re-
placed instead by "the careful formulation of the final plan",
to be designed by the City's chosen architect subject to UDC's
supervision.
The memorandum of understanding thus represented a starting
point upon which the lease was to be built, with many of the
points still to be negotiated or expanded upon by both parties
before a final determination. Nevertheless, the memorandum gave
the City and UDC an agreed upon basis for further negotiation
and the go-ahead to gear up for initial development preparations:
the City by demolishing the existing buildings on the Island and
UDC by finishing a detailed plan.
The memoranda of understanding were not publicly announced
until May 21, 1969--the delay of more than a month seemed to some
almost machiavelian, portraying uncertainty on the part of
either the State UDC or the City as to whether they in fact wanted
to proceed with the agreement. Rumors were actually afoot that
the Mayor, on reflection, had changed his mind on giving Welfare
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Island to UDC for development. 9' While it was truethat a
number of people were not happy with the City 's involvement
with UDC, (especially people such as J. Lee Rankin, Corpora-
tion Counsel, who was concerned about UDC encroachment on City
powers) it turned out, however, that the actual reason for the
delay was less contrived or deliberate than as first thought.
According to an April 14 memorandum, a joint Lindsay-Rockefeller
10.
press conferance had been scheduled for May 5, 1969. A
second memorandum indicated a postponement in the press con-
ference that was to announceEdward Logue's involvement as de-
veloper. It would be put off to"May 12 at the earliest and
probably not before, May 20, 1969", as the Governor was
apparently away on vacation. 11.
A second issue involved the decision of whether or not to
separate Welfare Island from the rest of the UDC program for
New York City when making the agreement public. The dilemma
was that the City wanted to establish Welfare Island as the
Mayor's program simply being carried out by UDC (to maintain
city identification), while at the same time implying that the
others (city projects undevelopable for assorted reasons) were
being pawned off on UDC without the City's principle involve-
ment. 12.. The eventual May 21 press conference, however,
announced all ten projects, although stressing Welfare Island. 13.
The City desired to claim credit as an equal in the Welfare
Island development. In fact, Mayor Lindsay characterized the
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program as "an exciting partnership between the City and the
State, one in which State development assistance is built on
the vital concept of a State agency helping to achieve the
14,
development goals of the City", while Jason Nathan, the
principal city negotiator, commented: "We are undertaking
a joint program of real dimension--not only of the housing
that will be built but also for the pattern of governmental
relations being forged. We already have developed the close
working relationship so necessary in any complex joint under-
taking such as this." 15 The Governor described UDC's role
in more grandiose terms: "This agreement between the City and
State represents the kind of cooperative action we must have to
solve the urban crisis in the United States. It represents the
type of program from New York City we had hoped to participate
in with the new statewide Urban Development Corporation." 16.
That Welfare Island was seen as a prototype of the kind of
city/state partnership needed to solve the urban crisis in the
United States is understandable given the urgency and scope of
urban problems and the necessity of both parties to show con-
cerned action. Nevertheless, Welfare Island was seen as a bell-
weather by both the City and State, an undertaking that would
possibly reverse or at least restrain the net outflow of middle
income whites to the suburbs by offering them a revitalized
urban center, one that if successful could serve as a model
wherever applicable around the country. The joint partnership
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mentioned was more than just words, for the decision to lease
Welfare Island to UDC was in essence a joint venture development,
one in which the City would provide the land and UDC would pro-
vide the development expertise and the capital to make it work,
with both sharing in its success. It was that understanding of
partnership, prominently mentioned by Jasan Nathan, that
permeated the lease negotiations, and that would profoundly
affect the outcome of those negotiations.
The general and specific memoranda of understanding are
most important for the City in that they demonstrated the City's
ability to engage a developer for Welfare Island as well as for
the City's other projects, and marked the formal assumption of
obligations and committments on the part of both parties. It
also marked the beginning of the Island's development along
agreed upon guidelines (with city preconditions) with the City
commencing demolition (as recommended by the Schmidt Committee as
well) and UDC undertaking the development planning.
The discussion of the memoranda is included to better under-
stand the lease itself, as the points agreed to by both parties
in the memoranda provide the starting framework for the onset of
the lease negotiations.
CHAPTER VII
THE LEASE
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The New York State Urban Development Corporation and its
subsidiary, the Welfare Island Development Corporation, were
formally granted control of Welfare Island on December 23, 1969.
On that day, the legal contractual instrument, the lease, was
signed between the lessor, the City of New York,and the lessee,
the Urban Development Corporation and its subsidiary. This
agreement is the primary controlling document regulating all
aspects of the proposed development for the full ninety-nine
year term of the lease, including the delineation of responsib-
ilities of the aforementioned parties and the basic ground rules
for their respective financial obligations.
A lease is essentially a written document describing
premises that are rented for a stated consideration. The owner
is known as the lessor, and the tenant as the lessee; the
consideration given is called the reddendum or rent, while the
term of the lease is known as the habendum.1'
Originally, long term ground leases became popular as a
means of circumventing a direct sale of property, taking advantage
of the legal distinction between leasing and selling and allowing
the reluctant seller, whatever his reasons, to maintain his fee
ownership.2. As the financial advantages of leasing became more
clearly understood, the lease as an in-lieu of sale approach was
replaced by the lease as a financing mechanism. The advantages
of leasing instead of buying came to the fore: 1) the avoidance
of a major front end cost of development, the purchase of land;
2) realization that land was non-depreciable, while all itmprove-
ments could be depreciated if leased; and 31 the fact that ground
rent was a deductible expense, while amortization of land was
not. The lessee could also increase his leverage using
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scant equity when it was understood that land and
improvements demand the same higher return when -purchased,
while the return on land leased from the lessor could be
lower because of the investment's security (a secured
annuity, with a residual value bonus), a feature attractive
to tax-exempt institutions such as pension funds,
There is no question that the Welfare Island lease in toto
marks the culmination of all the previous decisions examined
in this study and presents the vital underpinnings of the
entire development, determining the program, plan and means
of implementation, as well as the responsibilities and obliga-
tions of both parties. The lease is crucial in understanding
the Welfare Island project, not only in terms of the specific
provisions, but also as one means of analyzing the City's
effectiveness in achieving its goals and objectives with minimum
risk and financial burden to itself. In addition, the analysis
points up the bargaining strengths and negotiating ability of
both the City and UDC, the various tradeoffs and concessions
each side made, and finally, how each managed to protect its
own interests while working towards facilitating the development.
Obviously there is no accurate way to predict the future;
whether the lease will be changed, whether the development will
be completed according to the lease or completed at all. But-
the lease does provide a mechanism for assessing the responsib-
ilities and obligations agreed to by both parties and the
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manner in which they wished to see the development proceed.
For the purpose of this analysis, only those lease
provisions focusing upon the most important financing and
development issues will be included and examined in detail.
The first provision included delineates the developable land
area and determines the length of time necessary to construct
and finance all planned improvements. The next provision
concerns the delegation of responsibilities for the prepara-
tion of plans and construction of improvements, for time
limits and constraints and for relocation and demolition,
thus fixing the obligations of both parties with respect to
these items. Tied to these is another provision detailing
the means by which public facilities are to be constructed
and financed, and the parties responsible for this part of
the development. Finally, and perhaps most important of the
provisions in any lease are the rent provisions. The develop-
ment's ultimate success hinges on how well the financing formula
contained in these provisions works and on the overall deal
made by the City and UDC. The last included provision is the
lease's "enforcer", the default provision, that provides pro-
tection for both sides. (Other typical provisions such as
fire or casualty, insurance, mechanic's liens, use, indemnity,
notices, and more although certainly important, were not
directly pertinent to the focus of this study and therefore shall
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not be included here.)
The lease issues are looked at first in their general
context and then as they relate to each party. The positions
of both parties before entering into the negotiations are
examined and the resolutions to specific issues are then
analyzed. The lease provisions themselves are helpful in
determining how well the parties understood the significance
of various issues, how each attempted to facilitate the
development, and how each eventually fared in the negotiations;
factors that offer insights into the development process
generally. Specialized terms realting only to this lease will
be defined using the lease definitions for legal exactness and
precise meaning. Finally, for any provisions requiring mention
of lease schedules, wherever possible the information contained
in those schedules will be mentioned under that item. The
main provisions of the lease will be included as Appendix2C
for reference. 3.
LEASED PREMISES AND HABENDUM (LEASED TERM)
Perhaps the most essential of the lease provisions, outside
of land use and the determination of rent, was the provision
dealing with the extent of the leased premises (the specific
area in which development was allowed to take place) and the
duration of the lease (the term).
Despite the general understanding between the City and UDC
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that the leased premises would consist of Welfare Island in
general, it nevertheless became important to delineate pre-
cisely the exceptions to this understanding. UDC and the City
had already agreed that the hospitals would not be leased,
but there still remained the task of determining how much land
surrounding the hospital buildings the City would retain, and
the same determination had to be made for the various bridge
footings and water tunnel easements which were also not to -be
leased.
In general, the City was unconcerned about the exact spe-
cifications of the leased premises, reasoning that UDC would
certainly want the right to fill land to the bulkhead and
pierhead lines in an effort to maximize the actual amount of
developable land (indeed this was UDC's position). Realizing
that any landfill would benefit the City as would intense
development, the City was understandably unconcerned about the
actual details of the leased premises. In addition, since the
leas1 premises consisted of an island, there was little room
for either party to maneuver (not much to gain or lose), unlike
a large mainland tract where bargaining over boundaries can be
intense. Thus, in this case at least, the City and UDC both
shared the goal of maximizing the land to be developed and
consequently made the oftentimes thorny issue of leased premises
4.
a non-contentious one.
While the leased premises proved to be a non-controversial
point, the length of the lease term aroused more concern. Leases
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involving the building of improvements are usually considered
long term, having a minimum duration of 21 years. 5.
Generally it is in a lessor's interests to make the lease term
as short as possible, and he will press for a term just long
enough to allow the lessee to build his improvements, pay off
his debt and make his anticipated profits. For the lessor, a
short term is desirable so that the lease can then be renegotiated
(or a lease term extention can be agreed to in advance in order
to prevent later negotiating problems) to reflect changing
land valuations or rates of return more accurately, or simply
so that he may gain title to the improvements earlier, especially
if the project is economically successful. 6. The advantages
of the shortest possible lease term also applied to the City as
a lessor, although the City's concern was more than just financial.
While it would have liked to be able to renegotiate or take
over the development at an earlier point, it was concerned more
with the project's success as a whole and therefore did not see
this issue as crucial. Nevertheless, it would press for the
shortest possible term in which the development could be com-
pleted feasibly and successfully, without risking the develop-
ment's success by curtailing the lease term, especially since
the maximum limit of ninety-nine years was already set by the UDC
statute so a lease any longer was immediately ruled out.
The City itself had also set the precedent in long-term leasing
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of using ninety-nine years as a feasible and necessary lease
term especially where conventional financing was to be used. 8.
It is generally to the lessee's advantage, on the other
hand, to make the lease term as long as possible in order to
retain control of the premises, properly amortize his invest-
ment and earn maximum profits. Expecting to be the beneficiary
of inflation, the lessee may be able to raise his rents, and
if there is not an effective rent formula to reflect upward
changes in valuation (which the lessor tries to press forl, he
can possibly make greater profits and pay proportionally less
of his project revenues as rent to the lessor.
The desire for as long a term as possible also applied to
UDC as lessee, although the length of the term had to be kept
within its statutory limit. Like the City though, it was also
more concerned with the project's freestanding success socially
and physically as well as financially, and like most developers,
was unconcerned initially with the residual value of the project
(present value was low and the future value uncertain) or the
necessity to control the development for long periods beyond its
original development goal. Nevertheless, it needed sufficient
time to amortize its improvements and a sufficient cushion of
time to satisfy even the most conservative of lenders.
In short, the success of the project was the goal of both
parties. Although each tried to obtain the most advantageous
lease term for itself (subject to maximum term set by UDC statute)
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neither side felt so strongly about the term to let it
stand in the way of the development's progress and success.
Thus, although there were differences in the negotiations over
this point, those differences were not irreconcilable.
Resolution
Paragraph one of the lease provisions details the
eventual outcome of the negotiations over these two points.
The metes and bounds description of Welfare Island is broken
down into several components. It describes the Island out
to the pierhead and bulkhead lines which if filled would bring
the total usable land on the Island to 142.84 acres. Counting
all the exceptions, however, other than the water tunnel fee
parcel and temporary and underground easements, the usable land
figure falls to 117.50 acres "more or less". 9' Using the same
procedure and assuming maximum filling to the pierhead and bulk-
head lines, 121.14 acres "more or less" can be considered de-
velopable. The description of the premises to be leased clearly
was a noncontentious one between the City and UDC, especially
after the UDC agreed to use the City's "standard urban renewal
doughnut description" ' surrounding the hospitals and other
11.
non-leased premises in its survey description.
As in the Battery Park city lease 12. and the United
Nations Development Corporation lease 13. the habendum or
duration of the lease for Welfare Island is also ninety-nine years.
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This term is significant as it presupposes sufficient time
to amortize any investment made on the land,' pay off all
lenders, and provide for an adequate return on equity. At
the end of this period, the City will again take possession
of all the leasehold land and improvements, in this case at
midnight December 23, 2068, unless for some reasons (detailed
14.
later) the lease is terminated earlier. UDC, then, under
Article 14 (2) of the UDC Act received the maximum lease term
then permitted it by statute. It was obviously able to make
a strong case for ninety-nine years as necessary to make the
development feasible, while the City, not feeling that the
point was crucial and having already set precedents for the
ninety-nine year long term lease itself, did not press UDC
for any shorter habendum.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS AND CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENTS
An important question to be resolved was which party should
have prime responsibility for preparing designs, plans and
15.
specifications for all the improvements called for by the
General Development Plan. Although the memorandum of under-
standing tentatively gave this responsibility to UDC, the parties
reconsidered the issue before finalizing it in the lease.
Traditionally, the City has reviewed and approved all building
plans and sometimes their design before construction has taken
place. The City considered this review process crucial in
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allowing it to insure not only high architectural standards
and aesthetic acceptability, but also the adequacy, safety
and comparability of the public facilities and improvements
to be built. The City realized, however, that this process
often did not facilitate development or allow the developer
the power to quickly conceive and execute plans for improve-
ment. As a normal part of its development function, UDC
was willing to assume all responsibilities related to pre-
paring plans, either on its own or through its proposed sub-
sidiary, the Welfare Island Development Corporation (WIDC);
but it rejected the idea of City intrusion in terms of plan
approval. This desire for autonomy stemmed from UDC's
legislative ability to override local building and zoning
ordinances and also, more importantly, from the feeling that
as a public agency it was an equal to the City and therefore
should not be subject to the City's normal operating procedures.1 6 .
Aside from these factors, UDC's committment to good design was
well known, and UDC was fearful of the City's bureaucracy
hindering rather than encouraging good design. Even top City
officials were of the view that UDC was more to be trusted as
the arbiter of final plan design than the City's entrenched,
staid and often unimaginative bureaucrats responsible for plan
review.
In addition to the question of responbility for designs and
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plans, the issue of responsibility for construction of all
improvements remained to be resolved. The City's bringing in
of a developer in the first place clearly was for the purpose
of obligating that developer to construct all of the improve-
ments, with the exception of the public facilities. This point
was already generally understood and agreed upon by both
parties, although it had not as yet been definitelyascertained
whether UDC itself or WIDC would in actuality carry out this
responsibility.
Resolution
Subsequent to negotiations on this point, it was agreed that
UDC would be obligated for the detailed development planning
and implementation (including design), for obtaining the
financing, and for assuring the construction of all the improve-
ments. This provision is in sharp contrast to the one in the
memorandum of understanding, in which the subsidiary, WIDC, was
charged with constructing or arranging to construct the improve-
ments called for by the UDC final plan, and where it is also
the subsidiary who was to arrange for project financing. The
reason for this change seems to be that since the direct parties
to the lease and the negotiations are UDC and the City, the City
wanted to have the lessee, UDC, liable for these obligations
rather than a paper subsidiary.
TIME CONSTRAINTS
Another crucial provision in most ground leases and one
which often arouses heated debate is a time limit placed upon
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construction. The City would obviously like to have the
developer provide the improvements he has committed himself
to build as quickly as possible in order to insure both the
completion of the development and a safe and reliable stream
of ground rent and taxes. To insure that it is built and to
prevent UDC from stalling or delaying development for whatever
reason, a construction time limit provision was viewed as
essential by the City, with that limit forcing development to
take place within as short a time period as possible while
still allowing the developer some time leeway.
From the developer 's viewpoint it would be preferable not
to have any timing enforcement provision at all since he would
like as much time and leeway as needed to develop the premises.
If the developer did agree to such a timing provision, however,
in return he would press hard for a provision guaranteeing him
a means of extricating himself from the lease obligations in the
event that "circumstances beyond his control" prevented the
successful development of the land. In other words, the timing
control, although forcing development to commence by a certain
date, could also be used as a double edged sword. If the City
does not fulfill any of the obligations it undertakes and upon
which the progress of the development is contingent (i.e. the
completion of a subway line to Welfare Island), or if for other
reasons beyond UDC's control it cannot proceed with the develop-
ment, UDC could then press for termination of the lease, leaving
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the lessor with the land-very likely with additional obligations.
Resolution
According to the development timetable eventually agreed
upon, construction on Welfare Island was to begin subject to
17.
enforced delay * in eighteen months, by June 23, 1971, and
to be completed by June 23, 1979. If subway service was not
started by this completion date, then an additional two years
would be granted beyond the actual start of subway service.
(There is still some doubt that subway service will be ready
by June 23, 1979.1 If subway service does not begin, or if
enforced delay somehow postpones completion of construction
beyond December 23, 1984, either the City or UDC may terminate
the lease, giving 180 days written notice. 18. The completion
of subway service is seen as the City's responsibility and if
the lease is terminated for this reason, the City must pay
or assume any indebtedness with interest allocable for public
facilities. (This is the sole reason UDC could walk away from
its lease obligations and force the City to assume the full
public facilities debt. This will be discussed more fully in
the section on default.) In other words, UDC must begin
construction within eighteen months of the lease signing, but
if events occur beyond UDC's control (enforced delay, or subway
completion substantially delayed), UDC can bail out until
June 23, 1985. This again is a two-edged sword, for if no
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improvements other than public facilities are started by
this date, the effect on UDC, outside of substantial planning
and overhead expenses, would be minimal; on the other hand,
if construction has already begun, the effects would be
catastrophic. Perhaps only a UDC would be able to survive;
certainly almost no private developer could.
What should not be lost sight of it that UDC was given the
critical element of time. By not having to begin construction,
subject to enforced delay, until June 23, 1971, it has a
sufficient time period (over two years and two months) in
which to make the hard decision of whether or not to proceed. 19.
The completion time was certainly a bone of contention between
the City and UDC, with UDC trying to extend the period as long
as possible and the City trying to reduce it. The resolution
occurred some time after September 2, 1969 when Edward Logue
approved Paul Byard's request: "May I agree to...reduce the
time for completion to eight years?" 20.
RELOCATION AND DEMOLITION
UDC wanted to assume a developable site ready for the
digging of foundations and construction of improvements. It
especially did not want the responsibility for relocation or
demolition of existing structures since these problems would
only add to its costs and create time delays. The City, on
the other hand., realizing that it would be helping to facili-
tate development by providing UDC with a "ready to go" site,
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seemed willing to obligate itself to clear and demolish the
leased areas for UDC and to relocate existing City uses
promptly. UDC wanted to insure, however, that the City carried
out these responsibilities as quickly as possible; certainly
no later than UDC's development timetable required certain areas
to be ready for construction. Fearing that this relocation
requirement, although appearing simple and neat, would become a
bone of contention during the development process (possibly
even delaying development), UDC wanted the City effectively to
obligate itself to a quick and speedy execution long before any
development work was even due to commence.
Resolution
The eventual provision relating to demolition reaffirmed the
general memorandum of understanding which pledged the City to:
... the City will generally transfer project sites to the
UDC for development free of all tenancies and improvements
and the UDC will have no responsibilities for assembly, re-
location, or demolition as parts of the projects. 21.
In fact the City had already begun to demolish the dilapated
buildings on the Island before the memorandum of understanding was
even signed, let alone the lease points negotiated.
PUBLIC FACILITIES
Responsibility for Construction and Financing
The question of public facilities loomed large on the
negotiating table. For the City, public facilities represented
perhaps the major obligation it had in the Welfare Island project,
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not so much as lessor, but as a municipality that also happened
to be a landowner. It was the City's traditional obligation
to provide and/or construct public facilities for all develop-
ment in the City. In this case, however, the City was loathe to
assume the responsibility of financing or even constructing them.
For one, it ,anted to avoid if at all possible any appropriation
process or debt financing that would further tax its already
overburdened debt limit. Its capital budgeting procedure for
public facilities is a long and drawn out process calling for
approvals from various city agencies as well as from the City
Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate. Waiting for
approvals through this complicated and lengthy procedure had
often delayed projects that depended upon completion of those
facilities in order to proceed. Recognizing this problem from
previous experience and keeping in mind its desire to have this
project completed as quickly as possible, the City felt that UDC,
as a quasi-public agency of the State with developmental powers,
could construct the facilities for the City (thus avoiding the
City's approval process) and could possibly even finance the
facilities long term using UDC's own tax-exempt financing. This
factor would protect the City's interest by not placing it in the
position of having to pay a much greater sum than it would have
paid had it financed the public facilities itself. These
facilities could then be turned over to the City immediately upon
completion by sale or lease under a turnkey approach. Depending
on the means of financing to be arranged, difficulties would
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still be incurred with City bodies which would then be
responsible for appropriating the necessary funds. Never-
theless, this approach was an ideal one for the City since
it would then have no obligations for construction on
Welfare Island at all, would therefore not have to go through
a complicated approval process, and most importantly would
not tax its own overburdened debt limit. Aware that it stood
little to gain from the development anyway in terms of ground
rent and taxes (since whether it or UDC built public facilities,
those revenues or others would somehow have to be diverted to
repay the debt incurred), the City would therefore be receptive
to any solution or compromise that would help it avert the res-
ponsibility for construction, even if it meant making significant
concessions in the process.
Realizing the City's problem in terms of its overburdened
debt limit and fearing the delays that would be involved in
obtaining necessary approvals were the City to finance and con-
struct public facilities, UDC was willing to construct the public
facilities and to use its own unique financing ability to relieve
the City's burden, if it could in return receive some concessions
from the City. This arrangement would insure for UDC that the
public facilities would be constructed when they were desired
and needed and would insure the development's rapid progress.
In addition, UDC wanted to provide innovative public facilities
as set forth in the Johnson Plan and felt that it could do so
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more easily than the City which could not easily assume such
an unconventional posture. Basically, UDC wanted control over
what was constructed, how and when it was to be constructed,
and how it would be operated, maintained and integrated into the
development. Only by constructing all the improvements including
public facilities could it have this type of control. 22.
Thus UDC and the City were both agreeable to UDC's constructing
the public facilities with the only question remaining being how
they were to be financed. UDC could even agree to provide tax
exempt financing for the public facilities if the City would then
obligate itself to buy or lease the facilities or find some other
way to reimburse UDC for them, to cover their yearly cost, to make
up any deficit, and to agree to take over the full public
facilities debt in the event of a lease termination.
Also important was that the City agree to pay UDC by sale or
lease a sum to cover UDC's cost of designing, financing, and
constructing the public facilities including any debt service,
penalty, or premium on such service, as well as UDC's normal
allowances (basically a wastebasket term for UDC overhead). 23.
It would have to assure itself, however, of favorable lease
terms in order to insure the project's success, possibly trading
off financing the development for control by the City over plans,
etc.
UDC's unique ability to finance improvements thus helped to
facilitate the development process, whereas a private developer
- 178 -
would have had extreme difficulty in obtaining city
committments to finance improvements such as utilties let
alone housing, and would doubtless have subjected himself
to endless delays even if successful. UDC clearly under-
stood "the ace it had up its sleeve" and was hopeful of maxi-
mizing this advantage during the negotiations in return for
tradeoffs from the city. 24. The City, for its part, was
determined to avoid obligating itself financially for any
capital improvements, even public facilities if at all possible,
and was willing to work out any compromise with UDC that would
guarantee such an arrangement.
Cost Factors
In order to provide some protection against the possibility
that UDC would inflate public facilities costs the City felt
that it should demand certification of those costs, although
it realized that with UDC as construction supervisor and developer,
even certified figures would provide scant protection. The City
also wanted cost comparability, but the question arose as to
what could be considered comparable to the innovative public
facilities that were to be built on the Island. The only public
facility that could realistically be compared was the school, and
here the City did plan to ask for cost comparability since it
was assured of state reimbursement for a large share of its
capital expenditure over the life of the school bond issue.
Using this reimbursement mechanism, the City would be able to pay
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for the school through a lease or sale from UDC and thereby
cover its complete cost. Cost comparability in this case
would serve the additional purpose of allowing the City's
isolated debt service for the school to be scrutinized by the
State or even the public, and since it would be unconsolidated
it could be used in determining whether costs were indeed
excessive. The City would then use other comparable city schools
as a valid yardstick measure in obtaining a legitimate average
cost for similar facilities (while still granting UDC a little
financial latitude beyond that average, if it so desired.1
From the City's viewpoint, however, public facility costs
should be low for two reasons. First, the City was counting on
UDC as a state agency with Republican friends in the White House
to receive sizeable public facility grants for much of the
innovative and exotic hardware that would be needed, thus re-
ducing the cash outflow and therefore the City's eventual cost
of paying off the public facility debt service. The grants would
be viewed in essence as gifts that would not have to be repaid,
and would serve as justification for the exotic hardware that
probably could not otherwise be afforded. Secondly, counting on
the lease to be profit-sharing, the City felt confident that UDC
would provide the public facilities within reasonable limits of
adequacy and cost accountability since it would be to its
benefit as well as to the City's in making the development an'
economic success. 25.
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UDC, on the other ahnd, felt that cost comparability was an
unwarranted nuisance, and argued that there were no comparables
for much of the public facilities it would build. One reason UDC
was undertaking the construction of the public facilities at all
was that the City itself probably would not be able to build many
of the public facilities authorized by the General Development
Plan since they would be considered excessive, untried and a
waste of public resources. UDC was willing to go ahead with cost
comparab'lity, for the Welfare Island school since the City was
making a compelling justification for it. But it reasoned that
for the other public facilities, the City would be relying on
more than TJDC's good faith alone. UDC was also controlled by the
knowledge that it would have to either receive a large number of
grants or limit its expenditures for public facilities, since any
debt service not covered by grants would have to be paid oit of
development revenues. In addition, there was still the extreme
possibility that UDC would have to pay for the public facilities
or be obligated for their debt, if for some reason the City
refused to release UDC of the debt service obligation even in the
event of a default.
The problems of determining cost, and agreeing on cost
certifi'cation and cost comparability were crucial ones, as was
the issue of what review power the City would have. Intense
negotiations were necessary before a resolution acceptable to
both sides came about, as reflected in paragraph three of the
final lease.
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Resolution
In the eventual provision negotiated by the City and UDC
regarding public facilities, UDC obligated itself to provide
tax-exempt financing for public facilities from its own finan-
cing source, thus not taxing the City's debt limit and at the
26.
same time speeding up an otherwise lengthy and cumbersome process.
The City's Corporation Counsel, J. Lee Rankin, specifically
added the requirement during the negotiations that all public
facilities would have to be financed using tax-exempt funds,
reasoning that since the debt service cost incurred by the lessee
would eventually be borne by the City, the public facilities
should be financed with tax-exempt funds as the City would have
done had it constructed the facilities itself. 27.
Equally important to UDC however, was the fact that it could
consequently design and construct the public facilities on its
own timetable. This provision provided UDC with the flexibility
and certainty, that facilities would be built on time, a situation
that would be less than likely under the City's auspices (as
the sorry experience with city public facilities for Coop City
has demonstrated).
A significant concession made by the City was that UDC
would maintain control over the final design of the public
facility construction plans. The City and UDC, each in accordance
with its own laws and regulations for projects, could legally
certify completion of the project, "whichever event shall occur
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first". The negotiating session on July 22, dealt with this
very point. Paul Byard stated:
We reached a consensus to the effect that we would
certify to completion in accordance with the standards
of the department and that the City would have a period
in which to make objections. I have retreated somewhat
from that understanding because, if the City has the
right to inspect and recommend and we have the obliga-
tion of a public agency to produce an acceptable facility
which ties in with existing facilities, our certificate
should be enough. 28
This point was eventually won by UDC. The result was a dilution
of City power from approval to mere review and recommendation.
The memorandum of understanding had spoken only vaguely of UDC
responsibility for design of projects including preparation of
architectural plans and specifications, subject to city review.
But city review as intended here entails: "From time to time
upon request ... ........ ., the UDC will review the status of
such project with the representative of the City". 29. The
City's normal powers of final review for drawings and specifica-
tions of public facilities have thus been significantly diluted
to: "permit agents of the Department of Lessor having jurisdic-
tion of similar public facilities to inspect such drawings and
30*
to make recommendations thereon". This differs significantly
from the right to modify or disapprove any project. In effect,
the City is abdicating its right of review and its normal pre-
rogative to control its own public facilities as a concession for
'UDC's agreeing to construct and finance them, in the belief that
UDC would produce a high quality product.
In addition to the concessions the City had already made to
UDC, the City was prepared to make yet another in its effort to
- 183 -
insure UDC's comittment to construct and finance public
facilities. The memorandum of understanding for Welfare
Island clearly hinged project feasibility upon "...funds
available from State or other sources other than the City
for the project parks and recreational facilities". 31.
In entering the negotiations, even UDC was confident that
the New York State Parks Commission for New York City would
provide the parks according to their previously announced
intent. -Hopes for this eventuality were later dimmed, how-
ever, and the developer was anxious to make contingency
plans. The resultant lease provision contradicts the memor-
andum by stating that if these funds are not secured through
the -means mentioned in the memorandum, UDC would secure them
from the City or from its own tax-exempt financing, a com-
promise marking a fundamental change in the City's position.
Despite the fact that the City would probably never agree to
financing the parks, it has still given in to including parks
as a part of public facilities (no matter how reluctantly),
a -major retreat from its earlier position in the memorandum of
excluding parks from its financial obligations. 32.
Although the method of reimbursing UDC for the construction
and financing of public facilities is not discussed in this
provision (it is discussed in the section under basic rent),
the maintenance and operation of these facilities is considered
here. For the sum of one dollar, the City agreed to lease back
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from UDC all the public facilities upon completion, and
agreed to operate and maintain these public facilities,
with the exception of the school or appurtenance and those
public facilities to be maintained and operated by UDC as
provided for in the General Development Plan. Another
provision asserts a modicum of City control over the maximum
price it would pay to lease or purchase the Welfare Island
school or appurtenance from UDC once completed. By setting
an upper limit on what it would spend, the City is thus en-
couraging UDC to insure that its costs conform to the pro-
visions and do not go beyond, giving the City some degree of
certainty in regard to cost. On the other hand, the provision
also allows UDC to inflate construction costs, normal allowances,
etc, to bring its costs up to the legal maximum set on the
schools. 33.
The importance of the leasing and purchasing provisions is
in insuring a formula for arriving at a fair price to protect
both UDC and the City. Upon purchase of the schools by the City,
UDC i's protected for all its costs including design, financing,
construction, full debt service payments and normal allowances,
as well as any premium payments for early note or bond retire-
ment. A similar formula for leasing was worked out but on an
annual basis. Upon completion of debt service payments, the
City would be able to purchase the school for the nominal sum of
one dollar and the balance of any yearly rent due. This
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agreement, carefully drawn up by the City and UDC, was
essential in protecting their respective interests when an
actual financial accounting was due.
Conclusion
Although the City accomplished its limited objective of
avoiding the construction and financing of public facilities,
it had to concede a significant amount of its traditional
control over public facilities in the process. 34. Basically,
the developer was given complete responsibility for public
factlities from construction and financing to actual design,
with the City playing little or no role other than in their
eventual maintenance and operation. The City felt it could
justify this tradeoff primarily because UDC was considered
35.even -more committed to high design standards than was the City,3
and because the financial and administrative burden of providing
public facilities had been lifted from the City. It therefore
felt it had nothing to lose and everything to gain from such an
arrangement. (It should be noted, however, that only because
of the developer's unique powers and position could such a
tradeoff even take place.1
BASIC RENT
In most leases, the determination of reddendum or rent is
usually the most important provision, and this lease is no
exception. 36. The City wanted to extract as much rent as possible
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from UDC without endangering the development or its chances
of success. UDC, on the other hand, obviously wanted to
minimize its rents payments to the City. In this particular
case, a further complication arose as the City is entitled
not only to rent, but also to property taxes or tax equival-
ency payments, and any agreement on rent must take both into
account.
RENT
To determine what rent was to be paid, both parties had
to agree first upon a method of calculating rent. There are
basically three different methods of determining rents in
ground leases. 37.
Fixed Rent
One method is to fix rent absolutely at a predetermined
level, a method that for the lessor can be attractive if the
rent is set high enough initially to give the lessor
a sufficiently high present value return on his land
investment. If there is no provision to renegotiate after a
certain length of time, however, the fixed nature of the payment
tends to benefit the lessee more, since in inflationary times,
the rent remains a fixed absolute cost and therefore becomes a
declining percentage of the project's gross revenues. The
fixed rent approach also has its drawbacks for the lessee,
however, since the payment is proportionally steepest during
the earliest and most crucial phase of the development process,
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a time when the primary objective is to reduce expenditure
and minimize risk. Although that disadvantage may be balanced
or mitigated by the inflationary effect of proportionally
lower rents in the future, that advantage can be realized only
if the project is a success. In order to insure the success of
the development, the lessee would rather minimize early pay-
'ments and so retain any profit at a high present value during
the early years rather than in later years.
'Fixed Rent Formula
The second method, a variation of the first, is the fixed
rent formula approach. Rather than setting an absolute sum,
: t pegs rent at a specific date to some other value that may
vary such as land or gross revenue. Usually rent varies only
-upward with each boost setting a new minimum floor level. In
this case, however, that boost may only occur either at some
prespecified point in time or when the lease is renegotiated. The
advantage to the lessee is primarily that rent becomes a fixed
cost set at an equitable level, thus reducing uncertainties and
project risk and also giving him some certainty over his cash
flow (as he would have had he purchased the land). The lessee
still benefits by inflation as in the first method, at least
until the rent adjustment date.
The prime advantage for the lessor is that if the rent is
set high enough initially, he may receive a high present value
return on his investment and yet also retain the chance to
receive a still higher rent whenever rent if adjusted. On the
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other hand, if the rent is not set high enough initially,
inflation reduces its benefit in time and the rent adjust-
ment date may be far off in the future. Fairness to the
lessor can be insured if a profit sharing agreement is made
between the two parties above and beyond the ground rent.
A profit sharing agreement is one that allows for a prede-
termined sharing between the lessor and lessee of the lessee's
profits from the project, once all of his expenses and fees
have been deducted. This type of provision thus prevents
windfall profits to the lessee due to the lessor's agreement
to use a fixed formula rent over a long period of years, and
basically protects the lessor's interests.
Floating Rent
The third method, the floating rent approach, is similar
to the previous one except that the rent is allowed to float
yearly, tied to whatever value, index (gross revenue, land
value, or even the cost of living) or formula is agreed upon.
The rent here too is usually permitted to move only upward,
each boost thus acting as a minimum ground rent level. For
the lessor this is perhaps the best approach since it always
guarantees him a minimum rent, (he benefits if the formula
used is sentitive to inflationary pressures, as are most) and
since it provides for periodic review and consequent adjust-
ments of rent when necessary. For the lessee, however, this
technique is the least desirable of all, since even if the
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current rent is supportable by revenues, he has no degree
of certainty over what his future rent payments will be.
If steep rises occur in the early years when cash flow is
most uncertain, then the development's very future may be in
jeopardy. Very few developments will have net profits
rising rapidly enough to support this approach (unless the
formula was pegged to profits). The lessee's fear of the
inherent problems in this type of approach may lead him to
agree to a profit sharing lease above a fixed ground rent
as a preferrable arrangement.
In entering the negotiations to determine ground rent
and tax payments, the City's foremost goal was still to have
the Welfare Island development succeed, although at the same
time it wanted to maximize the ground rent it would receive
from the leased premises. It is possible that the City had
in mind a specific yearly ground rent figure since there is
a $2,000,000 floor mentioned at one point. 38. The City felt,
however, that an arbitrarily fixed rent sum was by itself
too simplistic an approach. Obviously an equitable formula
for both parties would have to be arrived at, one that would
fairly compensate the City for use of the leased premises
and at the same time reduce uncertainties for the developer
Cat least initially). The City thus reluctantly agreed not
to press for the floating rent approach although that would
have been most advantageous for itself, and instead was
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agreeable to using a fixed rent formula in order to
facilitate the development. At the same time, however,
it also wanted to protect the City's vital interests and
prevent any windfall profits to UDC that might result
from such an agreement. To insure those vital interests,
it would demand a profit sharing agreement in return for
agreeing to this fixed rent formula approach.
In determining a rent formula, the City realized that
UDC's only source of proceeds for paying rent would come
from the revenue-producing elements of the program and
obviously not from public facilities. The determination
of the development program, then, was a crucial ingredient
in arriving at an acceptable rent, although the City"s
plan had not been developed with the highest and best use
or maximum revenues to the City in mind.
As in most ground leases a land valuation had to be
made, in this case based not on the raw square footage of
land but upon the type and quantity of the revenue-bearing
improvements. Ground rent would have to be set at a level
sufficient not only to support public facilities, but also
to allow the various housing and commercial elements to be
economically viable under their own financing and competiti*vely
priced for their respective markets. While the land value
issue was crucial, the amount of ground rent per year would
depend also upon the agreed upon rate of return to the City
for that land value.
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Like other developers, UDC also used the land residual
approach in determining supportable land value. A developer
first determines his maximum total replacement cost and
mortgage for the housing and commercial space program. He
then calculates his total carrying charges, vacancy reserve,
estimated property taxes and his desired return. Whatever
remains is the maximum available for ground rent payments
40-
that year. Capitalized, this figure determines land value.
The developer is unconcerned with the land value however,
other than in the way it relates to the dollar figure he can
support. The City did not meekly accept this approach, but
rather negotiated using its own figures, bolstered by those
of comparable housing and commercial space elsewhere in the
City.
UDC further benefits by the fact that landowners
generally have lower capitalization rates than do developers
and this is doubly true where the landowner and the City are
one. Thus the landowner, in any case, would come up with a
higher land valuation than would any developer. Nevertheless,
the two parties negotiated not only on the dollar figure but
also on the land value. Even using its own capitalization
rate, the City had to justify any deal made and was always
susceptible to charges of a giveaway. The City felt it
would be able to justify a land value to the public based on
its own capitalization rate, a value that UDC could also
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accept (although UDC alone could not have justified as
high a figure using its own rate). This advantage is one
that the developer is able to exploit only through leasing,
especially leasing from the City. He is able in effect
to borrow the full value of the City's land at a cost less
than debt service on the improvements (even at UDC's
lending ratel.
UDC entered the negotiations with a desire to keep the
ground rent payments as low as possible in order to keep
rents marketable, and the development economically viable.
It therefore regarded fixing the rent payment as crucial in
reducing risk and uncertainty and in determining the develop-
ment's long term cash flow; and in order to guarantee that
rent would be determined according to a fixed rent formula,
UDC was willing, however reluctantly, to agree to a profit-
sharing arrangement. (Most businessmen are more willing to
pay a "tax" on profits than on gross revenues especially
where the project's success is undertain and therefore profits
unknown.) 41.
Property Tax & Equivalency Payments
The determination of the amount of taxes that should be
paid the City by UDC became a complicated procedure owing to
UDC's unique tax situation. Exempt from normal tax require-
inents, UDC's statute called for in lieu of tax payments of
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ten percent of shelter rent for all housing it financed,
whether public, subsidized, or middle-income housing. 42.
This factor in essence predetermined the tax solution for
the greater part of the housing on Welfare Island.
Although the City would certainly have liked a higher sum,
it was willing to go along with this ten percent figure
for the public housing since it was already following such
a formula itself for other public housing in the City, and
for the subsidized moderate income housing since its own
moderate income Mitchell-Lama program was also subject to
the same formula. For the straight Mitchell-Lama housing,
however, for which rents in 1969 were approaching the then
high peak of eighty to ninety dollars per room per month,
the ten percent figure was clearly unacceptable to the City.
The City argued that the income group being served was not
low or moderate income and could therefore afford to pay a
more jus~t levy. In addition, other non-UDC straight
Mitchell-Lama projects in the City were already paying more
than the ten percent in taxes and the City was concerned that
it obtain at least the equivalent in taxes to comparable
housing built elsewhere.
UDC would have liked to leave the tax payment at ten
percent for the Mitchell-Lama middle income housing, and
statutorily was within its rights to do so. However, special
counsel to the City, Sam Brooks, felt that middle income
straight Mitchell-Lama should be treated as a separate item
with a higher ground rent and tax equivalent 43., clearly
implying that the Board of Estimate would not accept the lease
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unless this tax figure was revised. As a result, both
parties were at an impasse as to this tax aspect of the
housing program. For the conventionally financed housing
and commercial space, no such tax stipulation existed and
UDC was concerned that the City might levy the same tax
burden (usually measured as percent of gross revenue) as
for comparable property elsewhere in the City. 44'
Furthermore, UDC was also concerned with fixing most
of these tax payments at their initial first year level as
a means of stabilizing the earlier more hazardous period of
the development. A tax freeze would help keep rents down
in the dwellings thus affected (basic rent and taxes being
passable expenses to tenants), and under a freeze, the City
would not lose out since its interests would be protected
from the possibility of UDC's making windfall profits by
the inclusion of a profit sharing lease. The City understood
UDC's contentions but countered that by providing for public
facilities it had incurred a major yearly cost and therefore
would need all the tax revenue it could get. Although
willing to accept UDC's arguments for freezing taxes for the
low and moderate income housing, it was reluctant to do so
for the middle income housing (even if government aided), and
even more reluctant for the conventionally financed housing,
since in both of these categories tenants could supposedly
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afford the passthrough of taxes in rents. As for
commercial space, the City had no intention of allowing
UDC to pay anything but full equivalent taxes to be de-
termined in the same manner as for all other commercial
space in the City--at the current real estate tax rate
45.
times the assessed value of the improvement. * (The
City also realized that any profit to be shared would, like
taxes, come only from increased revenues or rents to UDC.
Thus the City would probably be better off increasing taxes
rather than freezing them, thus increasing its revenue.)
One of the crucial problems facing both parties was the
Board of Estimate's determination not to accept a tax equiva-
lent expressed in any way other than at the "then current tax
rate multiplied by the then current assessed valuation, less
the tax exemption". 46. (This was the phrasing used also in
the Battery Park City lease.) Thus, while UDC pressed the
City for a guarantee of tax stabilization, the City felt it
could not accede since the Board of Estimate would not accept
anything that on the face of it looked like a tax deal for UDC.
Public Facilities Payment
Another crucial unresolved issue in the lease concerned
the method by which the City would provide compensation to UDC
for constructing and financing the public facilities.
There were' several alternative approaches that the City
could use to pay for public facilities debt services:
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1) .the City could appropriate funds directly to pay for
the yearly debt service; 2) it could pay for the entire in-
frastructure after UDC had financed and completed it, thus
assuming the permanent financing and allowing UDC to provide
the construction financing alone; or 31 it could allow UDC
to deduct the debt service payment for public facilities
from the rent and taxes due the City. '
If the City were to appropriate funds, it would undoubtedly
incur some complicated budget problems that it would prefer
to avoid, problems such as justifying the unique financing
and construction approach, the extent of the facilities, and
the amount therefore required on a yearly basis. The City
would also prefer not to finance the development under the
second alternative for the same reasons as above, and for the
additional one of not wanting to use its overburdened debt
limit. The one method that did appeal to the City was the de-
duction of the payment from the revenues due it from UDC. This
accounting procedure, if it could be worked out, would thus
not obligate the City for any cash payment and would therefore
not depend on yearly city appropriations.
This arrangement was ideal from UDC's point of view as well,
since it wanted the certainty of knowing that if it agreed to
finance the public facilities, it would then be able to retain
what it ordinarily would have paid the City in basic rent as
reimbursement. It would thus not be dependent upon city
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appropriations or payment schedules, or any number of
possible delays that city payment might entail. UDC
realized that it would also be much easier for the City
to pay for public facilities debt out of these revenues
than from the general city budget since no direct city
appropriation or accounting would be involved.
Another major question, however, revolved not so much
around the satisfactory resolution of this issue of re-
imbursement, but rather around the question of how the City
would make up any deficit in basic rent if there was not
enough revenue to pay off public facilities debt. UDC
wanted the City to appropriate any funds that might be
necessary to pay off this .debt rather than having to make
up any difference itself by paying more rent, the solution
which the City would have preferred.
In the determination of the basic rent formula, not
only was it important to take account of the debt service
for public facilities cost that would possibly be deducted
from rent, but it was also important from UDC's point of view
to deduct normal allowances allocable to that year. The
problem on this issue arose not so much because the City and
UDC disagreed on this basic contention, but because they
could not agree upon the definition of normal allowances.
Normal allowances for a developer usually refers to the over-
head expenses, fees and even remuneration for a particular
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development. However, the details of the definition
can vary and thus only through negotiations could this
issue and the others be resolved. 48.
Resolution
These were some of the issues that the City and UDC
had to deal with in determining the ground rent and tax
equivalency payments. Both parties understood that the
success of the development hinged on how well the resolution
of these problems fulfilled the interests of both parties:
the City's desire not to provide additional funds for
capital improvements; UDC's need to protect the development's
economic feasibility; and both parties' need for a fair and
equitable rent formula.
The basic rent formula reads as follows:
(a) Basic Rent. For each year of the term of this
Lease, Lessee shall pay to Lessor...as an annual tax
equivalent payment and ground rent, a Basic Rent which
shall be equal to the aggregate of the following sums,
less Debt Service for Public Facilities and Normal
Allowances allocable to such year: 49.
For Subsidized Housing:
(1) The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product
of $30 multiplied by the number of Completed Units of
Subsidized Housing plus (y) a tax equivalent for Sub-
sidized Housing equal to 10% of Annual Shelter Rent; 50.
For Middle Income Housing:
(2) The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product
of $180 multiplied by the number of Completed Units of
Middle Income Housing plus (y) a tax equivalent for
Middle Income Housing equal to 10% of Annual Shelter Rent;
For Conventionally Financed Housing:
(31 The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product
of $340 multiplied by the number of Completed Units of
Conventionally Financed Housing plus (y) the Tax Equiva-
lent for Conventionally Financed Housing;
For Commercial Space:
(4) The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product
of $.60 (sixty cents) multiplied by the number of square
feet of Completed Commercial Space plus (y) the Tax Equiva-
lent for Commercial Space. 51.
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The fixed formula rent approach is adjusted in the following
manner:
Adjustment of Rent. The Basic Rent shall be adjusted
as follows:
Ca} the ground rents set forth in subparagraphs
1Cx), 2 (xl, 3(x) and 4(x) of paragraph 4(a) hereof
shall be adjusted on each Rent Adjustment Date by
substituting after such date the Then "Current Ground
Rent for the Improvement or part of an improvement
adjusted as of such date for the ground rent payable
on account of such Improvement or part of an Improve-
-ment prior to such date, provided, however, that in the
event the Then Current Ground Rent on such Rent Ad-
Justed Date shall beless than the ground rent for such
Improvement set forth in subparagraph 1 (x), 2 (x), 3 (x),
or 4Cxl of such paragraph, as appropriate, no such ad-
justment shall be made; 52
This provision in the lease adds an inflation adjustor for
the lessor, with that adjustment allowed to move only upward.
In the event that the new current ground rent is less than that
of the previous rent adjustment date, the rent remains the same.
The inflator provides additional justification for use of a six
percent interest rate in devising an appropriate ground rent for
the City, as this six percent can be applied to a progressively
larger and larger land value. This arrangement seems fine until
the definition of rent adjustment date is analyzed. Increased
revenue as an inflation hedge is not a certainty in the present
or near future, but may be useful someday in order to receive
additional revenue from the project...in other words, a forty
year rent freeze.
Rent Adjustment Date: The 40th- anniversary of the
issuance of Lessee's certificate of completion or of
Lessor's temporary or permanent certificate of occu-,
pancy, whichever shall first have been issued, with
respect to each Improvement or part of an Improvement
consisting of Subsidized Housing, Middle Income Housing,
Conventionally Financed Housing or Commercial Space and
each 10th anniversary of the date of such issuance after
such 40th anniversary. 53.
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Derivation of Ground Rent and Tax Payment Formula
In order to understand how and why the formula for
ground rent and taxes was determined, each formula shall be
examined individually.
Subsidized Housing
Within the context of the lease, subsidized housing refers
to housing for those persons Celderly and non-elderly) and
families meeting income eligibility standards for admission to
federally assisted public housing, and for persons and families
eligible under section 236 of the National Housing Act.
For the subsidized housing the ground rent is given as
thirty dollars per unit. Elsewhere in the lease the formula's
derivation is disclosed:
Then Current Ground Rent: With respect to each
improvement consisting of Subsidized Housing, 6%
of the product of (x) the current land cost per
unit for economically feasible new housing in New
York City for persons and f amilies of low and mod-
erate income as of each Rent Adjustment Date for
such improvement times (y) the number of units con-
tained in' such Improvement; 54.
Assuming that thirty dollars is the product of six percent times
the current land cost per unit for economically feasible low
and moderate income new housing in New York City, then working
backwards, the value of current land cost per unit is $500. UDC
did not begin assuming this $500 land cost however, until
August 28, 1969. Earlier in July it was assuming $1000 per unit
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as land cost for the subsidized housing, and using a six
percent rate of return (equal to UDC's cost of borrowing)
had determined a $60 figure per unit, still below the City's
expectation of $120 per unit for subsidized housing ground
rent. 56. The City finally agreed, however, to allow UDC
the same $500 figure for Welfare Island that it applied to
any disposition of urban renewal land to UDC. The justifi-
cation for this figure is that it is the maximum cost that
can be charged for land while still allowing the development
of economically feasible housing for low and moderate income
families. 57' Using the land residual approach with even the
higher than FHA allowable UDC mortgage, the deduction of all
expenses and profits from the mortgage leaves a very slim
allowance for land if the developer is still to come in under
mortgage limits. In other words, a higher land price would be
unworkable since it would push rents up beyond project feasib-
ility.
In determining the derivation of the six percent figure it
would be useful to look back to 1969 and examine then-prevailing
interest rates. (Tables III,IV, & V respectively include:
Money Market Rates; Bond and Stock Yields; and Terms on Conven-
tional First Mortgages.) It is apparent from examining interest
rates in 1969 that towards the end of the year rates were slowly
rising. The six percent figure appears to be more closely re-
lated to the rate of long term United States Government Bonds
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TABLE III
MONEY MARKET RATES
(Per cent per annum)
U.S. Government securities (taxable) 4
Finance__________ __________
Prime Co. Prime
Period coml. paper bankers' Federal 3-month bills 5 6-month bills s 9- to 12-month issues
paper, placed accept- funds 3- to 5-
4- to 6- directly, ances, rate 3 year
months 1 3- to 6- 90 days I Rate on Market Rate on Market Bills (mar- Other 6 issues 7
months 2 new issue yield new issue yield ket yield)s
1962............... 3.26 3.07 3.01 2.68 2.778 2.77 2.908 2.90 3.01 3.02 3.57
1963............... 3.55 3.40 3.36 3.18 3.157 3.16 3.253 3.25 3.30 3.28 3.72
1964............... 3.97 3.83 3.77 3.50 3.549 3.54 3.686 3.68 3.74 3.76 4.06
1965 ............... .4.38 4.27 4.22 4.07 3.954 3.95 4.055 4.05 4.06 4.09 4.22
1966............... .5.55 5.42 5.36 5.11 4.881 4.85 5.082 5.06 5.07 5.17 5.16
1967............... 5.10 4.89 4.75 4.22 4.321 4.30 4.630 4.61 4.71 4.84 5.07
1968............... 5.90 5.69 5.75 5.66 5.339 5.33 5.470 5.48 5.45 5.62 5.59
1969............... 7.83 7.16 7.61 8.22 6.677 6.64 6.853 6.84 6.77 7.06 6.85
1969-Jan........... 6.53 6.14 6.46 6.30 6.177 6.13 6.312 6.28 6.05 6.26 6.04
Feb........... 6.62 6.33 6.47 6.64 6.156 6.12 6.309 6.30 6.19 6.21 6.16
Mar.......... 6.82 6.38 6.66 6.79 6.080 6.01 6.223 6.16 6.19 6.22 6.33
Apr.......... 7.04 6.38 6.86 7.41 6.150 6.11 6.168 6.13 6.03 6.11 6.15
May......... 7.35 6.54 7.38 8.67 6.077 6.03 6.149 6.15 6.10 6.26 6.33
June......... 8.23 7.25 7.99 8.90 6.493 6.43 6.725 6.75 6.86 7.07 6.64
July.......... 8.65 7.89 8.39 8.61 7.004 6.98 7.285 7.23 7.14 7.59 7.02
Aug.......... 8.33 7.71 8.04 9.19 7.007 6.97 7.194 7.19 7.27 7.51 7.08
Sept.......... 8.48 7.61 8.14 9.15 7.129 7.08 7.316 7.31 7.35 7.76 7.58
Oct........... 8.56 7.86 8.17 9.00 7.040 6.99 7.297 7.29 7.22 7.63 7.47
Nov.......... 8.46 7.92 8.18 8.85 7.193 7.24 7.565 7.62 7.38 7.94 7.57
Dec........... 8.84 7.93 8.58 8.97 7.720 7.81 7.788 7.89 7.64 8.34 7.98
1970-Jan........... 8.78 8.15 8.64 8.98 7.914 7.87 7.863 7.78 7.50 8.22 8.14
Week ending-
1969-Oct. 4...... 8.83 7.73 8.25 9.11 7.106 7.02 7.340 7.31 7.41 7.93 7.93
11...... 8.73 7.88 8.25 9.43 7.046 6.98 7.289 7.33 7.34 7.76 7.74
18...... 8.63 7.91 8.25 9.68 7.042 7.01 7.327 7.30 7.25 7.62 7.36
25...... 8.50 7.94 8.15 8.68 6.975 6.94 7.265 7.24 7.04 7.42 7.12
Nov. I...... 8.23 7.78 8.00 8.39 7.030 7.00 7.263 7.26 7.12 7.55 7.35
8...... 8.19 7.88 8.00 9.07 6.998 7.07 7.281 7.38 7.06 7.70 7.45
15...... 8.41 7.94 8.00 9.32 7.157 7.14 7.435 7.45 7.15 7.87 7.54
22...... 8.58 7.94 8.20 8.79 7.141 7.24 7.518 7.74 7.50 8.05 7.68
29...... 8.63 7.94 8.50 8.32 7.476 7.49 8.027 7.90 7.77 8.09 7.60
Dec. 6...... 8.63 7.98 8.38 8.91 7.453 7.60 7.613 7.83 7.55 8.11 7.64
13...... 8.75 7.88 8.53 8.75 7.702 7.81 7.803 7.92 7.61 8.32 7.95
20...... 8.93 7.89 8.63 9.14 7.920 7.88 7.922 7.89 7.61 8.37 8.06
27...... 9.00 7.90 8.72 9.18 7.804 7.82 7.815 7.82 7.67 8.44 8.10
1970-Jan. 3...... 9.00 8.03 8.75 8.71 8.096 8.02 8.101 8.03 7.75 8.56 8.26
10...... 9.08 8.11 8.75 8.45 7.960 7.91 7.991 7.93 7.58 8.36 8.21
17...... 8.75 8.13 8.68 8.96 7.837 7.82 7.784 7.64 7.47 8.11 8.10
24...... 8.70 8.16 8.63 9.30 7.789 7.83 7.663 7.70 7.43 8.13 8.04
31...... 8.55 8.23 8.50 9.04 7.888 7.89 7.776 7.80 7.52 8.23 8.20
I Averages of daily offering rates of dealers. 4 Except for new bill issues, yields are averages computed from daily
2 Averages of daily rates, published by finance companies, for varying closing bid prices. 5 Bills quoted on bank discount rate basis.
maturities in the 90-179 day range. 6 Certificates and selected note and bond issues.
3 Seven-day average for week ending Wednesday. 7 Selected note and bond issues.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Butletin, Board of Governors, the
Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.,
February, 1970, p. A 33.
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TABLE IV
BOND AND STOCK YIELDS
(Per cent per annum)
Period
1962.........................
1963.........................
1964.........................
1965.........................
1966.........................
1967.........................
1968.........................
1969 .........................
1969- Jan....................
Feb....................
M ar....................
A pr....................
M ay...................
June...................
July....................
Aug....................
Sept....................
O ct.....................
N ov....................
D ec....................
1970- Jan.....................
Week ending-
Oct. 4................
i1................
18................
25................
N ov. 1................
8 ................
15 ................
22................
29 ................
D ec. 6................
13................
20................
27................
1970-Jan. 3................
10................
17 ................
24................
31................
Government bonds
United
States(long.
term)
3.95
4.00
4.15
4.21
4.66
4.85
5.25
6.10
5.74
5.86
6.05
5.84
5.85
6.06
6.07
6.02
6.32
6.27
6.51
6.81
6.86
6.56
6.34
6.16
6.07
6.32
6.34
6.46
6.61
6.60
6.65
6.73
6.84
6.92
7.00
6.92
6.84
6.83
6.84
State
and local
TotalI Aaa Baa
3.30 3.03 3.67
3.28 3.06 3.58
3.28 3.09 3.54
3.34 3.16 3.57
3.90 3.67 4.21
3.99 3.74 4.30
4.48 4.20 4.88
5.73 5.45 6.07
4.89 4.58 5.34
5.02 4.74 5.44
5.25 4.97 5.61
5.24 5.00 5.57
5.39 5.19 5.63
5.78 5.58 6.01
5.80 5.61 6.08
5.98 5.74 6.28
6.21 5.83 6.58
6.12 5.80 6.45
6.25 5.88 6.60
6.84 6.50 7.23
6.74 6.38 7.13
6.22
6.15
6.05
6.13
6.16
6.06
6.14
6.33
6.47
6.68
6.82
6.92
6.92
6.88
6.80
6.65
6.68
6.77
5.83
5.80
5.75
5.80
5.84
5.75
5.78
5.95
6.05
6.34
6.48
6.57
6.57
6.52
6.41
6.36
6.34
6.39
6.58
6.40
6.38
6.48
6.52
6.42
6.50
6.67
6.83
7.05
7.20
7.32
7.32
7.28
7.25
7.00
7.10
7.15
Total1
4.62
4.50
4.57
4.64
5.34
5.82
6.51
7.36
6.89
6.93
7.11
7.17
7.10
7.27
7.39
7.37
7.53
7.72
7.76
8.13
8.32
7.66
7.74
7.77
7.71
7.68
7.68
7.70
7.78
7.89
7.97
8.05
8.15
8.27
8.33
8.36
8.33
8.28
8.29
Corporate bonds
By selected
rating
Aaa I Baa
4.33
4.26
4.40
4.49
5.13
5.51
6.18
7.03
6.59
6.66
6.85
6.89
6.79
6.98
7.08
6.97
7.14
7.33
7.35
7.72
7.91
7.28
7.37
7.39
7.31
7.25
7.26
7.29
7.38
7.50
7.60
7.64
7.73
7.84
7.90
7.91
7.92
7.90
7.91
5.02
4.86
4.83
4.87
5.67
6.23
6.94
7.81
7.32
7.30
7.51
7.54
7.52
7.70
7.84
7.86
8.05
8.22
8.25
8.65
8.86
8.18
8.26
8.26
8.21
8.17
8.19
8.19
8.28
8.38
8.45
8.57
8.68
8.80
8.89
8.95
8.86
8.79
8.81
By
group
Indus- Rail-
trial I road
4.47
4.42
4.52
4.61
5.30
5.74
6.41
7.22
6.78
6.82
7.02
7.07
6.69
7.16
7.29
7.29
7.42
7.59
7.61
7.95
8.15
7.53
7.62
7.65
7.59
7.54
7.55
7.56
7.62
7.75
7.79
7.83
7.95
8.13
8.19
8.18
8.14
8.12
8.14
4.86
4.65
4.67
4.72
5.37
5.89
6.77
7.46
6.98
6.98
7.16
7.25
7.27
7.37
7.50
7.57
7.68
7.76
7.83
8.16
8.38
7.73
7.70
7.76
7.79
7.80
7.79
7.76
7.84
7.96
8.01
8.07
8.19
8.28
8.34
8.42
8.38
8.34
8.38
Public
utility
4.51
4.41
4.53
4.60
5.36
5.81
6.49
7.49
7.02
7.05
7.23
7.26
7.15
7.38
7.49
7.40
7.62
7.91
7.94
8.39
8.54
7.82
7.98
7.99
7.89
7.82
7.84
7.89
7.98
8.09
8.22
8.35
8.44
8.50
8.56
8.62
8.57
8.49
8.47
Stocks
Dividend/
price ratio
Pre- Corn-
ferred mon
4.50 3.37
4.30 3.17
4.32 3.01
4.33 3.00
4.97 3.40
5.34 3.20
5.78 3.07
6.41 3.24
5.93 3.06
5.94 3.10
6.09 3.17
6.14 3.11
6.20 3.02
6.33 3.18
6.42 3.34
6.44 3.37
6.61 3.33
6.79 3.33
6.84 3.31
7.19 3.52
7.01 3.56
6.87
6.78
6.80
6.75
6.75
6.78
6.75
6.85
6.99
7.08
7.21
7.33
7.16
7.16
6.99
7.06
7.02
6.98
3.42
3.41
3.31
3.24
3.27
3.25
3.24
3.33
3.43
3.50
3.54
3.59
3.51
3.48
3.46
3.50
3.56
3.71
Earnings /
price ratio
Com
mon
6.06
5.68
5.54
5.87
6.72
5.71
5.84
..........
..........
..........
5.66
..........
...... ....
6.03 ..
..........
....... ...
16.37
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
Numberofissues2........... 91 20 5 5 108I 18 30 38 301 40 14 500 500
I Includes bonds rated Aa and A, data for which are not shown sep- Averages of daily figures for bonds maturing or callable in 10 years or
arately. Because of a limited number of suitable issues, the number more. State and local govt. bonds: General obligations only, based on
of corporate bonds in some groups has varied somewhat. As of Dec. Thurs. figures. Corporate bonds: Averages of daily figures. Both of these
23, 1967, Aaa-rated railroad bonds are no longer a component of the series are from Moody's Investors Service series.
railroad average or the Aaa composite series. Stocks: Standard and Poor's corporate series. Dividend/price ratios are
2 Number of issues varies over time; figures shown reflect most recent based on Wed. figures; earnings/price ratios are as of end of period.
count. Preferred stock ratio is based on eight median yields for a sample of non-
callable issues-12 industrial and two public utility; common stock ratios
NoTE.-Annual yields are averages of monthly or quarterly data. on the 500 stocks in the price index. Quarterly earnings are seasonally
Monthly and weekly yields are computed as follows: U.S. Govt. bonds: adjusted at annual rates.
SOURCE: Federal- Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors, the
Federa. Reserve System, Washington, D.C.,
February, 1970, p. A 34.
I
TABLE V
TERMS ON CONVENTIONAL FIRST MORTGAGES
Period
1964.............
1965.............
1966..........
1967........ ..
1968.............
1969V ........... '.
1968-Dec........
1969-Jan........
Feb........
M ar........
Apr........
May.......
June.......
July.......
Aug........
Sept........
Oct........
Nov........
Dec.V......
New homes
Con-
tract
rate
(per
cent)
5.78
5.74
6.14
6.33
6.83
7.66
7.09
7.16
7.26
7.32
7.47
7.50
7.62
7.76
7.86
7.89
7.98
7.97
8.07
Fees &
charges(per
cent)!
.57
.49
.71
.81
.89
.91
.89
.84
.81
.93
.96
.88
.84
.92
.86
.92
.89
.96
1.06
Maturity
(years)
24.8
25.0
24.7
25.2
25.5
25.5
25.9
25.6
25.6
25.8
25.4
25.8
25.6
25.5
25.2
25.3
25.3
25.3
25.4
Loan/
price
ratio
(per
cent)
74.1
73.9
73.0
73.6
73.9
72.8
74.0
73.6
73.3
73.8
72.6
73.2
73.0
72.0
72.3
72.4
72.9
72.8
71.9
Pur-
chase
price
(thous. of
dollars)
23.7
25.1
26.6
28.0
30.7
34.1
33.7
33.2
32.4
33.0
34.4
34.7
34.8
34.6
34.0
34.3
34.6
34.4
35.3
1 Fees and charges-related to principal mortgage amount-include
loan commissions, fees, discounts, and other charges, which provide
added income to the lender and are paid by the borrower. They exclude
any closing costs related solely to transfer of property ownership.
NonE.-Compiled by Federal Home Loan Bank Board in cooperation
with Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Data are weighted averages
Loan
amount
(thous. of
dollars)
17.3
18.3
19.2
20.4
22.4
24.5
24.7
24.1
23.5
24.0
24.8
25.0
24.9
24.5
24.3
24.7
25.0
24.6
25.0
Existing homes
Con-
tract
rate
(per
cent)
5.92
5.87
6.30
6.40
6.90
7.68
7.09
7.18
7.28
7.35
7.46
7.54
7.64
7.79
7.90
7.92
7.98
8.00
8.07
Fees &
charges(per
cent)!1
.55
.55
.72
.76
.83
.88
.85
.86
.86
.84
.85
.83
.86
.91
.93
.92
.91
.90
.93
Maturity
(years)
20.0
21.8
21.7
22.5
22.7
22.7
23.3
22.8
22.9
23.0
23.0
22.7
22.8
22.8
22.6
22.2
22.2
22.6
23.0
Loan/
price
ratio
(per
cent)
71.3
72.7
72.0
72.7
73.0
71.5
73.2
72.6
72.8
72.7
71.8
71.9
71.4
71.7
71.2
70.7
70.2
70.4
70.6
Pur-
chase
price
(thous. of
dollars)
18.9
21.6
22.2
24.1
25.6
28.3
28.1
27.9
27.2
28.2
28.2
27.8
28.5
28.5
28.4
27.5
28.1
28.8
30.0
Loan
amount
(thous. of
dollars)
13.4
15.6
15.9
17.4
18.5
19.9
20.4
20.0
19.6
20.2
19.9
19.7
20.1
20.1
19.8
19.2
19.5
20.1
20.9
based on probability sample survey of characteristics of mortgage
originated by major institutional lender groups (including mortgage
companies) for purchase of single-family homes. Data exclude loans for
refinancing, reconditioning, or modernization; construction loans to
homebuilders; and permanent loans that are coupled with construction
loans to owner-builders. Series beginning 1965, not strictly comparable
with earlier data. See also the table on Home-Mortgage Yields, p. A-53.
Fatdera1 Reserve
Federal Reserve
February , 1970,
Bulletin, Board of Governors,
System, Washington, D.C.,
p. A 35.
I
SOURCE:' the
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(term of twenty years) that yielded six percent for most of
the year. (Their highest level since the 1920's, touching
nearly seven percent by year's end, but sliding back towards
six percent by early 1970., 58.) UDC's own tax-exempt bond
rate, backed only by the moral obligation of the State of New
York, sold for par at 6.6% in 1970 in one of the largest tax-
exempt bondissues ever: $250,000,000. In retrospect, given
the present 1973 level of high interest rates, the six percent
figure appears to be rather low. But given the prevailing
interest rates in 1969 and the generally lower rates of the
1950's and 60's, the figure is understandable.
Interest rates generally reflect the security of the
investment. The City's security in this case is strong, since
the City knew that all projects financed by UDC had more than
just project revenues behind them; for UDC unlike any ordinary
private developer, has the moral obligation of the State behind
its bonds, thus indirectly insuring its projects. (To further
protect bondholders, a debt service reserve fund equal to one
year's. principal and interest is maintained at all times from
the proceeds of each bond issue; they may in addition have direct
appropriations from the State.) 59.
Another safeguard guaranteeing the ground rent payment is
the fact that the ground rent, at least in the case of the sub-
sidized housing, amounts to little more than ten percent of the
cash flow, while debt service requires nearly fifty percent of
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gross income. Where land is. not subordinated, the lessor
has a prior lien upon project gross revenue second only to
property taxes. In other words, the landowner has a prior
claim to payment before the lessee's mortgage lender, and
since he requires only ten percent of the project's cash
flow, has more than an ample cushion even for the worst
possible financial eventuality. Perhaps this safeguard ex-
plains why ground leasing has always been considered a secure
investment, in addition of course to appreciation potential
(especially in the center of the City Central Business Dis-
trict). Where land is subordinated, the mortgage lender has
first claim to project revenues (again, after property taxesl,
and the lessor's position, although still fairly secure, is
less so than the lender's. The landowner, however, having
claim to the residual value, having a second lien, requiring
only'ten percent beyond the lender's debt service, and also
having a possible profit sharing arrangement, is in a very
desirable position.
The ground rent is secured as well by the fact that the
City has a strong claim upon the improvements, and in the
eventuality that basic rent or additional rent is not paid,
can bring to bear the default procedures. As a last resort,
the City can have the lease terminated and take possession of
the land and any improvements. (This will be discussed in
more detail later.)
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For subsidized housing, the tax equivalency payment
amounting to ten percent of shelter rent is determined by
60.
statute. A UDC report explained the tax exemption for
UDC residential projects this way:
Given today's high cost of housing, it is necessary
for UDC to make full use of its exemption from local
real property taxes. UDC residential projects are
required to make payments in lieu of taxes in the
amount of 10% of shelter rent (i.e., rent not including
utilitiesI. This is (on the average) the equivalent
of a 70% exemption.. .61.
In order to get around the Board of Estimate's not wanting
to accept anything that on the face of it looked like a
tax deal for UDC, 62. the two parties inserted language else-
where in the lease explaining the tax equivalent for every
category individually, and also included a tax adjustment
date some time in the future for subsidized and middle income
housing.
UDC and the City resolved the tax stabilization problem
by essentially freezing taxes for thirty years at the rate of
ten percent of first year's operation shelter rent for the sub-
sidized and middle income housing. Conventional housing is
treated differently for unlike the thirty year reprieve given
to middle income and subsidized housing, conventional housing
is to be "from time to time assessed and reassessed" in the
manner of comparable properties. 63. This same approach is to
be used for commercial space which also did not participate in
a tax freeze.
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The determining provision for subsidized and middle
income housing was provision five of the lease; adjustment
of rent and the tax equivalent adjustment date:
(b) the tax equivalents set forth in subparagraphs
1(yY and 2(y) of paragraph 4(a) hereof shall be ad-
justed as of each Tax Equivalent Adjustment Date by
substituting.after such date the Tax Equivalent for
- Conventionally Financed Housing for the Improvement
adjusted as of such date for the tax equivalent pay-
able on account of such Improvement prior to such
date; and 64.
Tax Equivalent Adjustment Date: The 30th anniversary
ot the issuance of Lessee's certificate of completion
or of Lessor's temporary or permanent certificate of
occupancy, whichever shall first have been issued,
with respect to each Improvement consisting of Sub-
sidized Housing or Middle Income Housing. 65.
Although UDC had wanted,still lower taxes, it was reassured
that taxes for the conventional housing and commercial space
would not be higher than those of comparable real estate in
other parts of the City.
Middle Income Housing
The derivation of the $180 per unit ground rent figure is
found in the following formula:
..........with respect to each improvement consisting
of Middle Income Housing, 6% of the product of (x) the
current land cost per unit for economically feasible
new housing in New York City for persons and families
of middle income as of each Rent Adjustment Date for
such Improvement times (y) the number of units contained
in such Improvement; 66.
Dividing $180 per unit ground rent by six percent produces a
land cost of $3000 a unit. At an average of five rooms per
unit, land costs amount to $600 a room. UDC first calculated
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this figure at $300 per room amounting to $1500 per unit and
a payment of only $90 in ground rent. 67. In order to compen-
sate for the UDC tax limitation 68. , however, which limits
in lieu of tax payments to ten percent of shelter rent, the
City argued that ground rent should be raised. UDC was clearly
concerned but could not easily see its way out of the impasse.
Paul Byard finally broke the deadlock by adding a provision
setting a higher ground rent for straight Mitchell-Lama housing
(while retaining the tax equivalent equal to ten percent of
shelter rent so that housing could be developed as a project
of the Corporation) 69. The resultant additional $90 in ground
rent added to the ten percent shelter rent tax payment provided
rough equivalency with the taxes received from a standard
Mitchell-Lama project given a fifty percent exemption.
Conventionally Financed Housing
..... with respect to each Improvement consisting of
Conventionally Financed Housing, 6% of the product
of (x) the current land cost per unit for comparable
new housing in New York City for persons and families
who can afford conventionally financed and fully tax-
paying apartments as of each Rent Adjustment Date for
such Improvement times (y) the number of units contained
in such Improvement; 70.
Again the familiar six percent rate is used, as it is throughout
the determination of ground rent. In this case, by dividing the
ground rent of $340 per unit by six percent, a land cost of
$5,700 per unit is determined. UDC assumed a 4.75 room per
unit average for this type of housing, bringing land cost per
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room to $1,200, a figure that was prevailing at the City's
zoned density. A July 7 UDC analysis gave a land cost per
unit of $5000, but using seven percent (cost of borrowing to
UDC plus one percent for administration), UDC arrived at a
figure of $350 for ground rent per unit. 7 Only later,
by September 26, was a six percent capitalization rate applied
and*a unit cost of $5,700 arrived at by UDC, bringing rent to
72.$340 per unit per year. In other words, by using the City's
lower capitalization rate, UDC was able to use a higher land
value and still come out with a lower ground rent (although
higher than an earlier $300 ground rent demand, it received a
substantially lower ground rent for subsidized housing--$30
instead of $120.
The tax rate was set at the tax equivalent for conven-
tionally financed housing:
Tax Ecuivalent for Conventionally financed Housing:
Lessor's then current real estate tax rate times Lessor's
then current assessed valuation of land and buildings
for each Improvement or part of an Improvement consis-
ting of Completed Units of Conventionally Financed
Housing or consisting of Completed Units of housing to
be treated as Conventionally Financed Housing after
adjustment under paragraph 5(b) hereof. Such then current
assessed valuation for rent and buildings shall from time
to time be assessed and reassessed by Lessor in the
manner and subject to the limitations then currently im-
posed upon assessments of like properties by all laws
and regulations applicable thereto. Lessee may contest
any such assessment or reassessment in like manner. 73.
Although no tax freeze was added, a forty year rent freeze was
agreed upon.
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Commercial Space
.... and with respect to each Improvement or part of an
Improvement consisting of Commercial Space, 6% of the
product of Cxl the current land cost per square foot of
comparable commercial space in New York City as of each
Rent Adjustment Date for such Improvement or part of an
Improvement times (y) the number of square feet of commer-
cial space in such Improvement. 74.
Sixty cents divided by six percent brings the square foot land
cost of commercial retail and office space to ten dollars. For
this space, a floor area ratio, of eight was estimated, attri-
buting a value of eighty dollars a square foot for the land (or
ten dollars per square foot on each floori. 75.
Initially UDC used eight dollars a square foot for the
commercial space and applied the same rate to conventional housing
Cseven percentl, for a ground rent of fifty-six cents a square
foot, * The later ten dollar a square foot figure and lower
capitalization rate of six percent brought the square foot cost
for both retail and office space to sixty cents. Thus UDC was
able to give in to the City's demand for a higher figure by
again using the City's lower capitalized rate, and in return for
this higher ground rent and for the conventionally financed higher
ground rent it received the lower subsidized housing ground rent
figure. UDC gave in to the City's request that ground rent and
tax equivalent for commercial space be separately stated rather
than combined in a lump-sum as UDC would have liked (since then
both would have presumably been frozen, insuring tax and rent
stability, something that would have been very attractive to
potential retail and office tenants).
The tax rate was set at the tax equivalent payment for
commercial space.
Tax Equivalent for Commercial Space: Lessor's then
current real estate tax rate times the product of
Lessor's than current assessed valuation (expressed
in dollars per square foot of commercial space) for
land and buildings for each Improvement or part of
an Improvement consisting of Completed Commercial
Space times the number of square feet of Completed
Commercial Space. Such then current assessed valua-
tion for land and buildings shall from time to time
be assessed and reassessed by Lessor in the manner
and subject to the limitations then currently imposed
upon assessments of like property by all laws and regu-
lations applicable thereto. Lessee may contest such
assessment or reassessment in like manner. 77.
The Tenuous Balance
The importance of the rent and tax payments for the
conventional housing and commercial space is central to
understanding the lease (See Table VI). The conventionally
financed housing alone makes up 55% of the total anticipated
cash flow and 65.5% of the housing cash flow. Consequently, an
inordinate amount of weight is placed upon this housing and
upon the commercial space (which together comprise 70.86% of
all revenues) to support the public facilities of the development.
The subsidized units combined contribute only 14% of the total
cash flow although they represent 55% of the units, while the
conventional housing alone with less than half the number of
units contributes four times the amount of cash flow (55.36%)
In essence, the conventional housing and commercial space are
subsidizing the low income and moderate income housing units.
This means that the project's success and therefore UDC's ability
to develop Welfare Island hinges on the most risky of all the
improvements, the conventional housing, that will not even be
TABLE VI
BASICxRENT -AND TAX EQUIVALENT PAYMENTS CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
% BASIC RENT & % BASIC RENT & % BASIC RENT &
HOUSING TYPE NO.UNITS % UNITS TAX EQUIVALENT TAX EQUIV.HSNG.TAX EQUIV.TOTAL
LOW INC. P.H. 1000 20 $144,000 4.82 4.08
ELDERLY P.H. 500 10 $ 60,500 2.03 1.71
MOD. INC. 236 1250 25 $285,000 9.55 8.07
MITCHELL LAMA 1000 20 $540,000 18.09 15.28
CONVENTIONAL 1250 25 $1,956,000 65.52 55.36
TOTAL 5000 100% $2,985,500 100%
OMMERCIAL
ETAIL 100,000sf. 1/3 COMM. $152,000 N/A 4.3
2OMMERCIAL
)FFICE 200,000sf. 2/3 COMM. $396,000 N/A 11.21
TOTAL 300,000sf. 100% $548,000 N/A 15.51
'OTAL BASIC RENT AND TAX EQUIVALENT $3,533,500 = 100%
Conventionally financed housing equals 65.52% of total housing revenue,
and 55.36% of total revenues; yet it only contributes 25% of total units.
if commercial space is added to the conventionally financed housing,
revenues equal $2,504,000, or 70.86% of total revenues.
r1
I
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financed by UDC. If this housing cannot market, then
sufficient cash revenues cannot be generated to pay off the
public facilities and thereby to have the project operate
successfully, at least not without inordinate amounts of
UDC subsidy to pay off debt service for the public facili-
ties (even if it defers debt from the City by calling it
prepaid rent, without changing the development program).
Reimbursement for Public Facilities
The basic rent formula sets appropriate ground rents
and tax equivalent payments for all of UDC's revenue-pro-
ducing improvements. Deducted from this total sum is debt
service for public facilities and allocable normal allowances.
This netting off of debt service for public facilities
and normal allowances from basic rent is the final part of
the entire financing formula, making the development work.
This arrangement basically determines that public facilities
will be paid for by the City, with the City allowing the
lessee, UDC, to first deduct the cost of debt service from
the rent payment. 78. This financing device eliminates many
of the problems confronted by the two parties. For the City,
it eliminates the necessity of having to appropriate funds from
its hardpressed budget in order to pay for public facilities.
Instead, it is successfully fulfilling its financial obligation
by using the development's projected rents and taxes, thereby
eliminating the necessity for a budget line item and the subse-
quent series of necessary approval. The end result is the same,
however.
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In return for the City's rightful rent and taxes, UDC
has in essence assumed responsibility for the financing
and construction of the public facilities, and in addi-
tion, has gained control over their design and timing.
The City has avoided a major direct yearly capital ex-
pense that would have strained its debt limit, and more
importantly, has escaped all financial obligations for
any improvements on Welfare Island. By trading its ex-
pected rents and taxes, the City has in fact helped to
facilitate the development of a new town with a superarray
of public facilities, facilities that if financed by the
City would most certainly have delayed and possibly even
jeopardized the project because of all the appropriations
and approvals that would have been needed. The resolution
of this point can be criticized by some as a bad deal for
the City, since it seems to reap little or no rent or tax
benefit at all from the development in return for making
possible a wasteful and extravagantly expensive development
and infrastructure. The City could retort that the criti-
cism is short-sighted, not taking into account the real
economics of the development and the fact that the City will
eventually take over the full array of improvements in-
cluding the public facilities, built at little expense to
itself. Also,' if other development and the City as a whole
are to flourish, then the City must do whatever is necessary
to facilitate development of the sort that will be best for
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the long run well-being of the City. Clearly Welfare
Island was a project commanding the highest priority of
the City administration.
Vital from UDC's point of view was the inclusion of
the normal allowances provision, which it saw as crucial
in adequately covering its overhead costs, in providing
financial compensation to the Corporation for its efforts,
and in helping to keep the project a viable entity. The
definition and interpretation of normal allowances was
carefully examined by the City and the final definition
was eventually agreed to by both parties. 79' (See
Appendix C1
Deferral
UDC also wanted assurances that it would not be obligated
beyond basic rent, should basic rent not cover the cost of
public facilities. After assessing the expected cash flow
positions, UDC and City negotiators were confident that no
deficit would occur after netting public facilities debt and
normal allowances. 80. Despite this fact, UDC agreed to
the City's request that UDC set off any deficit that might
occur by paying it in that same year, and then carrying it
forward and deducting it from future rent payments. In other
words, in order to have the development proceed, UDC was re-
luctantly agreeing to a prepayment of rent formula that
would cover any deficit and at the same time. not obligate
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the City to use its own appropriations. (UDC agreed only
because it was fairly confident that no deficit would
occur.) 81.
Profit Sharing Agreement
In return for agreeing to the fixed formula rent approach,
the City demanded a profit sharing agreement, called addi-
tional rent, that was intended to prevent a windfall profit
to UDC. The agreement became moot, however, given UDG's de-
ductions, especially its project fee. 82. (See Appendix C)
In determination of net income, the project fee deduction
(or development fee paid out of project revenues rather than
capital) was viewed by UDC as fair compensation for risks
taken in connection with the development of the Island. The
City, represented by John McGarrahan, recognized UDC's claim
to a project fee in return for its assuming development risks:
"...if UDC is to be an effective instrument in the City on
this and other projects, we must recognize the practical need
for it to be a self-sustaining development enterprise". 83.
The additional rent is equal to net income. To understand
additional rent, the definitions of gross income and net in-
come must be understood:
(b) Additional Rent. In addition to the Basic Rent,
Lessee shall pay, in the same manner as the Basic Rent,
Additional Rent equal to Net Income for the preceeding
year. 84.
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Net Income:
Net Income: For any period, Gross Income less
(i) Normal Allowances, (ii) Basic Rent, (iii) the
amountof the following costs incurred by Lessee:
any amounts by which Lessee's operating and main-
tenance costs for any Public Facility consisting
of a garage, an elevator, a mini-transit system
or park exceed receipts derived by Lessee from
such Public Facility, to the extent such excess
shall not be included in Normal Allowances, and
(iv) the Project Fee.
Gross Income:
Gross Income: For any period, the total of all
receipts of any .nature derived by Lessee from the
Leased Premises or the financing of the develop-
ment thereof, including, without limitation, rents,
profits, interest and return of principal, other
than payments to Lessee of the purchase price of
or annual rent for any school or appurtenance and
other than development fees, after deducting from
such total all Debt Service for such period. 85.
To insure that this profit-sharing and UDC project fee
approach did not overly benefit UDC, J. Lee Rankin inserted an
amendment into the lease giving the Board of Estimate the right
of election to amend the lease within five years. 86. The
amendment deleted the provisions with respect to the project
fee and provided that the City receive sixty percent of the addi-
tional rent and the lessee retain the remaining forty percent.
Rankin reasoned that this arrangement would give the City a
chance to eliminate the flat fee and have any payment to the
lessee based on the success of the development and on how well
the developer kept down the projected costs and expenses. This
amendment thus encourages UDC to maximize profits from the
project. In return for allowing UDC to receive forty percent.
of the net income (it received zero before), the quid pro quo
was to strike out the UDC Project Fee, with the hope of mini-
mizing proceeds to UDC and increasing the return to the City.
This amendment takes effect only if approved by the Board of
Estimate by December 23, 1974. 87.
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Summary
Of the three rent approaches mentioned earlier, the
most advantageous one for the lessor is the floating rent
approach where profit sharing is not contemplated. Where
profit sharing is a possibility, however, and where the
lessor is genuinely concerned with the project's success,
then the fixed formula rent with profit sharing is the pre-
ferable solution in insuring the project's success for the
reasons already discussed, and this indeed was the approach
adopted in the lease. For the same reasons that the City
was reluctant to make it appear as if a tax deal had been
set for UDC, it also wanted to avoid giving the impression
that a rent deal was being made. The illusion it wanted to
present was that a floating rent was the resolution, if only
to assuage the City's Board of Estimate (the reason for the
inclusion of the "then current ground rent" provision for
each category).
Basically, each party felt it had negotiated a fairly good
deal for itself; 'but from an overall perspective, the City
seems to have gained a more advantageous position than UDC,
assuming far less risk and burden than it would normally assume
in most other developments. For essentially, the City was
able to negotiate in such a way as to avoid expending any of
its own financial resources for front-end capital expenses.
Not only did UDC agree to construct public facilities, but it
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also agreed to be reimbursed for these public facilities
'through ground rent and taxes and to recover any ,public facility
deficit beyond basic rent from its future basic rent
payments to the City, again allowing the City to avert
any expenditure of funds.
In return for UDC's agreeing to accept such terms,
the City did agree to give UDC a forty year rent freeze
on all revenue-producing elements of the development and
a thirty year tax freeze on middle and subsidized housing
according to statute (although not on commercial space or
conventional housing that were to be normally taxed). The
City further aided UDC by using its low capitalization rate
(that gave justification for higher land values than would
otherwise be the case), in setting ground rent levels
sufficiently low to make the development feasible (espe-
cially for subsidized and middle income housing). However,
the basic rent formula clearly sets the burden of ground
rent and tax revenue on the conventional housing and
commercial space, thus increasing the risk element of the
development for UDC,
DEFAULT
A strong default provision in a lease becomes the lease's
"enforcer". For the lessor, this provision provides protec-
tion and the means to repossess the property if default occurs
for any of a numberof reasons including non-payment of rent.
For the lessee, the provision clearly sets out the legal recourse
and protective mechanisms available to him should a default occur.
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Default can often be a blessing in disguise for either
party. For the lessor, a relatively minor default un-
realized by the lessee may be the golden opportunity to
gain control of valuable assets. The lessee, on the
other hand, could intentionally default in order to
possibly minimize his losses should a project's continued
operation prove financially ruinous. Thus, the rights
and obligations of each party under the default procedure
as well as methods of artibration and legal recourse
Ccourts have traditionally tended to avoid lease termina-
tion wherever possible, often supporting the lessee 88.)
'must be clearly defined to avoid problems of interpretation.
In the lease, the City's interest like that of any
lessor is a secured annuity. If rent is not paid and a valid
default is declared, the lease offers the City the protec-
tion of being able to terminate the lease and reenter the
premises. Availing itself of summary eviction proceedings
would be a last resort after all ordinary recourse was ex-
hausted. As mentioned earlier, equity courts are not often
willing to go along with the lessor in forfeiting valuable
leases, and there have been situations where the courts have
set aside terminations, even after a tenant has been dis-
possessed for non-payment of rent. The City realized that
UDC's major concern in the event that default did occur (for
instance, if there is a delay in the completion of construction
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beyond December 23, 1984), was that the City should then
assume the full financial responsibility for public facili-
ties (as it must under paragraph 2). The City did not,
therefore, view default lightly, primarily because it also
saw this- responsibility as unavoidable in order to assure
the bondholders that even in the event of the project's not
proceeding and revenues not forthcoming, it would not leave
them without recourse. If the infrastructure had already
been installed, the City could either develop the Island
itself, lease it, or sell it to some other developer, in a
more advanced stage of construction. The City, was reluct-
ant to become obligated for the public facilities debt,
however, especially if the development should turn sour at
some point through no fault of its own. It therefore insisted
on protection against UDC's voluntarily defaulting on the
lease (for whatever reason) and also insisted upon the right
to cancel for events of default, despite the fact that UDC
would have liked to be the only one able to default. 89. As
might be expected, the City preferred a short non-payment of
rent clause, but it also wanted mandatory arbitration pro-
cedures in the event that the two parties could not come to
terms on any matter in the lease.
In addition to UDC's already stated concern that the City
assume full financial responsibility for public facilities debt
service in a default, UDC's posture was basically to reduce the
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possibility of default on its part by requesting a longer
period before default could be declared for non-payment of
rent. 90. It was also concerned that it be given the right
to dispute any matter that the City might claim had been de-
faulted, or in other words, it also wanted strong arbitration
according to which disputed lease matters could be brought up
and hopefully resolved. Tough negotiating preceeded the final
agreement on the default provision.
Resolution
Both parties' concern with an arbitration agreement
resulted in a separate Arbitration provision. The City also
wanted included and UDC did not object to a No Waiver pro-
vision, whereby either party could insist on a strict inter-
pretation of the lease at any time unless written acceptance
of waiver by both parties was procured. The definition of
default finally agreed upon lists two conditions under which
default would be allowed to take place: 1) if payment of basic
rent or additional rent is not made and such non-payment con-
tinues for twelve months; or 2) if the lessee fails to perform
or keep any term, covenant or condition of the lease. 91.
(See Appendix C)
The twelve month nonpayment of rent default provision was
a victory for the City. Near the end of the negotiations Paul
Byard requested of Edward Logue: "May I agree to reduce the
period for default of rent to twelve months..." 92- Default
for non-performance of "any term, covenant or condition of
the lease" seems also to have been a point clearly won by the
City. The City kept battering away at UDC through Sam Brooks:
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"The Board of Estimate will not accept (your) default
clause and will insist on being able to cancel for events
of default." 93.
A subsequent provision, while protecting UDC's bond-
holders in terms of facilities (as in paragraph 2), obligates
the City to assume the public facilities burden in the event
of a default, but also protects the City in two ways. First,
if the City re-enters the leased premises in case of default,
its action is not to be accepted as a surrender of the lease
by UDC. The only way surrender of the lease may be accomplished
is if the City Board of Estimate accepts such a surrender. 94'
This provision clearly protects the City from any intentional
default action; and since the City wanted a means of termina-
ting the lease if it so chose, it clearly did not want the
financial obligation of public facilities debt service. Unless
it was advantageous for the City, it would let UDC hold that
obligation even if UDC defaulted, while at the same time still
reserving the right to terminate the lease itself.
The subordination provision which follows, however, almost
guarantees that the City would not terminate the lease.
Lessor agrees, for the benefit of the trustee or
holders of any leasehold mortgage, that Lessor's right,
title and interest in and to rent and other charges pay-
able under any sublease shall be subject and subordinate
to the rights of any leasehold mortgagepto any rent and
other charge pledged as security for the payment thereof
until payment in full of the indebtedness, with accrued
interest, secured by any leasehold mortgage. 95.
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This extremely important provision protects the leasehold
mortgagee and the bondholders by assuring them a first claim
upon rent and other income that was pledged to pay off any debt.
This provision was inserted to increase security for the fin-
ancial community, to protect their interests, and to insure
their participation in financing the development plan. Anything
other than a first lien (such as placing the City in first posi-
tion which it is in fact entitled to in terms of taxes on real
property throughout the Cityl could result in a lack of willing-
ness on the part of the financial community and objections from
UDC's bond counsel to backing this endeavor. CUnder statute the
City has no right of taxation on UDC leasehold interests, ) This
apparent compromise agreement, although pledging the City's rent
and in lieu of tax payments to the lessee's lenders, nevertheless
does not pledge the fee itself as is the case in most subordination
agreements. Its effect, however, is the same, in that UDC re-
ceives assurance for its lenders, in this case bondholders, of a
first lien on "rent and other charges".
The City reasone.dthat it should not matter to UDC whether or
not it had subordination (except in conventionally financed
construction and even here, UDC may be satisfied with no subordina-
tion if lease terms are long and interest rates high enoughi,
since in essence UDC is both the mortgage lender and the developer.
Once UDC began to construct and finance the public facilities
as agreed in return for the City's agreeing to pay for them over
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the next fifty years or so out of rent and taxes, the only
way UDC would be able to retire the entire debt service
for public facilities without outside help would be to build
the entire development, even if the development turned out to
be economically disadvantageous to it. In this way UDC is
basically roped in--it must finish all of the housing program,
especially the riskier "conventional" housing and the commer-
cial and retail space, since those elements provide the
greater part of the ground rent and taxes that would go to the
City and in turn back to UDC to pay off the public facilities
debt UDC has assumed. Even if the public facilities debt ser-
vice became more costly than UDC has originally anticipated
because of higher construction costs, etc., the burden would be
on UDC to raise rents or subsidy or to create more commercial
uses (with the City's approval). The City thus transfers the
responsibility for building the entire development fully to the
developer.
The City had faith that UDC would get the development moving
since it could finance development with funds received from
debt issues and state grants, and could also receive subsidy
funds in order to make rents feasible, thus burying any problems
or mistakes (by subsidizing any deficit) for a period of time.
These were all important considerations for the City, for they
meant that it would not have to renegotiate or backtrack before
the public, and would avoid the political embarassment that
occurs when a developer returns and asks .for changes in the
- 227 -
"deal" in order to make it work for him. (The City has all
too often been faced with a private developer crying proverty
and returning to the City asking for changes or other assist-
ance, including financing at times, to make a project work:
e.g. Waterside.
From the City's viewpoint, however, there was actually no
subordination. Once it had agreed to allow ground rent and
taxes to be used to pay off UDC's debt service obligations, it
no longer had any economic interest in the project. That was
the price the City paid for allowing UDC to assume the construc-
tion and full indebtedness for public.'facilities. The City,
in effect, sold the land, because by subordinating, it agreed
to receive no income in the form of rents or taxes, and really
had only a secondary participation in any additional profits,
thus benefiting only if the development proved to be profitable.
-or UDC this subordination meant thatas mortgagee, there would
be effectively no payment of ground rent and taxes until all
City indebtedness was paid off.1
Another aspect of this particular "subordination" acts to
reinforce the reality of a "sale" to UDC. Unlike real subor-
dination where the lessor must take over the mortgage in the
event of a default in order to protect his interests, the City
does not have to in this case. In other words, the City has no
economic reason to foreclose for non-payment of ground rent or
in lieu of tax payments since they are subordinated anyway.
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The City would want to avoid foreclosure in any case as it
certainly would not want to assume the burden of public
facility debt; and since only the Board of Estimate can
accept termination of the lease for non-payment, UDC cannot
terminate the lease on its own for nonpayment and force the
City to assume the indebtedness. Once payments were subor-
dinated, then, the City no longer had any economic interest
in the project and therefore had nothing to lose. It has
subordinated its interests until public facility indebted-
ness is paid off and may have to wait, possibly even beyond-
the term of the lease, before being entitled to ground rent
and tax payments or before regaining control over the land
and improvements. The subordination of the City's economic
interests, however, still leaves the City with the fee position,
and under other circumstances would thus leave the lender with
the technical disadvantage of not being able to sell the
entire development,including land, even if it chose to fore-
close on the lessee (although in this case they are one and
the same).
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that in the final analysis the City did
well in the lease negotiations with UDC and succeeded in
furthering most of its goals and objectives. It showed its
sophistication -and negotiating ability, rarely losing sight of
its objectives, yet pushing for and getting crucial concessions
from UDC through the use of a variety of ploys (i.e. claiming
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that the Board of Estimate would not approve a lease unless
certain conditions were met) and the knowledge of how des-
perately UDC wanted to develop Welfare Island. The City
carefully traded off minor points such as design control, final
plan approval, relocation and demolition, leased premises and
lengt;h of the lease term (all of which did not compromise the
City's basic goals and objectives and in fact even furthered
them by helping to move the development along faster), in
return for- UDC's agreeing to construct and finance all the improve-
ments including public facilities, a traditional City responsib-
ility. The financing of revenue improvements was expected, but
the unique arrangement with public facilities was a masterful
coup for the City. UDC felt though that it was to its advan-
tage to build and finance the facilities in order to insure
their availability when needed and to avoid the unnecessary delays
of the City approval process. For the latter reason, it also
agreed to accept the City's pledge of ground rent and taxes due
it from UDC as reimbursement for public facilities debt service
(allowing UDC to deduct debt service for public facilities from
the payment due the City), again avoiding a separate City appro-
priation.
The City in effect subordinated its position, giving first
lien upon ground rent and taxes to UDC's lenders (bondholdersl,
but felt it was' really not giving up anything significant. For
UDC was able to finance the public facilities using tax-exempt
bonds, thus not costing the City substantially more in terms of
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debt service than it would have paid itself. The City was
even able to negotiate that in case of a deficit UDC would
pay it and credit itself as in essence prepaying future ground
rent and taxes, with the City continuing to avoid all obliga-
tion. In a sense, the City traded off its expected ground
rent and taxes in return for no financial obligation, and in
addition, at the lease's termination would receive a complete
new community on Welfare Island including all the innovative
public facilities built at practically no cost to itself.
As additional security for the City, the default provision
was negotiated in such a way that even in the case of a UDC
default, the City could refuse to accept surrender of the lease
and therefore assumption of the financial obligation of public
facility debt service; thus, UDC was essentially locked into
completing the development. In fact, according to the terms of
the ground rent and tax equivalency formulas which concentrate
weight on the conventional housing and commercial space for most
of the revenue produced, UDC must successfully complete these
riskier elements of the project in order not only to subsidize
the subsidized housing and middle income housing, but also to
pay for public facilities debt service.
In a sense, then, the importance of the ground rent and tax
provisions was not in providing revenue for the City, but rather
in keeping rents down and in limiting the developer to the
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total debt service required to support the revenue producing
improvements as well as public facilities. By using its own
capitalization rate to lower ground rent and taxes for UDC,
the City contributed towards making the development viable.
Of secondary importance to the City as well were the defini-
tions of normal allowances, net income and project fee that on
the surface seem to favor UDC, but that actually leave very
little cash that can be utilized in profit sharing with the
City. These provisions and several others (i.e. the amendment
to strike UDC's project fee and replace it with another profit
sharing formula if that appears more advantageous in five years)
become moot and do not concern the City unless there is suffi-
cient revenue in the future to warrant such concern (that did
not appear likely for some time to come, if at all). The City
was -more concerned with controlling its downside risk and it
succeeded in securing that through negotiations with UDC. Its
upside position, while perhaps not as favorable as it would
have liked in terms of profit sharing and the concessions it
made of a 40 year rent freeze for all revenue producing elements
and 30 year tax freeze for subsidized and middle income housing
Cnot conventional housing or commercial), still leaves the City
with little responsibility and obligation, and with the risk
placed squarely on UDC's lap. It was a small price to pay for
the privilege of not having to expend any funds while still
having the development it wanted built, the social mix it wanted
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achieved, and an innovative new town to which it was
considered an integral party completed.
It was even able to retain development controls such
as time constraints which forced UDC to proceed and com-
plete the development within certain time spans (although
it can be argued that UDC had the cruicial element of time
in which it could decide not to build if it so chose). The
general development plan agreed to by both parties (based
upon the Philip Johnson plan that the City had commissioned)
and the other lease provisions provided the City with the
controls it desired to insure the development's being accom-
plished more or less along the lines it had intended, and
therefore minimized the necessity for direct City interven-
tion in the development process. It had, a competent developer
with almost unlimited financial resources behind it (the
StateY that could be relied upon to complete the development
and to assume financial deficits (should there be any)
without the City having to bail it out through tax deals,
financing, etc., as had been the City's experience so often
in the past.
The lease exemplified the City's understanding of the
development process, especially of the financial intricacies
of development and of its own role and that of the developer's
in facilitating the process. The City worked with UDC to help
it achieve the freedom it needed and desired to proceed, and
in return achieved for itself the financial autonomy it so
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desperately wanted without losing control over the
development (in terms of compromising its goals and
objectives for the Island). UDC though, is perhaps
the only developer capable of making the kinds of con-
cessions- that it did, and even for UDC, questions can
be raised as to how wise those concessions were in the
long term. But the City's policy of using UDC and of
initkating and pursuing the development of this complex
venture Cwithout losing understanding of what was happen-
in or which obligations to assume or not assume) dis-
played a masterful job of City policymaking and decision-
-making furthering the public interest in the development
sphere.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
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Perhaps the most important generalizable conclusion of
this study is the fact that cities do not have to be impotent
and ineffective in dealing with developers. From the initial
decision to develop Welfare Island to the final lease negotia-
tions, New York City demonstrated a determination, expertise
and capability in the art of development unanticipated by most
observers, and succeeded in effectively shattering the myth
that cities can have no effective role in controlling their
planning and development destinies. The case study method pro-
vided the laboratory to test the notion of whether or not cities
could indeed change their traditional passive role. Examination
of the decision-making process in the Welfare Island development
led to an understanding of the way in which city officials and
planners perceived their roles and proceeded to act to achieve
threir objectives. Based on this case study, it has been demon-
-strated that cities are indeed capable of taking on the role of
initiating and planning development, and with a good under-
standing of the development process and wise-decision-making,
can achieve their development goals and objectives with minimum
risk and burden to themselves.
Since the thesis is studying essentially the planning stages
of this development, it is limited to the events leading up to
the signing of the lease on December 23, 1969 and does not delve
further into the actual construction and building phase of the
project.
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Achievement of Goals & Objectives
It may be helpful to briefly review the City's originally
stated goals and objectives (refer to Chapter II) in an attempt
to assess how effective the City actually was in achieving each-
of these goals.
Financial
In terms of financial objectives, the City succeeded in all
three areas that it had outlined. It certainly minimized its
capital expenditures, not only in terms of revenue-producing
improvements but also in avoiding its traditional responsibility
of building and financing public facilities. By having UDC
agree to accept responsibility for these facilities, the City
avoided straining its debt limit any further and consequently
avoided the political problems and delays traditionally in-
volved in appropriating such expenditures. The City effectively
minimized its overvall financial risk in several ways: first,
by choosing a developer that it knew had strong financial re-
sources and the backing of the State should that be necessary;
second, by leasing and therefore insuring itself of residual
value and a share in future profits; and third, by netotiating
the financial lease terms in such a way as to transfer the bulk
of burden and risk for the development onto UDC rather than
itself. In terms of its expense, the City willingly traded off
the opportunity of receiving adequate ground rent and taxes to cover
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its anticipated costs (including maintenance and operation
of public facilities) in exchange for other significant
financial and nonfinancial concessions, realistically feeling
it could not expect more. In general, however, the City
realized that it had succeeded in its financial goals and ob-
jectives to a degree beyond even its own expectations.
Political
The City also accomplished the three political objectives
that it originally set for itself in the Welfare Island develop-
ment. The Mayor's prestige was certainly enhanced by the City's
initiating and facilitating the development and then retaining
its identification with the project as it progessed, while the
political consensus that the City so desired was achieved by
the Mayor's appointment of the Schmidt blue-ribbon committee
Can action that served to legitimize the City's plan). Finally,
the Welfare Island project would increase the amount of new
housing construction in the City, and so help to mitigate this
previous political liability for both the Mayor and his adminis-
tration. Thus, this development, by achieving these political
objectives, was an important factor in restoring the City's
credibility in the development sphere.
Physical
The physical and design objectives for the Island were
perhaps the most visible of the City's accomplishments. Not
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only did the City succeed in having its basic plan developed,
but it was also instrumental in the selection of the planner/
architects most attuned to the City's desires who would fur-
ther refine the plan. Also, secure in the knowledge that UDC
and Ed Logue both were at least as committed to good design as
the City itself, the City agreed to trade-off final plan and
design review. But in no way did the lack of active physical
control over the final plan and design detract from the achieve-
mnent of these objectives. In fact, UDC and the City were
lauded most favorably by design critics, and the City in parti-
cular received very favorable reaction from various civic and
special interest groups as well as from the general public for
both its initiative and for its innovative, exciting and well
designed plan. The plan itself was fully consonant with all
the City's other goals and objectives and by having UDC agree
to incorporate that general development plan into the lease,
the City was further assured of its completion.
Social
The City apparently also achieved its social objectives for
the development. It wanted Welfare Island to be a model of
lasting social significance, one that would embody the excite-
ment, innovation and creativity that the Lindsay Administration
felt were so much a part of New York. Although no guarantee
could be made that those qualities would indeed be present in
- 238 -
the actual development, the physical and social structure
to encourage those qualities were laid out quite carefully
in the development plan. Also, while the Schmidt Committee
plan could not realistically meet all the needs of the City,
it did attempt to maximize beneficial uses of Welfare Island
for the entire City, given the Island's inherent limitations,
and attempted at least in part to meet some of the needs of
the City'st residents. Perhaps more significant was the City's
success in obligating the developer to incorporate the econ-
omic and racial integration aspects of the plan (with the
risk of failure it implied) in an effort to enhance racial,
ethnic and class harmony in a city where those factors were
often at tinderbox levels, Possibly more than any other objec-
ttve, this one was made possible only by the presence and
acquiesence of UDC, a public developer, created not only to
build economically feasible development but also to take the
risks necessary in the achievement of its mandated social ob-
Jectives.
Control
The City effectively achieved control over the development
of Welfare island, viewing control not as an objective but
rather as a menas to an end. Although the City gave up control
over a number of areas (including final design and plan review)
it never lost sight of its overall objectives and made the
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necessary compromises toward achieving them. If control
over design for instance was given up,it was with the understanding
and agreement that the design objective would nevertheless
be achieved. Also, the necessity for physical control and
actual intervention in the development process would have negated
and even contradicted the City's intent to assume as little of
the risk and burden of development as possible.
-The Crucial Factors
There were several factors present in the Welfare Island
case that seemed instrumental in enabling the City to success-
fully, accomplish its objectives. They are: 1) ownership or
control of land; 2) the presence of a public development in-
strumentality; and 3) the City's demonstrated understanding of
the development process as well as its expertise and negotiating
ability.
Two of these factors, control of land and an understanding
of the development process, can be achieved by most cities. The
presence of a state development corporation, however, while
clearly a factor in the Welfare Island case, may not be available
to most cities. Nevertheless, the first two factors provide
cities with alternative options without making them dependent on
other layers of government for project success. While cities
may be able to successfully achieve their objectives without a
state development corporation, the creation of similar state
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development corporation models may be desirable for cities,
especially if existing local and state development or fin-
ance instrumentalities are insufficient alone to do the job.
1.1 Land. In the case of Welfare Island, one of the most
instrumental leverage factors operating in the City's favor
was its ownership and control of land that was strategically
located and marketable, land that many developers were in fact
anxious to develop. Ownership of such land enabled the City
to initiate and develop plans and strategies that would best
serve the public interest; any developer then wanting to under-
take the project had to deal with the City in order to gain
control of the land. The City's price, however, was the under-
taking of the City's plans. Thus, ownership or control of land
would seem to be a prerequisite for any successful city develop-
-ment role.
2. The Pre'sence of' a- Public Development Instrumentality. The
existence and presence of UDC certainly enhanced the City's
ability to get development moving more or less in the direction
of its intended plans. UDC enabled the development to proceed
speedily, minimizing governmental delays and a host of problems
that would certainly have delayed or discouraged a private de-
veloper. No private developer was able to make the concessions
to the City that UDC made, including its acceptance of the City's
unique social and economic mix and other innovative aspects of
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the plan. The City would also have almost certainly had to
assume greater financial obligation and risk without UDC,
possibly for the capital improvements and certainly for public
facilities, a 'ajor disadvantage. Because UDC was a quasi-
public developer that shared many of the City's goals and ob-
jectives, the City had more trust and confidence in UDC to
carry out the City's development plans without compromising many
of its objectives in the process. In addition to the controls
that the lease provided, the need for the City's future active
participation was further diminished by the knowledge of UDC's
and Ed Logue s conittment to good design and development, a
committment that would assure the City of the Island development
it had envisioned, one that would bring credit to the Linsay
Administration that initiated it and to the City as a whole for
pursuing the development.
3. Understanding of the Development Process. The City also was
able to succeed as well as it did because of the thorough under-
standing of the development process that it demonstrated through-
out its decision-making. It had a thorough command of its goals
and objectives for the Island and brought the plan to fruition
step by step: from its original decision to develop the Island;
to the development of its plan (Schmidt and later the Johnson
Plan); its choice of developer to carry it out; its decision to
lease; and finally its ability to negotiate a lease that in
essence achieved all its objectives and insured that the chain of
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previous decisions led to the desired outcome. The City
demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the limitations
of its role as well as the leverage it could use with de-
velopers, and methods and strategies that it could employ
to achieve its objectives with minimum risk and burden to
itself. That it was able to successfully translate that
knowledge and ability into a tangible development through its
negotiations with the developer again is a major accomplish-
ment, marking a change in the City's perception of its role.
Thus control of land, having UDC as developer, and the
City's effective development role were primary factors enabling
the City to successfully develop Welfare Island along the lines
it had intended.
The study of New York City's effectiveness in initiating and
pursuing the Welfare Island development implies that cities do
not have to retain impotent and ineffective roles in the develop-
ment sphere. There is no need for cities to feel outnegotiated,
financially unsophisticated, and development-unwise in dealing
with developers. An understanding and sophistication is necessary
if they are to take an active role in developing land and
achieving urban development objectives. Other cities may follow
New York's lead and adopt a similar approach if suitable to their
own objectives and unique situation. The process remains the
same. Cities must first identify potential sites requiring de-
velopment, whether their own underutilized land, land acquired by
eminent domain, or land controlled through conscious of unconscious
landbanking. Once those areas are identified, cities must
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determine realistic and appropriate objectives and translate
them into effective strategies. The development process in
reality is not a set method or approach, but rather is ad hoc
and must be determined specifically for each site.
Areas For' Further' Res-ear ch
Further research ideas arising from this study fall into
two areas: one, further analysis of Welfare Island upon comple-
tion of the development (in fact the first phase, 2000 units
of housing, is scheduled to be completed by the beginning of
1975Y; and two, further analysis of the three factors which
were seen as responsible for the City's success.
I. Further Exploring Welfare (Roosevelt) Island. As success-
f ul as the City has been up to the lease signing, it would
be instructive to return to Welfare Island after the completion
of the development, scheduled for some time after 1979, to
examine several issues:
A. Development Issues. For example, how well did the Island's
actual development correspond to the General Development Plan
agreed upon in the 1969 lease? Was the lease a workable document;
was it sufficiently flexible to take into account the needs of
the developer? Did the social and economic mixing scheme provide
serous difficulties for UDC, possibly in its own negotiations
for subdevelopers, for instance? Is the development proving to
be as marketable and successful as projected?
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B. Social Issues. Does the new community function?--a
question entailing a host of issues concerning the achieve-
ment of its model status. Do people interact or do they
live and work in separate enclaves? Is there a feeling of
community? Is the Island thriving, or dull, uninviting,
and sterile as some have charged new communities with being?
C. Effectiveness of UDC as Developer. How effective was UDC
in producing workable plans, in hiring architects, developers
and builders, in keeping costs down, in negotiating with
private developers, and in sharing profits and tax proceeds
with the City? Was UDC able to effectively manage the develop-
ment financing Cincluding sale of bonds) and construction, and
to insure the -marketability and workability of the plan, not
only for subsidized housing but for conventional? Was it able
to gain the support of lenders for the conventional housing
and to obtain all needed subsidies and expected federal grants
from Washington? Basically, was UDC able to handle the job, or
did the City -make a -mistake in choosing UDC? Did UDC concede
too much to the City initially, thus weakening its development
capability?
D. Financial Development. What were the final costs actually
incurred by both the City and UDC? Did UDC try to renegotiate
the lease at any point or ask the City for more than the lease
initially provided? Would UDC try to change the development
program in terms of social mix and economic formulae instead of
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depending so much upon the riskier elements of the development,
namely conventional housing and commercial space, to make it
financially work? Were these changes beneficial to the develop-
ment and the City's interests? What costs had the City not
counted on or poorly assessed? Did the City sufficiently con-
sider its share of operating and maintenance costs for public
facilities and services and what were these costs? What benefits
did the City receive that it had not expected?
Frow well the City negotiated with UDC is another issue. A
question that follows is whether or not UDC will be able to ful-
fill its committments to complete the development. If it completes
its commnittment regardless of the City's success in bargaining
then perhaps the feeling will be that the City didn't bargain hard
enough. If UDC fails to complete the development will the City
be blamed for bargaining too hard? If UDC fails to complete the
development the reasons for its failure may have to be investigated
to ascertain what role the City played in that failure. However,
the only conclusion that could be drawn is that UDC acted in its
own interest in accepting its committment to develop the Island
and expected it to be successful. Certainly the City cannot be
blamed for insisting on the best possible deal for itself within
reason. Any other posture would be unrealistic. Public or
private developers must be prepared to take risks; the degree of
risk to be assumed commensurate with the developer's expectations
of success.
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A detailed cost-benefit analysis of the City's direct
and indirect contributions to the Island's development should
be undertaken. It should try to take into account not only
direct cost expenditures, but also extremely difficult measure-
ments of the success of the social plan, the contribution of
the development as a model to aid the City's morale and its con-
tribution as a model in the City's ability to deal with developers.
Also possibly entering the equation should be the fact that by
allowing UDC to develop Welfare Island, the City gained UDC as a
developer for -much more difficult projects in other less desirable
parts of the City. A matrix for examining that question would be
valuable for future research.
IT. Testing Future Implications of Thesis
A. Land, The study has found that land leverage was crucial in
the City's ability to achieve as much as it did, implying that
landbanking of underutilized vacant land, or areas such as parks,
etc. until land is ripe for development, is of possible im-
portance to cities wishing to have a greater role in their develop-
-ment futures. It also implies that even where cities don't own
land, they might find it worthwhile to acquire land in a land-
banking program, or to exploit opportunities that may arise
(such as underutilized or phased out Army or Navy installations,
etc. which they may purchase from federal or state governments).
This policy may require national legislation that would authorize
the writing down of the cost ogff such land to cities for recrea-
tion or future development depending on the suitability of the
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site and the micro and macro planning needs of the neighborhood
and the city as a whole.
Such landbanking legislation that may further this objective,
if it can be determined to be a worthwhile policy, should be
further explored and tested. The use of eminent domain as an ad-
vanced technique before development or even as a landbanking
tool should be explored. Testing of comparable sites in New York
and other cities could be done to establish more :clearly land-
banking 's usefulness.
]B, UDC. This study finds that the presence of UDC was an
important component in aiding New York City to achieve its goals
and objectives in the Welfare Island case study. It is important,
therefore, to further test the advantages and disadvantages of
public development instrumentalities such as UDC. Towards this
end, it may be instructive to match several UDC projects with
those of private developers to determine the comparative perform-
ance of each in several areas:
1. To determine whether public development corporations or
private developers can best pursue social objectives and the
public interest.
2. To determine whether public development corporations or
private developers can provide for more innovative and exciting
-urban design and pleasing living environments.
3. To determine how cost effective both public development
corporations and private developers are.
4. To assess the relative speed and facility With which development
is planned and constructed.
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5. To assess which best furthers the achievement of municipal
and localities'- planning and development objectives.
Given the importance of the role UDC played in furthering
the Welfare Island development and further research establishing
thIs fact, then perhaps methods should be explored of creating
public development corporations or similar mechanisms perhaps
better suited to the particular needs of localities. Even local
ad-hoc agencies might be a preferable alternative to the private
developer since development agencies can in a sense channel de-
velopment along lines acceptable to cities, bear the risk of de-
velopment for subdevelopers, and furthermore, provide more
certainty for investors than in comparable projects privately de-
veloped. If the public development concept is seen by other
cities as helpful or desirable, then studying the best form
legislation can take to that effect may be useful, possibly
even the suggestion of a national model enabling statute (such
as the zoning enabling standard under President Hoover).
Research may conclude that such a mechanism is not currently
necessary in some areas where the private sector has more than
adequately met existing housing needs, or where social design
goals are not felt to be the obligation or responsibility of
government (as may indeed be the case) , or where other instru-
mentalities exist that may achieve more or less similar objec-
tives., Nevertheless, states and localities that can benefit
tangibly from the creation of a public development body, should
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receive encouragement as knowledge of its advantages is
more widely disseminated. Had the UDC concept not already
been created, it most probably would have to be invented.
Perhaps these new urban skills will propel block grant
policies further, thus encouraging the federal trend away
from the categorical programs of the past. Cities would con-
trol where and how funds would be spent and where they would
be -most effective in the urban development sphere. States
(perhaps the most appropriate level) or the federal government
-may wi'sh to participate in the formation of public development
corporations to aid and abet cities' development policies. They
can take the risk that cities with limited resources cannot. A
new ability of localities to control their planning and develop-
ment destinies may mitigate the necessity of the states and
federal government assuming that role, thus relieving them of a
burden that localities feel rightly belongs at that level. While
it does not relieve the states or the federal government of the
responsibility of planning for state and national growth, it
nevertheless adds a major element of planning stability at the
local level-and provides responsiveness to the needs of urban
residents, as well as parameters for states and the federal
government to use as planning baselines. Federal and state
policies should be sensitive to urban planning policies instead
of complicating or competing with them. For states and the
federal government this would be an important change in their
perception of how cities can control and initiate their own devel-
opment.
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Although it would be tempting to state unequivocably
that the City is capable of initiating and planning all de-
velopment in the City on land it owns, this statement does
not necessarily follow and is unsupported by the evidence
furnished by this limited study. What can be said, however,
is that if New York City succeeded in this particular case,
Welfare Island, other cities may be able to succeed similarly
elsewhere. The factors responsible for the City's success--
the availability of a suitably located and marketable site,
the presence of UDC (or other development bodies capable of
so significantly facilitating development and minimizing risk),
and the City's willingness and capability to assume a more
active development posture--may or may not be reproducable
elsewhere.
Whether or not cities and towns will respond to the challenge
of planning and controlling land development where feasible is
open to question. Will cities have the leadership, understanding,
financial resources and wherewithal to change their traditional
role, or will they feel that development still properly remains th
province of the private sector and that only traditional land use,
and zoning, building code and other regulatory functions are
appropriate for municipalities, any further action being financial
socially, and possibly politically risky.
Cities are still the only level of government that can plan
and control their development destinies. The City's role in the
e
ly,
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Welfare Island case was paramount. Without the City's active
participation clearly development of Welfare Island would not
have fulfilled the City's physical and social planning objec-
tives. Judicious management of the planning process by the City
can lead to better development redounding to the benefit of the
City.
In order to assume a more active role, cities will have to
develop knowledge of the development process, skills of bar-
gaining and of negotiating. They must understand trade-offs
and the economics of development. An understanding of the
economic incentives to developers, such as tax losses, will
provide citi'as with the kind of authority and leverage to bargain
effectively to achieve their objectives in an era of fiscal
austerity. This new role also requires the training and re-
cruiting of skilled planning and development officials, well
versed in the development process, capable of successfully
developing and implementing planning strategies based upon a
realistic appraisal of the particular site constraints and
overall city goals and objectives, and able to successfully
negotiate agreements to insure those objectives, without undue
risk and burden thrust upon the city.
Cities can also sharpen other tools they already have at their
disposal, some of which are not used aggressively enough. Where
legally possible, techniques such as more aggressive use of
eminent domain to aid land assemblage, property tax incentives
to aid new development in desired areas, and incentive zoning
and techniques such as underzoning, leading to more direct
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negotiations with developers, with the clear intent and
purpose of furthering urban development goals and objec-
tives should be utilized. Better coordination between
various arms of local government (where the mayor has
direct control) is needed, such as coordination of trans-
portation and land use planning, park planning and land
banking for future development. Most importantly, more
effective control of infrastructure placement is needed
at a pace determined by municipal planners and designed
to maximize leverage in development negotiations. Some
cities such as New York and Ramapo have made starts in
this direction (new York in incentive zoning and Ramapo
through a development point system based on infrastructure
placement), but a more thorough understanding of the de-
velopment process and coordination of the many tools and
techniques available to planners and policymakers can lead
to more effective control over cities' development destinies.
But the city will have to adapt its goals to meet the
realistic problems it faces. Funding limitations, limita-
tions of marketability and a whole host of other problems
,may still impede successful urban development. The city will
have to learn to operate within the realm of the "possible"
using iJts resources and, sWgll to the maximum and taking ad-
vantage of whatever assets it has in the process. The City in
the last quarter of the century perhaps may not look" like a
Buck Roger's well planned environment, but the city can if it so
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desires maximize its resources and skills through enlightened
development planning to ensure that the legacy left to the
City by its forebears will redound to the benefit of all its
residents.
Instead of merely reacting to developer initiatives as
has so often been the case in the past, cities can assume a
different role, that of actually initiating and pursuing their
own plans for developing land, gearing those plans to the goals
and objectives that best serve the public interest. By
assuming such a posture, cities can actively control urban
development and help shape their own future.
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APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of Welfare Island is one marked by many changes
in ownership and name, colorful escapades, scandal and
changing uses.
I. Early History
The Indians named it' Minahonnonck (or Minnahanock),
"tan island place," although from high above the island looks
like an Indian arrow head.1' The story of Peter Minuit's
purchase of the island of Manhattan for $24 worth of woven
cloth and metal tools is well known. Not so well known is
the story told of Welfare Island, bought by Governor Woulter
Van Twiller from the Indians in 1637 for use as a country
estate. 2- The island then was called Varcken Eylandt (Hog's
Island)., named for the pigs raised there. Governor Stuyvesant,
however, voided the Indian sale to Van Twiller in 1652 and
granted the island to Captain Francis Fyn by order of the West
India Company to prepare it for fortification against the
British. Fyn's island was confiscated in 1665 when Fyn capi-
tulated to the British and the island was transferred to the
British Crown along with New Amsterdam. The British called it
Perkens Island, but that name was shortlived as the Sheriff
of New York, Captain John Manning, bought the island in 1668
and gave it his name. 3.
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Manning was banished to his island for life after falling
into disgrace for hastily surrendering New York to the Dutch
in 1673, after the Dutch had staged a surprise naval a=siuLt in
an attempt to regain control of their old colony. Manning was
charged withtreason and found guilty by his incensed fellow
townsmen, even after his return from a trip to England where
he pleaded his case successfully before King Charles II.
During his banishment to the island, however, Manning lived in
a fine mansion and entertained his visitors in style with bowls
of rum punch in "The Castle." ' But he lived in disgrace until
his death in 1686, whereupon the island title and name were
passed to Robert Blackwell, the man who married Manningts step-
daugher and heir. The island eventually was passed on through-
the hands of Jacob Blackwell, Robert's son, who was the pro-
prietor during the Revolutionary War when the island was landed
on by the British forces following their victory on Long Island,
5
and subsequently to James Blackwell, Robert's grandson. * The
Blackwell name would grace the island for over two centuries, and
to this day Blackwell's mansion still stands, a rare reminder of,
a New York country home of the Federal period. (Blackwell's
mansion is currently being rehabilitated as part of the Welfare
Island development plan.)
During all this time, the only access to the island was by
boat; consequently, this lone solitary outpost to the north of
the major Dutch and British settlement down by the Battery, was
and could only be little more than a country estate. A descrip-
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tion of the island still exists in an advertisement by
James Blackwell, Robert's grandson, offering Blackwell's
Island for sale in the early 1800's:
A healty situation and many fish and fowl
caught here. Two small dwelling houses, a
barn, a bake-fowl house, cyder mill, orchard
of 540 fruit trees...pears, plums, peaches
and cherries. A number of the best stone
quarries already cleared to begin work imme-
diately. A complete set of farming tools and
quarry utensils and stock. Running springs
of most excellent water abound; 107 meadows,
eight of which are sale meadows. Whole im-
proved with manure in a good fence CsicL.
Inquire of Mr, Joseph Hallett, 204 Water Str.
or on premises of James Blackwell. 6.
Various attempts at sale by the now insolvent Blackwell
family led eventually to a sale to James S. Bell in 1828
for $30,000.00.
The island again changed hands in 1828 when James S. Bell
sold it to the Corporation of New York for a profit at
$32,500. Bell's widow, Magdalene, contested the transfer and on
September 11, 1844, her suit was settled by payment of an
additional $20,000. 7'
II. The Era of New York's Garden of Charity 8.
Penal Colony
Soon after the City purchased the island, it was put to use
as a place for charitable and corrective institutions.
Welfare Island was to begin its scandalous history as a way-
station for the human outcasts of society; a perfect location
for such a use as the dangerous and swift currents of the East
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River were considered an absolute safeguard against escape
and sufficient distance to keep such outcasts far removed
from the mainstream of society. From 1832, the year in which
the fortress-like penitentiary was completed, to 1936 (a
period of 104 years), this massive structure of medieval
dungeons, rounded turrets, and notched battlements (designed
in part by James Renwich) would serve as a home to some of
New York's most scandalous figures.
Charles Dickens, Britain's famed social critic, commented
on conditions in the city's new possession in his American
Wotes published in 1842:
One day, during my stay in New York, I paid a
visit to the different public institutions on
Long Island, or Rhode Island, I forget which.
CIt was Blackwell's Island.) ... wI as taken to
these institutions by water, in a boat belong-
ing to the island jail, and rowed by a crew of
prisoners, who were dressed in a striped uni-
form of black and buff, in which they looked
like faded tigers. They took me, by the same
conveyance, to the jail itself. 10.
Prison gangs quarried the island and Blackwell granite was
used for construction of many of the island's institutions as
well as for other city facilities. Later, prison labor was
used for many hospital functions until in the 1900's, public
outrage forced substitution of paid labor. The prison is des-
cribed admirably by Dickens:
It is an old prison, and quite a pioneer estab-
lishment, on the plan I have already described.
I was very glad to hear this, for it is unques-
tionably a very indifferent one. The most is
made, however, of the means it possesses, and it
it well regulated as such a place can be. 11-
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His compassion is evident:
The women work in covered sheds, erected for that
purpose. If I remember right, there are no shops
for men, but be that as it may, the greater part
of them labour in certain stone-quarries near at
hand. The day being very wet indeed, this labour
was suspended, were in their cells. Imagine these
cells, some two or three hundred in number, and
in every one a man locked up; this one at his door
for air, with his hands thrust through the grate;
this one in bed (in the middle of the day, remembery
and this one flung down in a heap on the ground,
viith his head against the bars, like a wild beast.
Make the rain pour down, outside, in torrents. Put
the everlasting stove in the midst; hot and suffoca-
ting, and vaporous, as a witch's caldron. Add a
collection of gentle odours, such as would arise
from a thousand mildewed umbrellas, wet through,
and a thousand buck-baskets, full of half-washed
linen--and there is the prison, as it was that day. 12.
A 19th century newspaper account characterized the island as
"a little city on waters...a city in which all the misery,
despair and viciousness of the metropolis are epitomized." 13.
Numerous scandals erupted and by 1914, conditions were
so poor that Dr. Katherine B. Davis, the new commissioner of
the Department of Correction, advocated the construction of a
new prison hospital and disciplinary quarters. Dr. Davis de-
voted herself to stopping the smuggling of narcotics onto the
island, and within a year, five staff personnel engaged in
the sale of narcotics to inmates had been arrested and con-
victed.
By 1921, the State Commission of Prisons, in documenting
the conditions, had described the prison in their report as:
"...one of the worst in the State and a disgrace to the City
14 *
of New York." It was described by others as "a sin-
steeped pile" and later as a clubhouse for gangsters. 15.
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Among its most illustrous prisoners were Tammany's infamous
Boss William M. Tweed and Mae West. 16.
The Blackwell name had become so strongly associated
with scandal that the Committee on Public Thoroughers of the
Board of Alderman recommended to the Mayor in April of 1921
that Blackwell's Island be changed to Welfare Island in order
to erase the stigma attached to its former name. 7' A few
days later the Mayor proclaimed that Blackwell's Island hereby
be known as Welfare Island. The name change was ushered in
this way: "That name Blackwell, with all the suggestions that
it connotes something of the past, and that the new name
Welfare seems to express the ideals for which the institution
on the Island stands." 18. By 1924, conditions were so bad
that the State Prisons Commission recommended abandonment of
the penitentiary and transformation of the island into a play-
ground. This was followed by a Grand Juror's Committee re-
commendation that a new prison be erected on nearby Riker's
Island together with a Board of.Estimate appropriation of
$100,000 for the new prison in October, 1925. 19.
In the meantime, those convicted of drug traffic con-
tinued to be a major component of the inamtes; 60% of the
persons committed to the workhouse in 1925 were drug addicts
or connected with illicit traffic in narcotics according to
criminal records. The prison conditions remained basically
unchanged and little progress was seen on Riker's Island des-
pite progress with plans and clearing of the site by prisoners.
It took three riots and considerable publicity between 1929 and
1934 to have $9 million appropriated for the prison on Riker's.
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The worst riot occurred on October 22, 1932, triggered by
a feud between Irish and Italian gangs competing for in-
fluence in the prison. After healing their wounds and
differences, they joined forces in the operation of a prison
vice ring. Joey Rao, a Dutch Schultz Harlem gangster, boot-
legger and racketeer, convicted of extortion in the Bronx
soda water business, headed the Italian faction, while Edward
Cleary headed the Irish group. The gangsters, living in the
style of feudal barons, smoked expensive cigars, wore silk
shirts, underwear and costly dressing gowns, and had suites
and their own garden plots in separate hospital wards over-
looking Manhattan. Valets served the gangster lords in their
rooms where they dined on steak and other choice food stolen
from the prison commisary. They totally controlled the pri-
son, squeezing profit out of every aspect of prison life. New
clothes of inmates were sold, privileges such as easier or
more lucrative jobs were sold, and even the parole list of
the warden was presented for their approval. Drug traffic
was wide and open, with even the guards assisting in the sale
of narcotics to inmates. A sophisticated carrier pigeon
system was even devised as a means of bringing heroin into the
prison. 20.
This state of affairs was to be ended by Mayor F. H. La
Guardia in one -of his first acts on January 24, 1934. The
"Little Flower" had his newly appointed Commissioner of Correc-
tions, Austin McCormick, stage an early morning raid on the
prison. The cells were cleared and their contents thrown into
the hallways. The booty included paper soaked in heroin solu-
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tion, files, razors, lead pipe pieces, and even transvestite
trappings--cosmetics, perfume,female underwear and a lady's
wig. Rao, Cleary and their henchmen were ousted from their
prison suites and marched into the prison's most unpleasant
cells. This depravity, now fully exposed by the crusading
LaGuardia, led to repeated demands for a new prison, and in
1936 the old stone prison was demolished and the prisoners
finally transferred to Riker's Island. 21.
This act marked the end of Welfare Island's use as a
penal colony although the reasons for a change in use relate
more to exogeneous factors than to the suitability of the
island itself for prison use; after all it was on another
island that the penal colony on Welfare Island was rebuilt.
The name Blackwell Island had become besmirched by prison
scandal, and it was not long before the "neutral" name of
Welfare Island also become synonymous with scandalous condi-
tions abiding during those days. The name transition was
thus a failure, but the prison moved not only because the is-
land itself had become a place of ill repute, but more im-
portantly because of its outmoded status, obsolescent facili-
ties, and because of the fact that new and varied institu-
tions were being built on Welfare Island, making it more than
just a prison colony and thus assuring that the prisoners
would certainly not be missed in the changing status of the
island.
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City Home for Dependents (Almshouse)
Simultaneous with the island's use as a correctional
center, it was also being used as the site of an alms-
house, the predecessor of the City Home for Dependents.
The city's original almshouse, holding thirty inmates,
was on the site of the present city hall and was later
moved to the grounds of Bellevue farm uptown on 26th
Street to rid the new city hall of complaints. Because
of persistent and intolerable overcrowding of both the
almshouse and hospital at Bellevue Farm, (by November,
1926, with New York City's population at only 175,000,
there were 1,366 inmates in the almshouse, 335 prisoners,
102 sick and 82 insane patients), it was decided to re-
locate the almshouse on Blackwell's Island on a 19 acre
tract. 22.
Dickens describes conditions in the following manner:
At a short distance from this building is another
called the Alms House, (This was probably the pre-
decessor of the City Home for Dependents.Y that is
to say, the workhouse of New York. This is a large
institution also: lodging, I believe, when I was
there, nearly a thousand poor. It was badly venti-
lated, and badly lighted; was not tooclean; and
impressed me, on the whole, very uncomfortably.
But it must be remembered that New York, as a great
emporium of commerce, and as a place of general
resort, not only from all parts of the States, but
from most parts of the world, has always a large
pauper population to provide for; and labours,
therefore, under peculiar difficulties in this res-
pect. Nor must it be forgotten that New York is a
large town, and that in all large towns a vast
amount of good and evil is intermixed and jumbled
up together. 23.
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Originally, in keeping with the philosophy that poverty
is a crime, John Sebring, overseer of the first Publick Work-
house and House of Correction in the City, was directed: "to
set the poor to work, and to correct the contumuacious,that
such poor as are able to work may not eat the bread of slought
and idleness and be a burden to the publick. " Many of
the city's vagrants and helpless poor were incarcerated with
hardened criminals in the tombs.
After the almshouse was built on the island, shortly after
1828, conditions were slightly better although the philosophy
of the day prevailed. In 1852 the workhouse was built and
the able-bodied indigent removed from the almshouse, while the
aged and disabled remained. W. H. Davenport reported in
Harper-s Magazine in 1866, that the workhouse was designed by
the city commissioners to be "as repulsive as is consistent
with humanity; while the almshouse was supposed to be 'a place
of comparative comfort, liberally though economically maintained."2 5 -
Modest stipends were paid to workhouse laborers but this
policy was soon abandoned as the workhouse became a penal in-
stitution for minor offenders--a haven for persons convicted
of small thefts, drunkenness, -vagrancy, disorderly conduct,
prostitution or drug addiction, generally sent to the island
directly from night court in Manhattan.
When male and female blind asylums were added to the alms-
house in 1869, its name was changed to the New York City Home
for the Aged and Infirm. The "blind leading the blind" became
a common sight as each morning a line of men would form two
abreast, arms touching, the shoulder in front, to be led to
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the barber shop. Each year the inmate population would
swell as winter neared and seasonal labor was laid off,
for no one would ever be turned away. The 'gome, con-
tinually crowded beyond capacity, was so bad at the end
of the 19th century that people slept two and three to
a bed and on the floors, in sheds and in tents. Barlow
alludes to its serenity and quiet village beauty with
its carefully tended flower beds, grass plots and hedges. 2 6 .
The City Home for Dependents, the oldest of the hospi-
tals and institutions run by the City, originally started
as an almshouse for indigent citizens. As the need for
medical services increased, it was expanded into both
nursing home and home for the aged. Pavillions for male
and female blind were added as well as a physio-therapy
building in 1908. The last major structure added was a
female industries building in 1915, although in 1941, the
old Neurological Institute was renovated and made a part
of the City Home for Dependents. In 1952, after 218 years
(124 on Welfare Island), the almshouse was closed, its able-
bodied inmates transferred to the Staten Island farm colony,
and the bedridden placed in the newly opened Bird S. Coler
Hospital. 27.
Lunatic ,Asylum
Perhaps the most famous building on the island and 'one
that has captured the imagination of many, is the original
New York City Lunatic Asylum that became part of Metropolitan
Hospital. Its octagonal rotunda has been praised by
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Charles Dickens: "The building is handsome; and is
remarkable for a spacious and elegant staircase...
its spiral staircase is generous in scale and as inter-
esting for the original sort of handling of space as
a Baroque stairhall." 28. Giorgio Cavaglieri calls it
the grandest interior in the city dating from before
the Grand Central Station concourse and a fascinating
premonition of the Guggenheim Museum that Wright cer-
tainly never saw. 29.
The east-west wing of the building and the Octagon
were completed June 10, 1839, but the north-south wing
was completed in 1847-48, depending on but modified
from the A.J. Davis design of 1834-1835. 30- Addi-
tional changes occurred in 1878 following a long and
complicated battle between architect, builder and the
city. The original domed roof of the Octagon will be
restored as part of the current Welfare Island develop-
ment plan, and it is hoped will provide a valuable accent
to the island's skyline as will be seen from Manhattan's
East Side.
Although the asylum's exterior was held in high es-
teem, conditions inside the asylum were deplorable. Dickens
describes the inmates of the asylum in horrifying detail:
I cannot say that I derived much comfort from the
inspection of this charity. The different wards
might have been cleaner and better orderedyI saw
nothing of that salutary system which had impressed
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me so favourably elsewhere; and everything had a
lounging, listless, madhouse air, which was very
painful. The moping idiot, cowering down with long
dishevelled hair; the gibbering maniac, with his
hideous laugh and pointed finger; the vacant eye,
the fierce wild face, the gloomy picking of the
hands and lips, and munching of the nails; there
they were all, without disguise, in naked ugliness
and horror. In the dining-room, a bare, dull,
dreary place, with nothing for the eye to rest on
but the empty walls, a woman was locked up alone.
She was bent, they told me, on committing suicide.
If anything could have strengthened her in her reso-
lution, it would certainly have been the insuppor-
table monotony of such an existence... 3 1 .
In 1867, the authorities made the mistake of committing
a girl of twenty, who after being refused a job at the New
York World, had disturbed the landlady of her cheap Man-
hattan boarding house by her strange behavior. Ten days
later, the World ran an expose of the conditions on Black-
well's Island, an expose so shocking that it caused the
City to institute reforms. The girl who had survived ten
days in the insane asylum wrote under the pen name of
Nellie Bly. 32.
Despite the horrors and woes afflicted on those unfor-
tunate human creatures in pre-Freudian days, the external
surroundings were considered innocent and charming. The
grounds were shaded by tall willows, horse-chestnuts and
buttonwood trees. A tree-arched carriage road led to a
river full of sailing craft of all types. The view to the
East was that of luxuriant foliage and elegant buildings
(and not of Con Edison's present Ravenswood smokestacks),
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while the view to the West was that of Manhattan Shore
with noble mansions and boat houses abounding. An ad-
joining twenty acres was used for a truck garden and an
extensive flower garden.
Hospitals
The 1800's and 1900's saw a number of public hospi-
tals devoted to a variety of purposes developed on
Welfare Island. Many of these hospitals decayed or be-
came obsolete over the decades, with only two still
functioning today: Goldwater Memorial Hospital, which
is a unique center for treatment of chronic diseases;
and Bird S. Coler Hospital, which deals primarily with
geriatric custodial cases. The two hospitals are the
successors on the island to such now defunct hospitals
as Metropolitan, Smallpox, New York Cancer Institute,
City, and Central Neurological Hospital. Some of these
old hospital structures will be preserved as reminders
of the island's role as a place of quarantine in those
pre-vaccine days when various contagious diseases struck
terror into the hearts of city dwellers. As Barlow put
it: "So imbued was the island with the atmosphere of dis-
ease and death that in the minds of many a trip across
the East River was synonymous with a trip across the
River Styx." 33.
Following is a brief description of some of the better
known hospitals:
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Smallpox Hospital
Built around 1854-56, Smallpox Hospital was designed
by James Renwich. This structure is currently known as
the Nurses' Residence and will be preserved as a landmark
building in the current Welfare Island development plan.
Metropolitan Hospital
The abandoned ruins of the Metropolitan State Hospi-
tal are in the 22-acre compound which includes Riverview
Juvenile Center, two churches, and the Octagon mentioned
earier as part of the Lunatic Asylum, on which site Met-
ropolitan Hospital was built. Originally the hospital
was the Ward's Island Homeopathic Hospital and was loca-
ted in the inebriate asylum there. In 1894 a plan was
instituted to put only state institutions on Ward's and
city institutions on Blackwell, so by 1902 the hospital
was relocated on Welfare Island as a concentrated tuber-
culosis unit and general hospital, while the insane
patients were transferred to the state's institution on
Ward's Island. The hospital's notoriety stems not only
from acute tubercular cases, but also from the leper
cases housed there from 1902 until the federal government
took them over in 1921.
City Hospital
City Hospital was a general hospital, the second old-
est of the hospitals and institutions conducted by the City
of New York. Opened in 1832 as an almshouse, it became a
hospital in 1837 and was totally destroyed in 1858 in the
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midst of a freezing blizzard, by a fire due to faulty
building construction. A new hospital was built in
1861 with stone quarried and constructed by the prison
inmates. In 1866 the name was changed to Charity Hos-
pital and only later, because of "real or fancied" ob-
jecttons on the part of the patients, it was changed
again to City Hospital in 1892. * In 1869, the admin-
istration of the hospital became so corrupt that the
Commissioner appointed a new medical superindendent
with complete authority over administrative matters to
make major improvements. The hospital reached a peak
b'ed capacity of 1060 in the 30's and that was reduced
to 880 upon the completion of Goldwater Hospital in
July, 1939. Despite major modifications in the 50's,
the hospital closed its doors in 1957 and many patients
transferred to Elmhurst Hospital in Queens.
Goldwater Memorial Hospital
With the old scandalous prison site demolished and
replaced by a new prison on Riker's Island, a hot debate
ensued between Parks Commissioner Robert Moses who
immediately published plans for a new sports park and
Hospitals Commissioner Goldwater who argued the case in
favor 6f a new hospital for the chronically ill.
Goldwater's argument eventually prevailed and the hospi-
tal that bears his name today was constructed in 1939.
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The hospital plan was enthusiastically embraced by
LaGuardia, and a comprehensive plan was envisaged,
'making Welfare Island a center for the chronically
ill Csknce the Department of Corrections had de-
partedl.
As a center for the treatment of chronic diseases
it was unique in the City. It was also considered
an architectural innovation in its day, giving con-
siderable attention to sunlight exposure and to other
design features which related the building structure
to the water environment. Occupying a 21 acre area,
Goldwater handles patients from throughout the City.
Constantly overburdened by "purely custodial cases"
Cgenerally indigent patients without homes, sometimes
transferred from other hospitals to open up needed beds),
however, the need was soon recognized for a hospital on
Welfare Island to deal primarily with custodial cases,
what was to be Coler Hospital. 35.
Bird S.. Coler Hospital
Named for the former Commissioner of the New York
City Department of Welfare (January 1918 to December 1928),
Bird S. Coler Hospital was completed in 1952, at which
time the City closed Metropolitan Hospital and the City
Home. Originally the hospital was organized and opera-
ted as a traditional chronic care hospital, with treat-
ment organized along the usual disease-oriented care
system. In 1962 the New York Medical College--Center for
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Chronic Disease was established at Coler to provide
a program directed to the care of the individual
patient with a strong emphasis upon rehabilitation,
even for those chronically ill patients who would
never be able to achieve total self-sufficiency.
There is no question that Coler is a geriatric facil-
ity, with a 1966 study showing that over half of the
patients were 65 and older at first admission and less
than 5% below age 35. The average stay at the hos-
pital in 1967 was 832 days. Basically patients fall
into two categories: those who require active long term
care, and those who require little active care but re-
quire attention beyond that which they can give them-
selves. 36.
Elevator and Storehouse Building
Completed in 1918 to provide elevator access to
the Island from the lower level of the Queensboro Bridge,
this building contained space for ambulances and other
vehicles to load into one of four vehicular elevators on
the top floors and descend to the Island and Reception
Hospital for emergency uses. When the Welfare Island
bridge was completed in 1955, the elevators stopped taking
vehicular traffic from the bridge, although pedestrian
elevator traffic still continues fiVe days a week.
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Blackwell Mansion
The twenty-seven acre City Home area also contains
the Blackwell Mansion, originally built about 1789. It
served as a staff house for resident physicians until
1934 and later as the medical superintendent's residence.
This home is being rehabilitated under the present Welfare
Island plan.
Fire Training School Area
Just north of the City Home Area is the New York City
Fire Department Bureau of Training which conducts a wide
variety of basic and advanced courses for firemen. The
basic training building is used for training firemen in
smoke and heat conditions and in search and rescue opera-
tions. Both the Fire and Police Departments conducted
training exercises in riot control in the old City Hospi-
tal area, with the Fire Department conducting operations
in -many of the abandoned buildings around the island, and
in the nearly deserted streets.
Primate Colony
This former hospital building housed a colony of rhesus
monkeys and larger primates used by New York University
Medical School for cancer and leukemia research.
The Lighthouse
At the northern tip of Welfare Island on ground that
was once separated from the remainder of Welfare Island
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by a wooden bridge until land-fill closed that gap,
exists a small granite lighthouse, believed to have
been built in the early 1800's. A fixed date is un-
available as improved building records in the City
did not begin until the 1860's. 37.
An amusing story that may be more apocrypha than
true tells of the lighthouse's origins. An Irish
-mental patient fearing a British invasion of the
Island some day is believed to have built a fort on
the small detached Island to safely secure it, be-
lieving it to be his special mission in life to frus-
trate a British takeover. 38. This event supposedly
occurred in the mid-1800's. Meanwhile, the East River
was becoming a major shipping channel and the authori-
ties decided to construct a lighthouse to aid shipping,
only to find a recalcitrant Irishman who only after
much cajoling and the payment of a large sum. of bogus
money, permitted the fort to be demolished. The story
continues that the patient built the lighthouse him-
self and left the stone marker at its base with the
following inscription:
This is the work/was done by/John McCarthy
Who built the light/House from the bottom to the
Top all ye that do pass by may/Pray for his soul
when he dies. 39-
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To complete the story, legend has it that this builder
had once been a river boat captain and for many years
the captains of boats moving up and down the river al-
ways saluted the fort and later the lighthouse as they
passed. 40*
The Religious Structures
Church of the Sacred Heart
This Roman Catholic Church, formerly known as
Saint Mary's, was built in 1912 on land loaned to it
by, the City. It served most recently as the residence
for the senior Catholic chaplain at Coler and three
other priests who serve at the New Metropolitan Hospi-
tal in Manhattan.
Chapel of the Holy Spirit
This Episcopal church is housed in a city building
built in 1923. It formerly served as the Protestant
chapel for Metropolitan Hospital and most recently as
the residence of the Protestant Chaplain from the new
Metropolitan Hospital.
The Synagouge
In the City Home area, this small building served
as the Jewish place of worship and most recently was
the residence of the Jewish chaplain. It was built in
1928 and sold to the City.
- 275 -
Chapel of the Good Shephard
Built in 1889, this Episcopal Church was used for
the Protestant chaplain of Caler Hospital. Designed
by Frederick Clark Withers, it is considered worthy
of preservation as a City landmark.
Church of the Good Samaritan
Built by the Lutheran Inner Mission Society on a
99 year lease with the city in 1917, it was most re-
cently owned by the Association for Relief of Indigent
Germans in the City and State Institutions of New York
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APPENDIX B
THE ISLAND OVER THE YEARS
Period
Pre-
Colonial
to 1637
1637 -
to 1652
1652
to 1665
1665
to 1668
1668
to 1686
1686
to 1828
1828
1828
to 1921
1921
to 1969
1969
to 1973
Name of Island
Minnahonnonck or
Minnahanock
'Varcken Eylandt
or Fin Island
Perkens Island
Manning Island
Blackwell Island
Blackwell Island
Blackwell Island
Welfare Island
Welfare Island
Ownership
American Indian
Governor Woulter
Van Twiller,Dutch
Captain Francis.
Fyn, Dutch
British Crown
Captain John
Manning, Sheriff
of New York City
Robert Blackwell
James S. Bell
Corporation of
the City of New
York
Corporation of
the City of New
York
Leased by N.Y.C.to
W.I.D.C. sub. of
U.D.C. 99 year
lease
Usage
Wilderness
Country Estate
& Livestock Farm
for hogs
Same
Country Estate
Country Estate
and Place of
Banishment
Country Estate,
quarry, orchards,
cider mill, farm
Same
Prison, Almshouse,
variety of charit-
able & correc.facil.;
Garden of Charity
City Hospital
Fire Training School
Relocation & Place-
ment
1973
to 2068
Roosevelt Island Leased by W.I.D.C. Develop New Community
& 2 pre-existing
hosp.
5000 families
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APPENDIX C
THE LEASE
The sixty-page lease is made up of twenty-seven provisions
covering a variety of topics, and three supplemental schedules
designed to clarify and provide detail for the twenty-seven
provisions.
Schedule One, Leased Premises, sets forth in its first seven
annexes the metes and bounds description and easements on the
"leased premises". The eighth describes the water supply ease-
ments and city fee parcel, and the ninth, the property and
utility maps. The second schedule, the General Development Plan,
outlines: 1) the basic program; 2) land-use; 3) design criteria
and 41 circulation; and also includes three appendices providing
charts of existing conditions, development land use and a site
plan. The last schedule presented is the Lessor's Demolition,
which provides for the City to demolish twenty-six buildings as
well as part of a twenty-seventh. The third and last section of
the lease ends with the Exhibit A Agreement defining the relation-
ships and respective roles of the City, UDC and its subsidiary,
and includes provisions dealing with: 1) services of a subsidiary;
2) obligations of the corporation; 3) payment of subsidiary;
4) agreement of the city and corporation concerning subsidiary;
5) termination; 6) notice; and 7) arbitration.
Appendix.C will include only the main body of the lease,
the twenty-seven provisions.
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THIS LEASE, made this 23rd day of December, 1969 between
THE CITY OF NEw YoRK, a municipal corporation of the State of New
York having an office at City Hall, Borough of Manhattan, City,
County and State of New York ("Lessor"), the NEw YORK STATE
URBAN DEVELOPMENT CoRPoRATIoN, a public benefit corporation of the
State of New York having an office at 666 Fifth Avenue, Borough of
Manhattan, City, County and State of New York ("Lessee"), and the
WELFARE IsLA.W DEVELOPMENT CoRPoRATIoN, a New York corporation
having an office at 666 Fifth Avenue, Borough of Manhattan, City,
County and State of New York ("Subsidiary"),
WITNESSETH:
1. Leased Property; Term of Lease. Lessor hereby leases to
Lessee and Lessee hereby rents from Lessor the following described
property (the "Leased Premises"):
(a) All the lands described in Schedule 1 attached hereto; and
(b) All building structures, facilities, equipment, paving, sur-
facing and other structures now or hereafter located on such
lands;
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to (i) the agreements of record and other
exceptions referred to in such Schedule 1, and (ii) such state of facts
as an accurate survey would show:
FOR a term commencing on the date hereof and expiring (unless
this Lease shall sooner terminate as provided herein) at midnight
on the 99th anniversary of the date hereof.
2. Lessee's Obligation to Prepare Plans and Construct Improve-
ments; Lessor's Obligation to Relocate and Demolish; Agree-
ment with Subsidiary. Lessee shall prepare or cause to be prepared
designs, plans and specifications for the Improvements called for by
the General Development Plan, shall obtain or cause sublessees to
obtain or shall otherwise arrange for financing upon such terms as
Lessee shall deem appropriate for the development of the Improve-
ments and shall construct the Improvements or cause the Improve-
ments to be constructed. Construction shall commence, subject to
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Enforced Delay, no later than eighteen months from the date hereof
and shall be completed, subject to Enforced Delay, no later than the
eighth anniversary of such date or, in the event subway service to
the Leased Premises shall not have commenced by such eighth anni-
versary, then such construction shall be completed two years after
the actual commencement of such service to the Leased Premises.
In the event of any delay in the completion of construction
beyond the fifteenth (15th) anniversary of the date hereof on account
of failure to commence such subway service, either Lessor or Lessee
may upon 180 days' prior written notice terminate this Lease. Upon
such termination Lessor shall
(a) pay to the trustee for the holders of any indebtedness
of Lessee a sum of money sufficient to fully and completely re-
deem any such indebtedness of Lessee allocable to Public Facili-
ties, with accrued interest, then outstanding, together with an
opinion of Lessor's Corporation Counsel stating that the Lessor
has power and is duly authorized to make such payment, or
(b) deliver to such trustee an instrument in writing duly
executed on behalf of Lessor in form and substance satisfactory
to such trustee, unqualifiedly assuming the full payment of any
such indebtedness of Lessee allocable to Public Facilities, with
accrued interest, then outstanding, together with an opinion of
Lessor's Corporation Counsel stating that Lessor has power and
is duly authorized to assume such payment and may assess, levy
and collect taxes on all the taxable real property in The City of
New York without limitation as to rate or amount to make any
and all payments required under such indebtedness.
Lessor shall promptly and with all due diligence proceed to re-
locate all occupants and uses of the Leased Premises. Lessor will
promptly and with all due diligence complete the demolition of all
improvements on the Leased Premises listed on Schedule 3.
In connection with Lessee's obligation to design, finance and
construct the Improvements, Lessee, Lessor and Subsidiary have
simultaneously herewith entered into a contract in the form attached
hereto as Exhibit A wherein the Subsidiary shall supply certain
services in connection with the development of the Improvements.
Lessor approves of and consents to said agreement.
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3. Lessor's Public Facilities. In accordance with paragraph 2
hereof, Lessee shall finance with tax exempt financing from the sale
of its own bonds and notes, from Lessor or from other sources of
tax exempt financing, and shall design and construct all Public Facili-
ties. Lessee shall deliver to Lessor to the person and at the place
provided in paragraph 15 hereof complete sets of schematic and work-
ing drawings and specifications for each such Public Facility at the
time of completion of such schematic and working drawings and
specifications, respectively, in order to permit agents of the depart-
ment of Lessor having jurisdiction of similar public facilities to
inspect such drawings and to make recommendations or comments
thereon.
Prior to the completion of each Public Facility which shall be a
school or an appurtenance to a school, Lessor shall agree to purchase
or lease each such school or appurtenance when and as completed in
the manner provided herein and shall initiate and complete all pro-
cedures and appropriations necessary to permit Lessor to complete
such purchase or lease as herein provided. Lessor may purchase each
such school or appurtenance by payment to Lessee of a price equal to
the cost to Lessee of the design, financing and construction of such
school or appurtenance including Debt Service for Public Facilities
and Normal Allowances allocable thereto and any premiums or
penalties payable on the retirement of bonds or notes issued to finance
such school or appurtenance. Such price shall be payable in a lump
sum upon the next Rent Payment Day after completion, or within
three months after completion if such next Rent Payment Day shall
be less than three months after completion, after delivery to Lessor
of Lessee's Certified Payment Statement with respect to such
price, or in equal semi-annual installments on each Rent- Payment
Day after the completion of such school or appurtenance through the
period of permanent financing thereof after delivery to Lessor of
Lessee's Certified Payment Statement with respect to each such
installment. In the event such price is paid in installments, such
price shall be deemed fully paid at the time of the discharge and
satisfaction of the financing of such school or appurtenance upon pay-
ment of any balance due on account of such price for the period from
the date of such discharge and satisfaction to the last previous Rent
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Payment Day. Upon completion of payment by Lessor, Lessee shall
deliver to Lessor such deeds or other documents as may be necessary
to transfer ownership of such school or appurtenance to Lessor and
to provide Lessor with the right to maintain and operate such school
or appurtenance on the Leased Premises during the term hereof.
Lessor may lease each such school or appurtenance upon comple-
tion by payment of an annual rent equal to the aggregate of Debt
Service for Public Facilities and Normal Allowances allocable to such
school or appurtenance for each year of the term of this Lease. Such
annual rent shall be payable in installments after completion by pay.
ment on each Rent Payment Day of the portion of such annual rent
accrued in the period for which payment is due on such Rent Payment
Day, after delivery to Lessor of Lessee's Certified Payment Statement
with respect to each such installment. Such lease shall provide Lessor
with the right to maintain and operate such school or appurtenance on
the Leased Premises during the term hereof. Lessor may purchase each
such school or appurtenance for which annual rent shall have been
paid through the period of permanent financing thereof by payment
upon satisfaction and discharge of such financing of the sum of one
($1) dollar plus the balance of any annual rent due at the time of such
purchase. Lessee shall deliver to Lessor against such payment such
deeds or other documents as may be necessary to transfer ownership
of such school or appurtenance to Lessor.
The cost to Lessee of the design, financing and construction of any
school or appurtenance required to be purchased or leased as provided
above, including Debt Service for Public Facilities and Normal Allow-
ances allocable thereto, shall in no event exceed the average cost of the
three (3) schools or appurtenances of similar size for similar age
groups for which construction contracts have most recently been bid
and let in The City of New York prior to the date of the commence-
ment of construction of such school or appurtenance, plus 10%.
Lessee will use its best efforts to secure funds for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the parks from the New York State Parks
Commission for the City of New York. In the event that such funds
are not secured by Lessee from such Commission, Lessee shall secure
tax exempt financing for such parks from Lessor or from the proceeds
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of sale of its own bonds and notes and shall undertake such construc-
tion, operation and maintenance.
Lessor shall not discriminate against residents of the Leased
Premises with respect to the provision of police, fire, sanitation, health
protection, public education and other municipal services. In order
to provide such services Lessor shall, except with respect to each
school or appurtenance required to be purchased or leased by Lessor
as provided above and except with respect to each Public Facility
to be maintained and operated by Lessee as provided in the General
Development Plan, lease each Public Facility from Lessee upon com-
pletion for the sum of one ($1) dollar and Lessor thereafter during
the term of this Lease shall have the right to operate and maintain
such facility in conformity herewith.
Each Public Facility shall be deemed complete either when there
shall have been issued by Lessee and delivered to Lessor .a certificate
of completion stating that such Public Facility has been completed in
in accordance with all laws and regulations applicable to projects
of Lessee and in accordance with the working drawings submitted to
Lessor for inspection, as modified by Lessee to reflect such recom-
mendations of Lessor as Lessee may in its sole' discretion accept, or
when there shall have been issued by Lessor and delivered to Lessee
Lessor's temporary or permanent certificate of occupancy or any
other certificate or license required to permit the occupancy or use
of such Public Facility, whichever event shall first occur.
4. Basic and Additional Rent.
(a) Basic Rent. For each year of the term of this Lease, Lessee
shall pay to Lessor, in such coin or currency of the United States of
America as at the time of payment shall be legal tender for the pay-
ment of public and private debts, at the office of the Lessor at the
Municipal Building, Borough of Manhattan, City, County and State
of New York, or at such place or to such agent as Lessor may from
time to time designate, as an annual tax equivalent payment and
ground rent, a Basic Rent which shall be equal to the aggregate of
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the following sums, less Debt Service for Public Facilities and Normal
Allowances allocable to such year:
(1) The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product of
$30 multiplied by the number of Completed Units of Subsidized
Housing plus (y) a tax equivalent for Subsidized Housing equal
to 10% of Annual Shelter Rent;
(2) The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product of
$180 multiplied by the number of Completed Units of Middle
Income Housing plus (y) a tax equivalent for Middle Income
Housing equal to 10% of Annual Shelter Rent;
(3) The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product of
$340 multiplied by the number of Completed Units of Convention-
ally Financed Housing plus (y) the Tax Equivalent for Conven-
tionally Financed Housing;
(4) The sum of (x) a ground rent equal to the product of
$.60 (sixty cents) multiplied by the number of square feet of
Completed Commercial Space plus (y) the Tax Equivalent for
Commercial Space.
(b) Additional Rent. In addition to the Basic Rent, Lessee
shall pay, in the same manner as the Basic Rent, Additional Rent
equal to Net Income for the preceding year.
(c) Time of Payment. The Basic Rent and the Additional Rent
shall be payable in semi-annual installments on each Rent Payment
Day. Lessee shall deliver to Lessor on or before each Rent Pay-
ment Day Lessee's Certified Payment Statement and pay to Lessor
the Basic Rent and Additional Rent for the period for which Basic
Rent and Additional Rent are payable on such Rent Payment Day.
(d) Set Off; Deferral. On each Rent Payment Day Lessor may
set off against all sums then due and payable by it to Lessee, and
Lessee may set off against all sums then due and payable by it to
Lessor, all such sums due and payable to each by the other on any
previous Rent Payment Day as shall not have been paid prior to
such subsequent Rent Payment Day. In the event that on any Rent
Payment Day the amount of Debt Service for Public Facilities and
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Normal Allowances deductible as provided in paragraph 4(a) shall
be greater than (i) the aggregate of the sums computed in accordance
with subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) of paragraph 4(a) above or
(ii) Gross Income, Lessee may defer any sum by which such amount
exceeds the lesser of (i) or (ii) and deduct such sum on any subse-
quent Rent Payment Day or Days. Any such sum remaining to be
deducted as of the termination hereof shall be adjusted upon such
termination.
z. Adjustment of Rent. The Basic Rent shall be adjusted as
follows:
(a) the ground rents set forth in subparagraphs 1(x), 2(x),
3(x) and 4(x) of paragraph 4(a) hereof shall be adjusted on each
Rent Adjustment Date by substituting after such date the Then
Current Ground Rent for the Improvement or part of an Improve-
ment adjusted as of such date for the ground rent payable on
account of such ;[mprovement or part of an Improvement prior to
such date, provided, however, that in the event the Then Current
Ground Rent on such Rent Adjustment Date shall be less than
the ground rent for such Improvement set forth in subparagraph
1(x), 2(x), 3(x) or 4(x) of such paragraph; as appropriate, no
such adjustment shall be made;
(b) the tax equivalents set forth in subparagraphs 1(y) and
2(y) of paragraph 4(a) hereof shall be adjusted as of each Tax
Equivalent Adjustment Date by substituting after such date the
Tax Equivalent for Conventionally Financed Housing for the
Improvement adjusted as of such date for the tax equivalent
payable on account of such Improvement prior to such date; and
(c) from and after the 10th anniversary of the date on
which Basic Rent shall have become payable on all Improve-
ments consisting of Subsidized, Middle Income and Conventionally
Financed Housing and Commercial Space, the Basic Rent shall be
equal to the aggregate of the sums set forth in subparagraphs
1, 2, 3 and 4 of paragraph 4(a) hereof less Debt Service for Public
Facilities. Lessee may deduct Normal Allowances deferred from
the period previous to such 10th anniversary as provided in
subparagraph 4(d) from any Basic Rent due after such 10th
anniversary.
- 286 -
8
6. Payment of Charges for Municipal and Public Utilities. (a) Ex-
cept as specified in (b) below, Lessee will pay or cause to be paid all
rents, rates and charges, excises, levies, license fees, permit fees, and
other authorization fees, and, except as otherwise herein provided,
all other charges of every character which at any time during the
term of this Lease may be legally and properly assessed, levied,
confirmed or imposed upon the Leased Premises. Lessee may contest,
by appropriate legal proceedings diligently conducted in good faith
without any cost to Lessor, the amount, validity or application of
any imposition or any lien, encumbrance or charge against the
Leased Premises.
(b) Lessor and Lessee agree that Lessee by this Lease is acquiring
in the Leased Premises a leasehold interest only; that the tax equiva-
lent payments provided in paragraph 4(a) hereof are in lieu of all
local and municipal taxes, including real estate taxes on land and
buildings, on the Leased Premises or on the Improvements, other than
assessments for local improvements; and that in the event Lessee is
required to pay any local or municipal taxes, Lessee may deduct the
amount or amounts thereof from Basic Rent.
7. Insurance. Lessee at its expense will maintain or cause to
be maintained with insurers licensed by the State of New York:
(a) standard fire and extended insurance coverage, including
war risks when obtainable, with respect to the Improvements
against loss or damage by fire, lightning, windstorm, hail, explo-
sion, riot attending a strike, civil commotion, aircraft, vehicles,
and smoke in an amount not less than 80% of the full insurable
value of such Improvements;
(b) coverage for leakage of sprinkler systems and explosion
of high pressure boilers and other heaters;
(c) loss of rental insurance;
(d) Workmen's Compensation Insurance; and
(e) comprehensive general public liability and property dam-
age insurance applicable to the Leased Premises in amounts of
at least $5,000,000 for any one accident, $1,000,000 for injury
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to or death of any one individual and $500,000 for damage to
property, written on an occurrence basis.
All insurance policies maintained by Lessee pursuant to this para-
graph shall (i) name Lessor and Lessee and any leasehold mortgagee
and any trustee for bondholders as insureds, as their respective inter-
ests may appear; (ii) provide (where such provision is obtainable)
that any loss shall be payable notwithstanding any act or negligence
of Lessee; (iii) provide that no cancellation thereof shall be effective
until at least ten (10) days after receipt by Lessor and Lessee of
written notice thereof; (iv) provide that the insurer shall waive any
right of subrogation against the Lessor or Lessee resulting from
negligence of the Lessor or Lessee or any assignee or subtenant
of the Leased Premises; (v) provide that Lessor's interest therein
shall not be subject to cancellation by reason of any act or
omission of Lessee or any leasehold mortgagee; and (vi) provide
that any loss is to he adjusted with and payable solely to Lessee,
Lessor or any leasehold mortgagee or trustee for bondholders, as their
respective interests may appear. Lessee shall deliver to Lessor a copy
of all policies of insurance required by this Lease, accompanied by a
a certificate of the insurer as to the issuance and effectiveness of the
policy and the amount of the coverage with respect to the Leased
Premises.
8. Fire or Casualty. In the event of any damage or loss to
improvements on the Leased Premises by fire or other casualty,
whether or not insured, Lessee shall at its sole cost and expense
repair or rebuild the same, or cause any sublessee to repair or rebuild
the same, so as to make the improvements at least as nearly as pos-
sible equal to the condition, quality, character and class of the Improve-
ments existing immediately prior to the occurrence or with such
changes or alterations as Lessee shall elect to make in conformity with
the General Development Plan. All insurance proceeds under fire or
casualty insurance, after deduction of any cost of collection, shall be
applied by Lessee for such repairing or rebuilding.
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9. Mechanic's Liens. Notice is hereby given that Lessor shall not
be liable for any labor or materials furnished or to be furnished to Les-
see upon credit, and that no mechanic's or other lien for any such labor
or materials shall attach to or affect the reversion or other estate or
interest of Lessor in and to the Leased Premises. Whenever and as
often as any mechanic's lien shall have been filed against the Leased
Premises, based upon any act or interest of Lessee or of anyone claim-
ing through Lessee, or if any title retention agreement, conditional bill
of sale, chattel mortgage or otherwise shall have been filed for or affect-
ing any materials, machinery or fixtures used in the repair or opera-
tion thereof or annexed thereto by Lessee or its successors in interest,
Lessee shall forthwith take such action by bonding, deposit or pay-
ment as will remove or satisfy the lien, title retention agreement, con-
ditional bill of sale or chattel mortgage, and if Lessee shall fail to take
such action for twenty (20) days after notice to Lessee, Lessor may
pay the amount of such mechanic's lien, title retention agreement, con-
tional bill of sale or chattel mortgage, or discharge the same by
deposit, and the amount so paid or deposited, with interest thereon,
shall be deemed rent reserved under this Lease, and shall be payable
forthwith with interest at the rate of seven per centum (7%) per
annum from the date of such advance, and with the same remedies to
Lessor as in case of default in the payment of rent.
10. Use. Lessee shall use and occupy the Leased Premises in
the manner and for the purposes described in the General Develop-
ment Plan and shall not use or occupy the Leased Premises or permit
the same to be occupied other than for lawful purposes, or for a pur-
pose or in a manner likely to cause structural injury in any building
to be erected on the Leased Premises or for any dangerous or noxious
trade or business.
11. Indemnity. Lessee shall not do or permit any act or thing
upon the Leased Premises which may subject Lessor to any liability
by reason of any violation of law, but shall exercise such control
over the Leased Premises as to protect the Lessor notwithstanding
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that joint or concurrent liability may be imposed upon Lessor by
statute, ordinance, rule, regulation or order. Lessee shall indemnify
and hold harmless Lessor from and against any and all liability, suits,
claims, demands, actions, judgments, costs and expenses, to the extent
that any of the same should not be covered by insurance maintained
by Lessee, arising from conduct on or management of or from any
work or thing whatsoever done in or on the Leased Premises or out
of any breach, violation or non-performance of any Lessee's covenants
or conditions of this Lease, by damage to property or any injury to
person or persons occasioned by Lessee's use and occupancy of the
Leased Premises or by any use or occupancy which Lessee may permit
or suffer to be made thereof. Should Lessee be required to defend
any action or proceeding to which Lessor is made a party, Lessor may
appear, defend or otherwise take part in such action or proceeding at
its election by counsel of its own choosing, provided such action by
Lessor does not limit or make void any liability of any insurer of
Lessor or Lessee with respect to the claim in such action. Lessee's
liability hereunder shall be reduced by the net proceeds actually
collected by any insurance maintained by Lessee for Lessor's benefit.
12. Assignment; Subleasing; Mortgaging. Lessee may at any
time assign this Lease with the consent of Lessor. Lessee may at
any time assign this Lease without the consent of Lessor to Subsidi-
ary, provided that Subsidiary affirmatively and unconditionally as-
sumes in writing the applicable covenants of Lessee and the provisions
of this Lease. Subsidiary shall accept such assignment and assume
Lessee's obligations hereunder as set forth in this paragraph, pro-
vided, however, that such assignment shall not release Lessee from any
of its obligations to Lessor hereunder, in the absence of a written re-
lease of Lessee from such obligations executed by Lessor.
Lessee may at any time sublease the whole of the Leased Premises
with the consent of Lessor, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Lessee may sublease at any time any portion or portions
of the Leased Premises without the consent of Lessor in order to
carry out the development required by the General Development Plan.
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Each sublease shall provide that such sublease may not be assigned
without the approval of the Lessee in each case first obtained.
Lessee may mortgage or hypothecate this Lease without the con-
sent of Lessor. Upon request of Lessee, Lessor shall execute and
deliver all such instruments with respect to this Lease, including
amendments hereto, as Lessee shall reasonably request to facilitate
Lessee's obtaining, or otherwise arranging for, the financing of the
Improvements as provided in paroagraph 2. At Lessor's request,
Lessee shall deliver to Lessor copies of every bond indenture, mort-
gage or like instrument relating to any indebtedness of Lessee in-
curred or currently planned to be incurred in whole or in part to
finance the Improvements. No provision in any such instrument shall
alter the respective rights of Lessor and Lessee under this Lease.
Lessor agrees, for the benefit of each sublessee under each sub-
lease and the holder or holders of each leasehold mortgage of any
sublease, that, upon the termination of this Lease pursuant to any of
the provisions of paragraph 1 or paragraph 14 hereof, Lessor will
recognize the sublessee under such sublease or any transferee or
assignee of the sublessee's interest therein by assignment or fore-
closure as the direct tenant of the Lessor under such sublease, pro-
vided that at the time of the termination of this Lease (a) no default
exists under the sublease and (b) the sublessee, transferee or
assignee shall deliver to the Lessor an instrument confirming the
attornment to the Lessor and recognizing the Lessor as such sub-
lessee's, transferee's or assignee's lessor under such sublease.
13. Condemnation. Should a court of final jurisdiction deter-
mine that any governmental body, agency or other authority may con-
demn the Leased Premises or any portion thereof, then if, at any time
during the term of this Lease, there shall be a total taking or a con-
structive total taking of the fee title to any part of the Leased Prem-
ises or of the Lessee's leasehold interest therein in condemnation
proceedings or by any right .of eminent domain, this Lease shall ter-
minate as to that portion of the Leased Premises so taken on the date
of such taking and the rent and other charges payable by the Lessee
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hereunder with respect to such portion shall be apportioned and paid
to the date of such taking. For the purposes of this paragraph, the
term "a constructive total taking" shall mean a taking of such scope
that the portion of the Leased Premises not so taken is insufficient to
permit the restoration of the Improvements thereon so as to constitute
a complete, rentable building or buildings, capable of producing a pro-
portionately fair and reasonable net annual income. The average net
annual income produced by the Improvements on the portion of the
Leased Premises so taken during the five (5) year period immediately
preceding such taking shall be deemed to constitute a fair and reason-
able net annual income for the purposes of this paragraph.
In the event of any such total taking or constructive total taking
and the termination of this Lease as to the portion of the Leased
Premises so taken, the award or awards for said taking (herein
referred to as the "Condemnation Proceeds"), shall be distributed in
the following order of priority:
(a) upon the request of the trustee of the holders of any
indebtedness of Lessee, there shall first be paid to such trustee a
sum sufficient to fully and completely redeem any such indebted-
ness allocable to the Leased Premises, or to- that portion of the
Leased Premises so taken, with accrued interest, then outstanding;
(b) from the balance, if any, the Lessor shall then be paid a
sum equal to the value of the land plus the value of any Public
Facilities, to the extent the same shall have been paid for for by
Lessor (herein referred to as the "Land Award");
(c) then the balance remaining, if any, shall be divided
between the Lessor and the Lessee in accordance with their respec-
tive interests in the Leased Premises immediately prior to such
termination of this Lease. The value of Lessor's interest shall be
the aggregate of (a) the then value of Lessor's interest in the
Leased Premises at the expiration of the term of this Lease, plus
(b) the then present worth of the then future rents reserved under
this Lease. The value of Lessee's interest shall include the then
value of its interest in the remainder of the term of this Lease and
the then value of the Improvements.
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In the event of a taking less than a constructive total taking, this
Lease shall not terminate or be affected in any way, except as herein-
after provided, and the Lessee shall first be entitled to receive, subject
to the rights of any trustee for bondholders or leasehold mortgagee,
that portion of the Condemnation Proceeds with interest thereon as
shall equal the fair market value of the Leased Premises or portions
thereof, unimproved and unencumbered by this Lease, plus the fair
market value of any Public Facilities constructed or installed at the
expense of the Lessee on the part of the Leased Premises so taken.
That part of the Condemnation Proceeds with interest thereon as shall
be awarded for restoration of the Improvements on the portion of the
Leased Premises so taken, plus so much thereof as shall represent
compensation for the value of the portion of the Improvements so
taken, shall be payable in trust to the Lessee or the holder of any
leasehold mortgage constituting a lien on the Leased Premises for
application by the Lessee, or such holder, to the cost of restoring,
repairing, replacing or rebuilding the Improvements, any balance of
the Condemnation Proceeds to be shared equally by Lessor and Lessee.
[n the event of a taking less than a constructive total taking, the
Lessee shall proceed, or shall cause the sublessee under a sublease of
the property affected by such taking to proceed, with due diligence to
restore, repair, replace or rebuild the remaining part of the Improve-
ments to substantially their former condition or with such changes or
alterations as the Lessee may deem desirable in general conformity
with the General Development Plan.
If the whole or any part of the Leased Premises shall be taken
in condemnation proceedings or by any right of eminent domain for
temporary use or occupancy, then this Lease shall remain in full
force and effect, and the Lessee shall continue, to the extent Lessee
shall not be prohibited from so doing by any condemning authority,
to pay, in the manner and at the times herein specified, the full
amounts of the Basic and Additional Rent and other charges payable
by the Lessee hereunder.
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14. Default by Lessee. In case one or more of the following
events shall have occurred and shall not have been remedied:
(a) default shall be made in the payment of Basic Rent or
Additional Rent and such default shall continue for twelve months
after written notice from Lessor thereof, specifying such default,
shall have been given to the Lessee, each sublessee and the
Trustee for any bondholders and the holder of any leasehold
mortgage; or
(b) Lessee shall fail to perform or cause to be performed
any term, covenant or condition of this Lease on the part of the
Lessee to be performed, other than the covenant for the pay-
ment of Basic Rent and Additional Rent, and shall have failed
promptly after written notice thereof from Lessor to commence
with due diligence and dispatch the curing of such default or,
having so commenced the curing of such default, shall there-
after fail to prosecute and complete the same within a reasonable
time, provided that Lessee may dispute any matter contained in
such notice by giving Lessor written notice thereof within 30
days after receipt by Lessee of such notice of Lessor, and in
such case, such dispute shall be determined by arbitration in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 16 hereof and no
default under this paragraph (b) shall be deemed to arise unless
the arbitrators' determination is adverse to Lessee and Lessee
(subject to Enforced Delay) shall have failed to commence
promptly thereafter with due diligence and dispatch the curing
of such default, or, having commenced the curing of such default,
shall thereafter fail to prosecute and complete the same within a
reasonable time:
then in case of a default Lessor may, subject to the rights of the
trustee for any bondholders and the holder of any leasehold mort-
gage as set forth herein, at its option, give to Lessee and to each
sublessee, and to any trustee and leasehold mortgagee, a notice of
election to terminate this Lease at the expiration of thirty (30) days
from the date of service of such second notice, whereupon, unless
such rent in case of a default under (a) above, together with interest
at the rate of 7% per annum, shall have been paid, or any other
default cured by Lessee, before the expiration of said thirty (30)
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days, the term of this Lease and all right, title and interest of
the Lessee hereunder shall expire as fully and completely as if
that day were the date herein specifically fixed for the expira-
tion of the term of this Lease, and the Lessee will then quit and
surrender the Leased Premises to the Lessor, subject, however, to
any sublease which the Lessor pursuant to the provisions hereof
has agreed to recognize. Upon such termination of this Lease as
provided in (a) above, the Lessor shall have the right to enter upon
and take possession of the Leased Premises by summary proceed-
ings or other legal proceedings, without being liable in damages
therefor, and take and have again the Leased Premises and every part
thereof, free, clear and discharged of this Lease, and of all the rights
of the Lessee hereunder.
Lessor shall not so terminate this Lease upon the occurrence of
a default unless Lessor shall
(a) pay to the trustee for the holders of any indebtedness of
Lessee a sum of money sufficient to fully and completely redeem
any such indebtedness of Lessee allocable to Public Facilities,
with accrued interest, then outstanding, together with an opinion
of Lessor's Corporation Counsel stating that the Lessor has
power and is duly authorized to make such payment, or
(b) deliver to such trustee an instrument in writing duly
executed on behalf of Lessor in form and substance satisfactory
to such trustee, unqualifiedly assuming the full payment of any
such indebtedness of Lessee allocable to Public Facilities, with
accrued interest, then outstanding, together with an opinion of
Lessor's Corporation Counsel stating that Lessor has power and
is duly authorized to assume such payment and may assess, levy
and collect taxes on all the taxable real property in The City of
New York without limitation as to rate or amount to make any
and all payments required under such indebtedness.
No re-entry by the Lessor shall be deemed an acceptance of a
surrender of this Lease. A surrender of this Lease may be accepted
only by the Board of Estimate of Lessor and only in the manner
provided by law at the time thereof.
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Lessor agrees, for the benefit of the trustee or holders of any
leasehold mortgage, that Lessor's right, title and interest in and to
rent and other charges payable under any sublease shall be subject
and subordinate to the rights of any leasehold mortgagee to any rent
and other charge pledged as security for the payment thereof until
payment in full of the indebtedness, with accrued interest, secured by
any leasehold mortgage.
15. Notices. Any notice, demand or request which, under the
terms of this Lease or under any statute, must or may be given or
made by the parties hereto, shall be in writing, and shall be given by
mailing the same by registered or certified mail addressed to (a) Lessor
addressed as follows: Administrator, New York City Housing and
Development Administration, 100 Gold Street, Borough of Manhattan,
City, County and State of New York; (b) Lessee addressed as follows:
General Manager, New York State Urban Development Corporation,
666 Fifth Avenue, Borough of Manhattan, City, County and State of
New York; and (c) Subsidiary addressed as follows: President,
Welfare Island Development Corporation, 666 Fifth Avenue, Borough
of Manhattan, City, County and State of New York. Any notice given
hereunder shall be deemed delivered when deposited in a United
States general or branch post office, enclosed in a registered or
certified prepaid wrapper, addressed as hereinbefore provided. Any
such address may be changed from time to time upon notice given
by the addressee in the manner herein provided.
If requested in writing by the holder of any leasehold mortgage
or any sublessee, which shall have duly registered with Lessor its name
and address, any such notice or demand shall also be given or made
by Lessor in the manner herein specified and contemporaneously to
such holder of a leasehold mortgage or sublessee. Any such holder or
sublessee shall be subrogated to all rights of the Lessee with respect
to the remedying of any default of Lessee.
16. Arbitration. In the event of any dispute with respect to any
matter in this Lease, such dispute shall be determined in the City of
New York by arbitration in accordance with commercial arbitration
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rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association (or, if
such Association shall not then be in existence, such other organization,
if any, as shall then have become the successor of said Association and
if there shall be no successor, then in accordance with the then pre-
vailing provisions of the laws of the State of New York relating to
arbitration). Lessor and Lessee shall each appoint a fit and impartial
person as arbiter who shall have had at least ten (10) years'
experience in the County of New York connected with the subject
matter of the dispute. In case either the Lessor or the Lessee shall
fail to appoint an arbiter for a period of thirty (30) days after
written notice from the other party to make such appointment, then
the arbiter appointed by the party not in default hereunder shall
appoint a second arbiter for and on behalf of the party so failing to
appoint an arbiter. ;[n the case of the failure of the arbiters so
appointed to agree upon the matter in dispute, said arbiters shall
appoint a third party to act as umpire. In the case of the failure
of such arbiters to agree upon an umpire, then such umpire shall be
appointed by the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York for the First Department.
The arbiters so appointed, after being duly sworn to perform their
duties with impartiality and fidelity, shall proceed promptly to deter-
mine the matter in dispute in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure and may hold hearings at which the Lessor and Lessee
may adduce evidence and witnesses may give sworn testimony.
17. No Waiver. Failure of any party to insist upon a strict
performance of any of the covenants and conditions hereof shall not
be deemed a waiver of any rights or remedies that such party may
have and shall not be deemed a waiver by such party of any subse-
quent breach or default. This Lease may not be changed orally, but
only by an instrument in writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement or change is sought.
18. Quiet Enjoyment. Lessor covenants that the Lessee, upon
paying the rent and all other charges herein provided for and upon
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observing and keeping all of the covenants, agreements and provisions
of this Lease on its part to be observed and kept, shall lawfully and
quietly hold, occupy and enjoy the Leased Premises during the term
of this Lease without hindrance or molestation by or from anyone.
19. Certificate of Lessor. Within thirty (30) days after delivery
to Lessor of written notice of Lessee's request for such statement,
Lessor shall execute, acknowledge and deliver to Lessee a statement in
writing certifying that this Lease is unmodified and in full force and
effect (or if there shall have been modifications, that the Lease is in
full force and effect as modified and stating the modifications) and
the dates to which the rent has been paid, and stating whether or not
to the best knowledge of the signer of such statement Lessee is in de-
fault in performing any term, covenant, agreement, provisions, condi-
tion or limitation contained in this Lease, and if Lessee shall be in
default, specifying each such default of which the signer may have
knowledge, it being intended that any such statement delivered pur-
suant to this paragraph may be relied upon by any prospective sub-
lessee or any leasehold mortgagee, but reliance on such certificate may
not extend to any default as to which the signer shall have had no
actual knowledge.
20. Lessor's Inspection and Audit of Books and Records; Lessee's
and Subsidiary's Reports. The Lessee and the Subsidiary shall keep
proper books of record and account in which full and correct entries
shall be made of all financial transactions, revenues, losses, charges
and expenses paid or incurred by Lessee or Subsidiary in respect to its
operations on the Leased Premises and the performance by Lessee and
Subsidiary of all terms and conditions of this Lease, all in accordance
with generally accepted accouniting principles. Lessor shall have the
right to inspect and audit such accounts on its behalf annually and at
such other reasonable times as it may in its sole discretion deem
advisable or necessary. The performance of all conditions and terms
of this Lease shall be subject to audit and review by Lessor's Comp-
troller on behalf of Lessor. Lessee and Subsidiary shall cooperate
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with the Lessor in maintaining its books and accounts in such manner
as to permit audits.
Upon the request of Lessor, Lessee or Subsidiary or both of them
shall deliver to Lessor Annual Reports on the progress of the develop-
ment of the Leased Premises.
21. Additional Properties.. In the event that Lessor shall deter-
mine that the Bird S. Coler and the Goldwater Memorial Hospitals
and the incidents and appurtenances thereof and properties currently
occupied thereby, as such properties are more fully described in Annex
III and Annex IV to Schedule 1 attached hereto, shall no longer be
devoted to hospital uses, Lessor shall notify Lessee of such determina-
tion, it being the intention of Lessor and Lessee that such properties
be developed in a manner consistent with the General Development
Plan. After such determination and notice Lessor, Lessee and Sub-
sidiary shall consult with a view to developing a plan for the develop-
ment of such properties as a part of the General Development Plan.
22. Definitions. As used herein the following terms have the
following respective meanings:
Additional Rent: The payment provided for in paragraph 4(b).
Annual Shelter Rent: Total rents received from the occupants
of an Improvement or part of an Improvement consisting of Completed
Units of Subsidized or Middle Income Housing less the cost, if any, of
providing to such occupants electricity, gas, heat and other utilities.
Basic Rent: The payment provided for in paragraph 4(a).
Commercial Space: Any Improvement, or space in an Improve-
ment, used exclusively for commercial or business purposes.
Completed Units; Completed Commercial Space. Dwelling
units and commercial space in any Improvement or part of an Improve-
ment as to which there shall have been issued by Lessee and delivered
to Lessor prior to any occupancy thereof a certificate of completion
stating that such Improvement or such part is complete in accordance
with the laws and regulations applicable to projects of Lessee, or as
to which there shall have been issued by Lessor its temporary or
permanent certificate of occupancy or any other certificate or license
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required to permit the occupancy or use of such Improvement or such
part, whichever shall first have been issued.
Conventionally Financed Housing: As defined in the General
Development Plan.
Debt Service: Any and all payments of principal, premiums or
interest on any bond, note or other indebtedness incurred or payable
by Lessee to finance the cost of development of the Leased Premises,
including, without limitation, all payments to any sinking, reserve
or any other fund required by or pledged to any mortgagee, trustee
or holder of any such indebtedness and the payment, purchase,
redemption or retirement thereof or as further security therefor.
The allocation of Debt Service shall be in accord with Lessee's
standard accounting method uniformly applied, which method shall
conform with generally accepted accounting principles.
Debt Service for Public Facilities: For any period, Debt Service
allocable by Lessee to Public Facilities. For such period, Debt Service
for Public Facilities shall be reduced by all receipts derived by Lessee
from the operation of any Public Facility or the financing thereof as
reimbursement of Debt Service payable by Lessee on such Public
Facility.
Enforced Delay: Any delay in the performance of the obliga-
tions of the Lessee, Subsidiary, sublessees or their sublessees by
reason of act of God or the public enemy, of the United States of
America, the State of New York or the Lessor, the laws, rules,
regulations or orders of such political jurisdictions, judicial or other
legal proceedings, fires, floods, epidemics or similar afflictions, strikes
or labor disputes, freight embargoes, weather of unusual severity and
delay by Lessor in the performance of its obligations hereunder,
including, without limitation, demolition, relocation or appropriation
of sums required for the purchase or lease of any school or appur-
tenance.
General Development Plan: General Development Plan attached
as Schedule 2 hereto prepared by the firm of Philip Johnson and
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John Burgee providing a program for clearance of the Leased
Premises and the construction thereon of Subsidized Housing, Middle
Income Housing, Conventionally Financed Housing, Commercial Space
and Public Facilities, all as set forth therein, as may be modified
from time to time by agreement of Lessee by its President and Chief
Executive Officer and Lessor by its Mayor.
Gross Income: For any period, the total of all receipts of any
nature derived by Lessee from the Leased Premises or the financing
of the development thereof, including, without limitation, rents,
profits, interest and return of principal, other than payments to Lessee
of the purchase price of or annual rent for any school or appurtenance
and other than development fees, after deducting from such total all
Debt Service for such period.
Improvement: Any building, structure, utility, roadway, street,
park, public facility, sidewalk, landscaping, site improvement, develop-
ment and other betterment to be provided by or caused to be provided
by the Lessee pursuant to the General Development Plan.
Leased Premises: As defined in paragraph 1.
Lessee's Certified Payment Statement: A statement prepared and
certified by Lessee on or prior to each Rent Payment Day and on or
prior to each other day upon which such statement is required to be
delivered pursuant to the provisions hereof setting forth the sums
required to be paid, set-off or otherwise settled on such Rent Payment
Day or other day, including, without limitation, Gross Income, Debt
Service for Public Facilities, Normal Allowances, Debt Service for
Public Facilities allocable to each school or appurtenance, Normal
Allowances allocable to each school or appurtenance, Basic Rent, Net
Income and Additional Rent.
Net Income: For any period, Gross Income less (i) Normal
Allowances, (ii) Basic Rent, (iii) the amount of the following costs
incurred by Lessee: any amount by which Lessee's operating and
maintenance costs for any Public Facility consisting of a garage, an
elevator, a mini-transit system or park exceed receipts derived by
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Lessee from such Public Facility, to the extent such excess shall not
be included in Normal Allowances, and (iv) the Project Fee.
Normal Allowances: All reasonable cash expenditures, disburse-
ments, costs, reserves and allowances of Lessee or Subsidiary of
every character incurred, made or paid by the Lessee or Subsidiary
in connection with the performance of its obligations and functions in
respect of this Lease or arising by reason of, or resulting in any
manner whatsoever from, the use, operation and maintenance of the
Leased Premises and services provided thereon, including, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing:
(a) the cost of supplies and materials required for the
administration, operation, maintenance and repair of the Leased
Premises, the cost of remuneration of persons, whether or not
officers and employees of Lessee, engaged in such administration,
operation, maintenance or repair, including wages, medical and
general welfare benefits, group life insurance, workmen's compen-
sation insurance, the Lessee's contributions to unemployment in-
surance and pension funds and uniforms, and amounts paid
pursuant to contracts or agreements with contractors or others
for or in connection with such administration, operation, main-
tenance or repair;
(b) the cost of all repairs, alterations and improvements to
maintain the Leased Premises net of the proceeds of any insur-
ance received by Lessee applicable to such repairs, alterations
and improvements;
(c) the cost of utility services, including gas, electricity,
water, fuel and telephone;
(d) the cost of advertising the Leased Premises or portions
thereof;
(e) lawyers' fees and disbursements for services rendered in
connection with the administration, operation, maintenance or
repair of the Leased Premises, including without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, all such fees and disbursements
relating to the collection of rent from sublessees and all expenses
of such collection of rent, and the lawyers' fees payable in respect
of the preparation, ,execution and registration of this Lease;
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(f) auditors' fees for preparing the statements herein refer-
red to;
(g) sales, excise and other similar taxes, if any, paid in
respect of the foregoing, any charges, levies and fees, if any,
paid pursuant to paragraph 6(a) hereof and any local or munici-
pal taxes, if any, imposed with respect to the Leased Premises
on the Improvements;
(h) the cost of all permits, licenses or other authorizations
required for the administration, operation, maintenance and
repair of the Leased Premises; and
(i) payments made by the Lessee in satisfaction of or on
account of premiums with respect to any policy or policies of
insurance on or in any way relating to the Leased Premises.
Without the consent of Lessor, which shall not be unreasonably
withheld, Normal Allowances shall not include any amount by which
Lessee's operating and maintenance costs for any Public Facility
consisting of a garage, an elevator, a mini-transit system or a park
exceeds receipts derived by Lessee from such Public Facility. For
any period, Normal Allowances shall be reduced by the amount of
any such cash expenditures, disbursements, costs, reserves and allow-
ances allocable to any Improvement that are reimbursed out of the
receipts derived by Lessee from its operation of such Improvement
or out of the financing provided for the construction of such Improve-
ment. Normal Allowances exclude any cash expenditures, disburse-
ments, costs, reserves and allowances allocable to any park.
Project Fee: An amount reserved to Lessee equal to two percent
(2%) of Total Project Cost, as hereinafter defined, payable in equal
installments on each Rent Payment Day out of the remainder, if
any, of Gross Income less Normal Allowances, Basic Rent and any
amount by which Lessee's operating and maintenance costs for any
Public Facility consisting of a garage, an elevator, a mini-transit
system or a park exceed receipts derived by Lessee from such Public
Facility, to the extent that such excess shall not be included in
Normal Allowances, such installments to equal the following in each
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year of the term hereof: 2.5 percent of such amount each year during
the first ten years of the term hereof; 1.25% of such amount each
year during the eleventh through thirtieth years of the term hereof;
the balance of such amount in equal portions in each year of the
remainder of the term hereof. In the event that on any Rent Payment
Day the portion of any installment of such fee then payable shall
exceed the balance of Gross Income less Normal Allowances, Basic
Rent and any amount by which Lessee's operating costs for any
Public Facility consisting of a garage, an elevator or a mini-transit
system or a park exceed receipts derived by Lessee from such Public
Facility, to the extent such excess shall not be included in Normal
Allowances, Lessee may defer such excess and deduct it on any
subsequent Rent Payment Day. Any such excess deferred and remain-
ing to be deducted as of the termination hereof shall be adjusted
upon such termination. The phrase "total project cost", for the
purposes of this paragraph, means the aggregate of all costs of
planning, design, engineering, construction, equipment and comple-
tion of the Improvements. Until construction is completed and
actual costs are determined, the computation of the Project Fee shall
be based upon cost estimates reasonably determined from time to
time by Lessee. If and when the estimate of total project cost is
adjusted in accordance herewith prior to the determination of actual
total project cost, amounts computed and payments made or to be
made based upon total project cost shall be appropriately adjusted.
Public Facilities: As defined in the General Development Plan.
Rent Adjustment Date: The 40th anniversary of the issuance
of Lessee's certificate of completion or of Lessor's temporary or
permanent certificate of occupancy, whichever shall first have been
issued, with respect to each Improvement or part of an Improvement
consisting of Subsidized Housing, Middle Income Housing, Conven-
tionally Financed Housing or Commercial Space and each 10th anni-
versary of the date of such issuance after such 40th anniversary.
Rent Payment Day: The 45th day after the last day of each
sixth and twelfth month of each year of the term hereof.
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Subsidized Housing: As defined in the General Development
Plan.
Tax Equivalent Adjustment Date: The 30th anniversary of
the issuance of Lessee's certificate of completion or of Lessor's tem-
porary or permanent certificate of occupancy, whichever shall first have
been issued, with respect to each Improvement consisting of Subsidized
Housing or Middle Income Housing.
Tax Equivalent for Commercial Space: Lessor's then current
real estate tax rate times the product of Lessor's then current
assessed valuation (expressed in dollars per square foot of commer-
cial space) for land and buildings for each Improvement or part of
an Improvement consisting of Completed Commercial Space times
the number of square feet of Completed Commercial Space. Such
then current assessed valuation for land and buildings shall from
time to time be assessed and reassessed by Lessor in the manner
and subject to the limitations then currently imposed upon assess-
ments of like property by all laws and regulations applicable thereto.
Lessee may contest such assessment or reassessment in like manner.
Tax Equivalent for Conventionally Financed Housing: Lessor's
then current real estate tax rate times Lessor's then current assessed
valuation of land and buildings for each Improvement or part of an
Improvement consisting of Completed Units of Conventionally
Financed Housing or consisting of Completed Units of housing to be
treated as Conventionally Financed Housing after adjustment under
paragraph 5(b) hereof. Such then current assessed valuation for
rent and buildings shall from time to time be assessed and reassessed
by Lessor in the manner and subject to the limitations then currently
imposed upon assessments of like properties by all laws and regula-
tions applicable thereto. Lessee may contest any such assessment or
reassessment in like manner.
Then Current Ground Rent: With respect to each Improvement
consisting of Subsidized Housing, 6% of the producet of (x) the current
land cost per unit for economically feasible new housing in New York
City for persons and families of low and moderate income as of each
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Rent Adjustment Date for such Improvement times (y) the number
of units contained in such Improvement; with respect to each Improve-
ment consisting of Middle Income Housing, 6% of the product of (x)
the current land cost per unit for economically feasible new housing
in New York City for persons and families of middle income as of
each Rent Adjustment Date for such Improvement times (y) the
number of units contained in such Impgrovement; with respect to each
Improvement consisting of Conventionally Financed Housing, 6% of
the product of (x) the current land cost per unit for comparable
new housing in New York City for persons and families who can
afford conventionally financed and fully taxpaying apartments as of
each Rent Adjustment Date for such Improvement times (y) the
number of units contained in such Improvement; and with respect to
each Improvement or part of an Improvement consisting of Commer-
cial Space, 6% of the product of (x) the current land cost per square
foot of comparable commercial space in New York City as of each
Rent Adjustment Date for such Improvement or part of an Improve-
ment times (y) the number of square feet of commercial space in such
Improvement.
23. Surrender of the Leased Premises; Successors and Assigns;
Counterparts. Upon any expiration or earlier termination of this Lease,
Lessee shall peacefully vacate and surrender to Lessor the Leased
Premises and all Improvements in good order, condition and repair,
reasonable wear and tear excepted. The terms of this Lease shall,
subject to the terms hereof, bind and inure to the benefit of Lessor
and its successors and assigns and Lessee, its successors and assigns.
This Lease may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of
which shall be an original, all of which shall constitute one and the
same instrument.
24. Subsidiary. Subsidiary has joined as a party to this Lease
solely for the purpose of agreeing to report as provided in paragraph
20, of accepting the assignment hereof and of assuming the Lessee's
obligations hereunder upon assignment as set forth in paragraph 12
and of agreeing to the undertakings stated in paragraph 26 hereof and
for no other purposes.
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25. Administration. Except where otherwise expressly provided
herein, the rights and duties of the Lessor hereunder shall be admin-
istered and enforced in all respects by its Administrator of the
Housing and Development Administration.
26. Non-Discrimination. (a) At all times during the construc-
tion, maintenance and operation of the Improvements, Lessee shall not
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment
because of race, color, creed or national origin. Lessee shall take
affirmative action to ensure that employees and applicants for employ-
ment with Lessee, its sublessees, contractors and subcontractors are
treated without regard to their race, color, creed or national origin
and shall take affirmative action to assist in providing training and job
opportunities in order to ensure equal employment opportunities for
members of minority groups with Lessee, its sublessees, contractors
and subcontractors. As used herein, the term "treated" shall mean
and include, without limitation, the following: recruited, whether by
advertising or other means; compensated, whether in the form of rates
of pay or other forms of compensation; selected for training, including
apprenticeship; promoted; upgraded; downgraded; demoted; trans-
ferred; laid off; and terminated. Lessee will post in conspicuous places
on the Lessee's Premises, available to employees of Lessee and appli-
cants for employment, notices provided by Lessor setting forth the
language of this non-discrimination provision; and
(i) Lessee shall, in all solicitations or advertisements for
employees placed by or on behalf of Lessee, state that all
qualified applicants will be considered for employment without
regard to race, color, creed or national origin;
(ii) Lessee shall send each labor union or other representa-
tive of workers with which it has a collective bargaining agree-
ment or other contract or understanding a notice advising such
labor union or workers' representative of Lessee's agreement as
contained in this paragraph and a copy thereof shall be sent to
Lessee within three (3) days of notification to such union or
representative; and
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(iii) Lessee shall furnish to Lessor all information required
by Lessor pursuant to this paragraph and will permit access
by Lessor to its books, records, and accounts for the purposes
of investigation to ascertain compliance with this paragraph.
(b) To evidence compliance with the provisions of (a) hereof,
Lessee shall furnish such compliance reports as may from time to
time be required by Lessor, such reports to contain information as
to Lessee's practices, policies, programs, employment policies and
employment statistics. Such compliance reports shall, if Lessor
so requests, contain the following additional information:
(i) information as to the practices, policies, programs, em-
ployment policies and employment statistics of the Lessee's sub-
lessees, contractors and subcontractors;
(ii) if Lessee has a collective bargaining agreement or other
contract or understanding with a labor union or an agency refer-
ring workers or providing or supervising apprenticeship or train-
ing for such workers, such information as to such labor union's
or agency's practices and policies affecting compliance as Lessor
may require, provided that to the extent such information is
within the exclusive possession of a labor union or an agency
referring workers or providing or supervising apprenticeship
or training, and such labor union or agency shall refuse to
furnish such information to Lessee, Lessee shall so certify to
Lessor as part of its compliance report and shall set forth what
efforts it has made to obtain such information.
(c) Lessee and Subsidiary shall include or cause to be included the
provisions of this paragraph 26 in every sublease, contract and sub-
contract of Lessee or Subsidiary and each obligation of Lessee or
Subsidiary hereunder shall be deemed an obligation of each such sub-
lessee, contractor or subcontractor. Lessee and Subsidiary shall like-
wise include or cause to be included in every sublease, contract or sub-
contract all non-discrimination provisions required by federal, state or
local law, including Lessor's Executive Order 71, as the same may be
amended from time to time. All such provisions to the extent applicable
are hereby incorporated in this Lease.
(d) Lessor, Lessee and Subsidiary shall require that any contractor
or subcontractor performing work on the Leased Premises shall pro-
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vide on-the-job training positions in accordance with any applicable
governmental order, plan, undertaking or agreement to provide such
on-the-job training positions from time to time in effect with respect
to Lessor, Lessee, Subsidiary and any organization representing the
employees of. such contractor or subcontractor; provided, however,
that in no event shall any such contractor or subcontractor provide
for fewer on-the-job training positions than the number of apprentices
or trainees allowed on the job under applicable colleotive bargaining
agreements.
(e) Lessor, Lessee and Subsidiary shall, from time to time, mutu-
ally agree upon goals for the employment, training, or employment and
training of members of minority groups in connection with performing
work on the Leased Premises and any contractor or subcontractor
performing work on the Leased Premises shall be required by the
applicable contract or subcontract to meet such goals.
27. Amendment. Upon notice from Lessor to Lessee and approval
by Lessor's Board of Estimate within five years of the date of this
Lease, this Lease shall be amended as follows:
(a) Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 hereof shall be
amended to read as follows:
"(b) Additional Rent. In addition to the Basic Rent, Lessee
shall pay, in the same manner as the Basic Rent, Additional Rent
equal to sixty percent (60%) of Net Income for the preceding
year";
(b) The definition of Net Income in paragraph 22 hereof shall
be amended to read as follows:
"Net Income: For any period, Gross income less (i) Normal
Allowances, (ii) Basic Rent and (iii) the amount of the following
costs incurred by Lessee: any amount by which Lessee's operating
and maintenance costs for any Public Facility consisting of a
garage, an elevator, a mini-transit system or a park exceed
receipts derived by Lessee from such Public Facility, to the
extent such excess shall not be included in Normal Allowances";
and
(c) The definition of Project Fee in paragraph 22 hereof
shall be stricken in its entirety.
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APPENDIX D
SYNOPSIS OF GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
On the basis of the recommendations of the Mayor's
Committee on Welfare Island (The Schmidt Committee), New
York and UDC agreed to the General Development Plan in-
corporated into the lease. The following is a brief
summary of that plan.
Housing
The new community will have approximately 5,000 units
of housing, including hospital-related housing (the total
program to be determined in consultation with the City).
The City and UDC agreed to an income mix composed of the
following: 20% of the units for persons and families eli-
gible for admission to federally assisted public housing;
10% for elderly persons and families of the same income
class; 25% for persons and families eligible under Section
236 of The National Housing Act; 20% for persons and famil-
ies eligible to occupy limited profit housing financed
under Article II of the New York State Private Housing
Finance Law; and 25% of the units for persons and families
affording fully taxpaying conventionally financed housing.
Design
The residential buildings in both North and South Towns.
(containing 60% and 40% of the dwelling units of all income
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groups respectively) are to be irregularly shaped
structures opening towards the water, approximately
twelve stories high at their highest points along
Main Street and tapering down in height as their
extensions approach the Waterfront Promenade. The
buildings are to provide community rooms and service
facilities for tenants, while open lawn areas be-
tween building extensions are to be used for re-
creation.
Commercial Space
Approximately 200,000 square feet of office space
and 100,000 square feet of retail commercial space
are to be provided. Office space and shopping are to
be concentrated in the Town Center area with additional
commercial facilities to be provided in North Town.
Open Space and Landmarks
The open space areas are to be developed to serve
not only residents of the Island, but residents of the
City as a whole. Parks are to be landscaped to enhance
existing topography and growth; Lighthouse and Southpoint
Parks at opposite ends of the Island are to offer sitting
and picnic areas at the edge of the water. (Lighthouse
Park, revolving around the old inactive beacon, consists
of three acres at the very northern tip of the Island.
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Immediately to the south of Bird S. Coler Hospital
and to the north of North Town is the approximately
twenty-five acre Octagon Park, containing the site
for the Urban Ecology Center and Octagon landmark.
Also in the North Town area is the Chapel of the Good
Shephard landmark. Separating North and South Towns
is the six acre Blackwell Park containing the Black-
well Mansion, while three additional landmarks and a
park are to be found south of Goldwater Memorial Hos-
pital at the southern tip of the Island: the main
building of the old City Hospital; the former Small-
pox Hospital the Strecker Laboratory; and the approxi-
mately ten acre Southpoint Park. That the planners
attempted to utilize all available land is evidenced
by the seven acres beneath the Queensboro Bridge des-
ignated to be developed as a Sports Park complete with
recreational areas for the Island's residents.
Circulation
The Island's open space areas are unified by a
system of pedestrian paths and walkways. A promenade
is to be built along the entire waterfront, which will
be reserved for pedestrians and cyclists and which will
also be suitable for use by emergency vehicles. Pedes-
trian streets and plazas are to have an internal walkway
system, and an efficient and economical mini-transit
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system is to be the principal means of on-island public
transportation, with residents and visitors encouraged
to leave their cars at the Motorgate plaza (accomodating
2500 carsl except when loading and unloading. Vehicular
access to the Island is only by Welfare Island Bridge,
owned and maintained by the City. The Island's roads
lead north from the Motorgate plaza to the Bird S. Coler
Hospital and Lighthouse Park, and then wind south through
the new community to Goldwater Memorial Hospital and
Southpoint Park.
Recognized as essential in assuring the general success
of the plan is the completion of the Island's subway sta-
tion which will provide inexpensive and convenient access
from Manhattan and Queens, timed to coincide with the com-
pletion of housing and office space. Other pedestrian
access will be from Queensboro Bridge passenger elevators
decending to the Sports Park.
Wherever feasible, imaginative water access to landings
on the west side of Octagon Park and in the Town Center at
Town Square and Harbor is being planned.
'Additional Public Facilities
The plan provides for a variety of public facilities.
A school system will be provided to serve approximately 2000
children of Island residents from kindergarten through the
eighth grade, and a library facility will be located in South
Town. Also to be provided are a comprehensive system of
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community facilities including community rooms, day care
centers for Island children, facilities for the elderly,
two swimming pools (one in each town) and other recrea-
tional facilities, and a fire station and police office.
Public open spaces are to be incorporated as well, in-
cluding a town square, a town harbor, a glass enclosed
shopping arcade, and parks including renovated landmarks.
Utility infrastructure includes provision for collec-
tion, treatment and disposition of liquid and solid wastes,
water, gas, telephone and electric lines.
Responsibilities of Parties
UDC is obligated by the lease to provide all of the
above public facilities with some exceptions. A new eleva-
tor to the Queensboro Bridge may be provided at UDC's dis-
cretion. An Urban Ecology Center and landmarks scheduled
for rehabilitation are to be carried forward only if non-UDC
financing can be obtained.
Except for the mini-transit system, elevator, garage
and public open spaces (UDC's responsibility to operate and
maintain), the City is to operate and/or maintain all the re-
mainder of the public facilities.
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33. Citizen' Housing and Planning Council of New York, Inc.
would receive "top-secret" draft reports, while author was
on the staff.
34. Report' of the Welfare Island Planning and Development Committee,
op.cit. pp.3-11.
35. Ibid., p.11
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Chapter IV. The City Selects a Developer
1. Report of the Welfare- Island Planning and Development
Committee ,' 'op-.'cit., p.11
2. Letter from Walter Wriston to Benno C. Schmidt, June 25,
1968.
3. Nathan, op',cit.
4. McGarrahan -op--it. Although the Mayor was to use this
approach lateTrin the proposed financing of New York City
Convention Center, it was used only as a last resort after
being unable to obtain state financing.
5. BaumbuschKops.cit.
6. Letter from Roger Starr, Executive Director, Citizens'
Housing and Planning Council of New York, Inc. to Mayor
John Lindsay, October 24, 1969.
7. McGarrahan, op'-stit.
8. Nathan, op .tcit.
9. Ibid.
10. William K. Reilly and S.J. Schulman, "The State Urban
Develqpment Corporation: New York's Innovation, "'in The
UrbanKLawyer, Summer 1969, Vol.1, No.2, p.132.
11. New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, As Amended
through June 1972, Chapter 174, Section 1, New York State
Laws of 1968.
12. Philip David, "State Development Corporation," paper delivered
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Boston Develop-
ment Strategy Seminar, Department of Urban Studies and
Plannings, March 21, 1975, p.5.
13. -Ibid., p-5.
14. Ibid., p.8.
15. Whereas the private developer often reneges on agreements with
the City with impunity, asking for additional concessions be-
yond those which were initially granted or even pulling out
entirely, UDC could be expected to keep its word more readily.
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16. Albert Walsh, President, National Realty Committee,
interviewed by author (New York, New York), July 9,
1973. The former Administrator of the City's Housing
and Development Administration confirmed: "Everyone
with any knowledge was aware that every major developer-
at one point or another had looked at Welfare Island and
that it was worthwhile only as long as there was an
entity like UDC to take a crack at it... to see if they
could come up with a proposal which looked feasible after
they spent their own money."
17. Ed Logue was the well known urban renewal and redevelop-
ment "King Midas" for whatever hs touched had seemingly
turned to gold in New Haven and Boston. Seven years in
each city had earned him the reputation of a "mover and
-shaker," someone who could successfully grab up big
chunks of federal money for cities. Lindsay, impressed
with Logue's reputation, brought him into New York City's
housing scene after his own election by appointing him to
two committees: the task force on housing and urban renewal
chaired by Charles Abrams and at the same time the task
force on housing and neighborhood improvement. His chair-
-manaship of the latter resulted in the report, Let There be
-Committment, which recommended reconstituting the housing
and planning agencies of the City into a super-Housing and
Development Administration. It turned out that Lindsay
did not get his hoped for Administrator (Ed Logue), however,
supposedly because LOgue's preconditions for the job were
deliberately impossible for Lindsay to fulfill politically.
Logue's later courtship with Nelson Rockefeller soon led to
his appointment as head of the newly formed State Urban De-
velopment Corporation, a much more powerful body than the
City Housing and Development Adminristration Lindsay had
created. (In interviews, both Adam Yarmolinsky and Andrew
Kerr independly relate that Logue made conditions for accept-
ing the job as housing chief of the City impossible for
Lindsay to politically fulfill. Logue meanwhile was
courting Rockefeller and accepted his job invitation. When
Logue called Lindsay to inform him of the job, Lindsay
abused him verbally and Logue hung up.
18. Robert Dormer, Richmond Foundation, interviewed by author
(Brooklyn, New York), August 10, 1973.
19. Letter to Edward J. Logue from John G. Burnett, September 19,
1968.
20. Ibid.
21. Jason Nathan, op.cit.
22. Jason Nathan, on cit.
23. Adam Yarmolinsky, interviewed by author (Boston,Mass.)
May 14, 1973.
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24. New York Times, March 1, 1968, p.38. Actually the response
by other mayors to UDC was favorable, New York Times of
February 29 and March 14, 1968. The mayors _of Albany,
Syracuse, Binghamton and Auburn supported UDC.
25. McGarrahan, op.cit.
26. Ibid.
27. Seth King, "Mayor Discloses Welfare Island Plan," New
York Times, February 13, 1969.
28. Draft letter from Edward Logue to Jason Nathan, February 14,
1969.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Jason Nathan, op.cit.
32. Ibid. The Elliott turndown came despite the fact that
Edwin Friedman, Senior Planner of the City Planning De-
partment, had been given the task of determining possible
development sites for the fledgling agency and produced
an internal report looking upon -UDC as a strong potential
developer for Welfare Island, among other projects, one
that could present a development plan and provide a means
for implementation.
33. A vivid example of the problems involved in having separate
city agencies for planning and development, something Logue
himself sought to remedy by recommending in Let There be
'Comittment that a superagency be created combining both.
34. Nathan, op.cit.
35. Ibid.
36. Donald Elliott, interviewed by author (New York, New York),
June 27, 1973.
37. Nathan, op.cit.
38. McGarrahan, op.cit.
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Chapter V. The Decision to Lease
1. This ground rent can be fixed absolutely or by formula,
and can be used as a guaranteed minimum sum or can be
allowed to float. The ground rent can be the only yearly
return to the lessor, or it can be supplemented by a
sharing of profits above this minimum figure.
2, Stanley L. McMichael, Long and Short Term Leaseholds in-
hlidinq-Ninety-Nine Year Leases (Cleveland, Ohio: Stanley
McMichael Publishing Co., 1925) pp.ll5 -1 2 5 .
3. The lessor assumes the least risk having first claim upon
the income of the lessee's improvements ahead of the lessee s
lender (except where there is subordination). The knowledge
and security that if default occurs foreclosure will provide
the lessor with control of the improvements,allows the
lessor to receive a ground rent rate below that of the mort-
gage interest rate.
4. In some subdivisions the developer provides the infrastruc-
ture which is later deeded over to the municipality.
5. Charles Abrams, Man's Stuggle in an Urbanizing World
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), p. 2 6 .
6. The high value of the development, however, makes it pro-
hibitively expensive to condemn and redevelop the premises
in the future. This can be seen as an asset, preventing
the elimination of much needed housing, although at the
same time preventing an increase in the density of whatever
open spaces remain,if such an increase was felt to be desirable
By the City. The City, however, retains a very valuable
asset, the full value of the development, including the
addition of a subway stop that immeasurably increases the
value of any land in New York City.
7. That plan, an outgrowth of the Mayor's Committee on Welfare
Island headed by Benno C. Schmidt, is the basic Philip
Johnson plan.
8. It is this type of flexibility under leasing that makes it
so advantageous to both parties, with major decisions depend-
ent upon mutual agreement.
9. The ability of the lessor to force development depends on the
incentive to proceed, or disincentive to stop. Where the de-
veloper owns the land outright, he could decide not to pro-
ceed, or to stop if financing or other development problems
were unresolvable. If development conditions are poor, it
is doubtful that leasing would change the end result; it may
in fact facilitate termination. Even in a sale, if the de-
veloper had not bought land outright but had only optioned it
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or bought contingently, he could conceivably drop the
entire development if circumstances warranted.
10. Jason Nathan,'-op.it.
11. This is the case along Vanderbilt Avenue where the
success of the Biltmore Hotel and other buildings along
Park Avenue .are certainly not a reflection upon the
landowner, the old New York Central Railroad and its
successor, the bankrupt Penn-Central.
12. Other projects, for these reasons, were handled simil-
arly, including Battery Park City, United Nations De-
velopment Corporation and Waterside.
13. New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, As
Amended through June 1972, Chapter 174, Section 1 Laws
of 1968. Section 14 (2): Section 14(2): Notwithstanding
the provisions of any general, special or local law or
chapter, any municipality, by resolution of its local
governing body, is hereby empowered without referendum,
public auction, sealed bids or public notice, to sell,
lease for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years, grant
or convey to the corporation any real property owned by
it which the corporation shall certify to be necessary
or convenient for its corporate purposes. Any such sale,
lease, grant or conveyance shall be made with or without
consideration and upon such terms and conditions as may
be agreed upon by such municipality and the corporation.
Certification shall be evidenced by a formal request from
the president of the corporation. Before any such sale,
lease, grant or conveyance may be made to the corporation,
a public hearing shall be held by the local governing body
to consider the same. Notice of such hearing shall be
published at least ten days before the date set for the
hearing in such publication and in such manner as may be
designated by the local governing body.
14. Tnternal Revenue Code (Chicago,-Illinois: Commerce Clearing
House, Inc., February 1970), Sections 167 and 178. Tax
treatment under the Code allows an expense deduction called
depreciation (confined to the property's useful life) for
the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of property
'utilized in a trade or a business, or for property held in
the production of income. Land is considered non-depreciable,
and an expense allowance for the cost basis of land is not
permitted.
15. UDC negotiates with a developer to form a limited partner-
ship housing company through which tax benefits flow to the
investors.
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16. Amortization is that part of the mortgage debt service
under a purchase that repays principle; and under the
Internal Revenue Code it is considered a non-deductible
expense. Although the funds which are received and used
to repay debt (amortization) more significantly reduce
the cash flow, they are nevertheless considered as income
to the owner and as such are taxable (representing an
actual cash outflow). A lease ground rent payment on the
other hand is a deductible expense.
17. Control is illustrated by the following case: When Webb &
Knapp sold the Union Carbide building on Park Avenue for
$17 million, the New York Central received nothing al-
though it owned the land underneath, the fee.Webb & Knapp
as the lessee controlled the property.
18. The City as lessor can also reduce risk in the area of
property tax (although this aspect is not applicable to
UDCY. The City and the developer can agree together upon
property tax payments, usually setting them at a fixed
percentage of gross revenue rather than basing them upon
the property tax rate and assessed valuations as is so
often legally required. The property tax issue has been a
particularly thorny one for most developers, and the lack
of an agreement with the City has created cash flow prob-
lems for many and a lack of confidence in proceeding with
projects (especially in the inner City). The lease form-
alizes the tax agreement in a binding manner and thus
offers the developer and his lender far more assurance
than does a non-enforcable oral or non-legal written pro-
mise (that has been the traditional method in some cities
such as Boston).
19. In the case of Welfare Island, UDC had already obtained a
committment from the City that it would assume the major
obligation of agreeing to provide a subway link from the
Island to Manhattan, clearly a responsibility upon which
the entire development hinged. Thus, the City reduced the
development risk to UDC by taking responsibility for comp-
letion of this vital transit link.
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Chapter VI. Prelude to the Lease: The Memorandum of
Understanding
1. Memorandum from Stephen Lefkowitz to Robert Litke
Cinternal memorandum of New York State Urban Develop-
inent Corporation), March 19, 1969.
2. General Memorandum of Understanding between the City
of, New York and the New York State Urban Development
Corporation, April 17, 1969.
3. Basically the City was providing UDC with the old urban
renewal package--a cleared site, a detailed program
and government approvals.
4. McGarrahan, op.cit.
5. Welfare rsland Memorandum of Understanding between the
City of New' York and the New York State Urban Develop-
ument'-Corporation, April 18, 1969.
6. By setting these conditions, the City was establishing a
convenient mechanism that could later be used as a means
of halting the development or could alternatively be
waived allowing development to proceed.
7. Welfare-Island Memorandum of Understanding, op.cit.
8. Joint Press Release by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
and Mayor John V. Lindsay, for release Wednesday, May 21,
1969. During this joint City/State press conference
attended by Governor Rockefeller and Mayor Lindsay,
Ed Logue declared, "We have carefully selected talented
architects to design these projects.. .we expect to make
significant contributions to urban design and environ-
mental planning because there is no reason why lower in-
come housing cannot be built to the highest standards of
appearance. We must provide the kind of decent housing
so sorely needed in our cities, without ugliness."
9. Memorandum from Deputy Mayor Robert Sweet to John McGarrahan,
the Mayor's Housing Aid, April 14, 1969.
10. Ibi'd .
11. Memorandum from Deputy Mayor Robert Sweet to John McGarrahan,
May 2, 1969.
12. Ibid.
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13. Joint Press Release, op. cit.
14. Joint Press Release,' op. cit.
15. Joint Press Release, op. cit.
16. Joint Press Release, op. cit.
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Chapter VII. The Lease
1. Stargey L. McMichael, Long and Short Term Leaseholds
including Ninety-Nine Year Leases, (Cleveland, Ohio:
Stanley McMichael Publishing, 1925), p. 1 2 .
2. Tbid. The American long term building lease differed
from earlier leases in that the tenant was obligated
to improve the property by erecting a specified type
of structure within a stipulated period of time.
3. A lease as long and complex as this one is no easy docu-
ment to assimilate. A UDC negotiator's comment to his
colleague regarding the lease provisions perhaps sums
it up best, "Should you find them less than lucid, you
will join Dr. Kristof, who asked to have them translated
into English, and Mr. Lefkowitz, who took an aspirin."
4. Letter from Paul Byard, UDC Attorney to William P. Clark
of Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates,, Attorneys, July 28,
1969.
5. Stanly L. McMichael and Paul T. O'Keefe, Leases, Per-
centages\ Short and Long Term (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1959), pp.1-10. Leases for a period of
twenty-one years or more are considered to be long term
leases; short term leases run from one through twenty years.
6. Ibid.
7. New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, As Amended
through June, 1972, Chapter 174, Section I Laws of 1968,
Section 14(2)
8. Stanley L. McMichael, op.cit. One of the most commonly
used forms for long term leasing is the 99 year lease,
however, its significance is unclear. Matthew Beacon in
A Treati's'eon'-Leases and Terms' for Years (1798), explained
that the 99 year period represented three lives, while
others have hypothesized that an English common law pre-
vented a lessor from granting a lease of 100 years and
that 99 years was the maximum term possible. See Harold B.
Wahl, "Why a 99 year Lease?",29Florida Bar Journal, 548, 1955.
One lawyer recently concluded that there is no legal reason
fo± selecting 99 years in preference to an even century,
but that one justification for its popularity is that it
coincided roughly with the economic life expectancy of two
buildings. Currently it is felt however, that 99 years is
sufficient time even for the most convervative of lenders
to finance a lessee's project. Waterside's developer,
Richard Ravitch, could not receive conventional mortgage
financing without the assurance of a 99 year lease from the
City. (Although once the City agreed to and was able to
finance the development itself, the lease term was lowered
to sixty years; as a lessor it had no need of extra time to
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protect its own lender's interest and desired control
and full value.
9. Lease between the City of New York, lessor, the New York
State Urban Development Corporation, lessee, and the
Welfare Island Development Corporation, subsidiary,
December 23, 1969 (herinafter referred to as the Welfare'
Island Lease). In schedule 1 of the lease the term "more
or less" is frequently used.
10. Letter from Paul Byard, op.cit.
11. Letter from Paul Byard to William P. Clark, August 13, 1969.
12. Lease between the City of New York as Lessor and Battery
Park City-Authority as Lessee, November 24, 1969.
13. Lease between the City of New York and United Nations De-
velopment Corporation, August 1, 1972.
14. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. p.l.
15. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. paragraph 22. As defined by
the lease an improvement is any building,structure,
utility, roadway, street, park, public facility, sidewalk,
landscaping, side improvement, development and other better-
ment to be provided by or caused to be provided by the
Lessee pursuant to the General Development Plan.
16. Shirley Siegel, former General Counsel of the Housing and
Development Administration of the City of New York, inter-
viewed by author (New York, New Yorkl, July 11, 1972.
17. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 22. As defined by
the lease, enforced delay is any delay in the performance
of the obligations of the Lessee, Subsidiary, sublessees
or their sublessees by reason of act of God or the public
enemy of the United States of America, the State of New York
or the Lessor, the laws, rules, regulations or orders of
such political jurisdictions, judicial or other legal pro-
ceedings, fires, floods, epidemics or similar afflictions,
strike, labor disputes, freight embargoes, weather of unu-
sual severity and delay by Lessor in the performance of
its obligations hereunder, including without limitation,
demolition, relocation or appropriation of such sums re-
quired for the purchase or lease of any school or appurten-
ance.
18. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. paragraph 2.
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19. Walsh, opi.cit. According to Albert Walsh, now President
of the National Realty Committee and formerly City Ad-
ministrator of Housing and Development, "A long planning
period was chosen to give UDC a crack at it, to see if
they could come up with a proposal which looked feasible
to them to encourage them to spend their own money."
20. Letter from Paul Byard to William Clark, July 28, 1969,
op.cit.
21. General Memorandum of Understanding, op.cit. p.2
22. McGarrahan, op.cit.
23. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue
Robert E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, August 1, 1969.
24. Letter from Edward J. Logue to Jason Nathan, August 4, 1969.
25. McGarrahan, op.cit.
26. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. paragraph 3.
27. Siegel, op.cit.
28. Letter from Paul Byard to William Clark, July 28, 1969,
op.cit.
29. General Memorandum of Understanding, op.cit., p.7
30. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. paragraph 3.
31. Welfare Island Memorandum of Understanding op.cit. p.4.
32. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit.
33. Ibid.
34. Shirley Siegal, former General Counsel of the Housing and
Development Administration, interviewed by author (New York,
New York), June 27, 1973. Shirley Siegal, one of the City
lease negotiators, joined others claiming that UDC was en-
croaching upon City powers and criticized the handling of
the public facilities provision: "The matter of the rela-
tionship between UDC and the City on the design and use of
the public facilities in the project, is an area that has
ended up not being taken care of in an ideal way, to put
it mildly."
35. Letter from Paul Byard to William Clark, July 28, 1969,
op.cit. Byard agreed on the matter of standards, "...that
we (UDC1 would design the public facilities to equal or
exceed the minimum standards of the relevant department."
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36. Stanley L. McMichael, op.cit. p.12
37. Ibid., pp. 92-104
38. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue,
Robert E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, op.cit.
39. McGarrahan, op.cit.
40. Stanley L. McMichael, op.cit.,pp.115-125
41. Letter from Paul S. Byard to Jason Nathan, September 8,
1969. Also, Max Kargman, President of First Realty Co.
of Boston, often told the author that this was the best
reason for a progressive income tax.
42. New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, as
amended through June, 1972, Chapter 174, Section 1 Laws
of 1968, Section 22.
43. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue,
Robert E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, August 20,1969.
44. Ibid. In determining their positions, both parties had to
estimate projected rent levels that would yield estimated
tax revenues for the City. UDC was concerned that the City
would overestimate rent revenues and expect more taxes than
were realistic given even optimistic market projections.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue,
Robert E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, op.cit.
August 1, 1969.
49. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit.,paragraph 4.
50. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph22.
51. We-fare Island L-ease- op.cit., paragraph 4.
52. Ibid., paragraph 5.
53. Ibid., paragraph 22.
54. Ibid.
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55. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue,
Robert E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, August 28, 1969.
56. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue,
Robert E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, July 18, 1969.
57. Frank Kristof, interviewed by author, (few York, New York),
June 15, 1973.
58. Paul Anderson, financial econmist, Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, telephone interview with author, (Boston, Mass.),
November 20, 1973.
59. New York State Urban Development Corporation Official
Statement for 1972 Series A General Purpose Bonds, July 25,
1972, p. 3
60. New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, op.cit.,
section 22.
61. New York State Urban Development Corporation Annual Report,
1971, p. 8 .
62. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue, Robert
E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, op.cit., August 20,1969
63. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. paragraph 22, p. 2 6.
64. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. paragraph 5.
65. Ibid., paragraph 22.
66. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit. paragraph 22, p. 2 7
67. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue, Robert
E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, op.cit., July 18, 1969.
68. While only UDC financed housing benefited by the thirty
year tax freeze, all the revenue producing elements (UDC
and non-UDC financed) received a forty year rent freeze.
69. Letter from Paul S. Byard to Samuel Ratensky, Assistant
Administrator of the Housing and Development Administra-
tion of the City of New York, August 19, 1969.
70. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 22, p. 2 7 .
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71. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to Edward J. Logue,
Robert E. McCabe and Stephen A. Lefkowitz, op.cit.,
July 18, 1975. Included "Rough Estimates of Land
Rent 7/7/69" by Frank Kristof.
72. Memorandum from Frank S. Kristof to E. Logue, R. McCabe,
S. Lefkowitz and J. Nathan, September 10, 1969 (re-
vised, September 26, 1969).
73. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 22, p. 26,
74. Ibid.,p.27
75. Memorandum from Frank Kristof to E. Logue, R. McCabe,
S. Lefkowitz, September 10, 1969 (Revised September
26, 1969 ),
76. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to E. Logue, R. McCabe,
S. Lefkowitz, July 18, 1975. Frank Kristof 7/7/69
Rough Estimates of Land Rent.
77. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 22, p.26.
78. Letter from Paul S. Byard to William P.Clark, July 28,1969.
79. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 22, pp.23-24.
80. Walsh, op.cit.
81. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to E. Logue, September 2, 19694
82. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit.,paragraph 22, pp.24-25.
83. McGarrahan, op.cit.
84. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 4(b), p. 6 .
85. Ibid., paragraph 22, pp.22-23.
86. Siegel, op.cit.
87. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit.,paragraph 27, p.30.
88. Seneca B. Anderson, "Mortgagee Looks at Ground Leases,"
10 University of Florida Law Review, 1 Spring 1957, in
Commercial Real Estate Leases, 5th ed., (New York:
Practicing Law Institute, June 1974) pp.155-180.
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89. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to E. Logue, R. McCabe,
and S. Lefkowitz, op.cit., August 20, 1969.
90. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to E. Logue, September 2,
1969.
91. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 14, p. 1 5 .
92. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to E. Logue, op.cit.
September 2, 1969.
93. Memorandum from Paul S. Byard to E. Logue, R. McCabe and
S. Lefkowitz, op.cit., August 20, 1969.
94. Welfare Island Lease, op.cit., paragraph 14, p. 1 6 .
95. Ibid., p. 17.
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Appendix A. Historical Background
1. Philip Johnson and John Burgee, The Island Nobody Knows
(New York: N.Y. Urban Development Corporation, October,
1969), p.l.
2. Edwin Friedman, Welfare Island-A Comprehensive Program,
(New York: New York City Planning Commission, May 1965),
p.12.
3. Frederick W. Richmond and Victor Gruen, East Island,
(New York: East Island Development Corporation, undated
proposal) circa 1961, p. 4 .
4. Elizabeth Barlow, "A Mini-City buds on New York's
Island of Despair," Smithsonian, Vol. 1, No.11,
February 1971, p.58.
5. Ibid., p.59.
6. Richmond and Gruen, op.cit. p.4.
7. Ibid.
8. New York City Department of Hospitals, "History of City
Hospital," (New York City Department of Hospitals Public
Relations Department, undated), p.2.
9. Frances FitzGerald, "Welfare Island: East River Loser,"
in New York Magazine of the New York Herald Tribune, May 16,
1965, p. 9 .
10. Charles Dickens, American Notes, 1842. (Greenwich,Conn.:
Fawcett Publications, 1961), p. 1 6 .
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Barlow, op.cit., p.59.
14. Report of the Welfare Island Planning and Development
Committee submitted to Mayor John V. Lindsay, February
1969, p. 1 8 .
15. Richmond and Gruen, op.cit., p. 4 .
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16. FitzGerald, op.cit., p.9. Mae West was sentenced to ten
days in 1927 for her "indecent performance" in a play
called Sex. What she resented most was exchanging her
skinfitting gold gown for prison-issue dress and itchy
underwear. The warden let her wear her own.
17. Report of the Welfare Island Planning and Development
Committee, op.cit., p.18.
18. New York City Department of Hospitals, "History of the
Metropolitan Hospital" (New York City Department of
Hospitals Public Relations Department, undated), p.5.
19. Report of the Welfare Island Planning and Development
Committee, op.cit.,p.18.
20. FitzGerald, op.cit., p.9.
21. Richmond and Gruen, op.cit., p.14.
22. New York City Department of Hospitals Newspaper Release.
(New York City Department of Hospitals Public Relations
Department, June 18, 1952), p. 2 .
23. Dickens, op.cit.,p.18.
24. New York City Department of Hospitals Newspaper Release,
op.cit., p.l.
25. Barlow, op.cit., p.61.
26. Ibid., p.62.
27. New York City Department of Hospitals Newspaper Release,
op.cit., p. 3 .
28. Giorgio Cavaglieri, Protection of Landmark Buildings-
Welfare Island, New York City. (New York, March 15, 19701,
p.4.
29. Ibid., p.4.
30. Ibid., p.2.
31. Dickens, op.cit., p.16.
32. FitzGerald, op.cit., p.9.
33. Barlow, op.cit., p.62.
34. New York City Department of Hospitals, "History of City
Hospital", op.cit., p.l.
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35. New York City Department of Hospitals, "Hospital Tour
of Welfare Island Wednesday Afternoon, August 20, 1947,"
New York City Department of Hospitals, August 20, 1947, p. 2 .
36. Report of the Welfare Island Planning and Development
Committee, op.cit., p.29.
37. Cavaglieri, op cit., p.2.
38. New York City Department of Hospitals, "History of the
Metropolitan Hospital," op.cit., pp.4-5.
39. Ibid., p.5.
40. Elizabeth Barlow, op.cit., p.61.
" ..where a lighthouse now stands there was
a curious structure known as Maxey's Fort.
It was built of blocks of clay and grass
dug from the Marsh behind it.- According
to accounts of the day it was built soon
after the Civil War by a mad Irish Army
officer, Thomas Maxey, and mounted with
wooden cannon. Maxey, fearing an invasion
by rebel privateers, would stand guard each
day brandishing a wood bayonet on a broom
handle. He was, in spite of his warrior-
like attitude a gentle person, extremely
fond of birds. An elaborate gate decorated
the causeway that led over the salt mars:h to
the Fort, it had two large openings near- the
top designed by Maxey to accomodate the nests
of wild geese. Inscribed upon it were these
words:
I invite the fowls
And the birds of the air
to enter..."
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